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I. INTRODUCTION
The inequitable distribution of environmental hazards and locally
unwanted land uses (LULUs) by race and class in the United States has
received much study, reaction, and opposition. Varying, and sometimes
competing, conceptions of environmental justice as an empirical, politi-
cal, legal, environmental, and economic issue have emerged. However,
little attention has been devoted to the use of local land use planning and
regulation as an environmental justice strategy! This lack of attention
ignores the inequitable distribution of land use regulatory patterns ac-
cording to the racial and socioeconomic composition of neighborhoods.
This article documents the disproportionately higher amount of industrial
and other non-residential land uses in census tracts where low-income
people of color live, based on a study of thirty-one census tracts in seven
cities nationwide. In addition, empirical evidence shows that environ-
mental justice advocates are beginning to move from reactive strate-
gies-essentially an "opposition" model of environmental justice-to
proactive planning and participation in policymaking. In this new land
use planning model of environmental justice, residents of minority and
low-income neighborhoods identify not only the activities they wish to
exclude from their neighborhoods, but also their visions for what they
wish to include in their neighborhoods; in other words, their visions of
the public good. A variety of land use regulatory tools implement the
land use goals of low-income and minority communities. The tools in-
clude changes to comprehensive plans, amendments to zoning codes and
maps, and the use of sophisticated, specialized, and flexible zoning tech-
!. Only five scholars have devoted any attention to land use planming or regulation as an
environmental justice strategy. See Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning
Approach to Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVrL. J. 495, 537-38 (1992) (calling for commu-
nity-based environmental planning); Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Eqplicating a
Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 740-44
(1993) (articulating a theory of a litigation-enforced constitutional and statutory right to protective
zoning for low-income communities of color); Yale Rabin, Eusive Zoning: The Inequitable Leg-
acy of Euclid, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 101 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden
eds., 1990) (using case studies to show that cities zone low-income communities of color for inten-
sive land uses, i.e., expulsive zoning); Jim Schwab, Land-Use Planning and Environmental Justice,
ENV'T & DEV. (Am. Planning Ass'n, Chicago, ill.), July 1995, at I (describing environmental justice
issues and merely identifying the need for local environmental and land use planning); Robert Sit-
kowski, Commercial Hazardous Waste Projects in Indian Country: An Opportunity for Tribal Eco-
nomic Development Through Land Use Planning, 10 J. LAND USE & ENV1L. L 239, 242-70 (1995)
(describing models of land use plaming to address hazardous waste projects in Indian country). No
one, however, has done a systematic quantitative comparison between zoning patterns in low-
income, high-minority neighborhoods and zoning patterns in high-income, low-minority neighbor-
hoods. In addition, authors have failed to define either specifics of a land use planning model that
will promote environmental justice or concrete and comprehensive land use regulatory mechanisms
that low-income and minority communities can use to seek their goals. For a well-described, proac-
tive planning approach to environmental permitting and administrative decision making at the fed-
eral level, see Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB.
U. 431,456-59 (1994).
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niques like performance zoning, overlay zoning, conditional use permits,
special districts, negotiated zoning, and exactions.
The land use planning model of environmental justice is represented
by a movie: The Milagro Beanfield War.2 Directed and produced by
Robert Redfordand starring Sonia Braga, Chick Vennera, and Panama-
nian singer and politician Ruben Blades, The Milagro Beanfield War is
the story of a small, dying, Hispanic town in New Mexico. The movie's
connection to environmental justice is often ignored. The town stops a
major resort development--an unwanted land use that will harm the local
community and environment-when Joe Mondragon plants a beanfield
and diverts water from the development to the beanfield. As Joe's bean-
field comes to life, so does the local community. Only with alternative
plans for the use of the land and local natural resources does the town of
Milagro prevent the developer's LULU.
The Milagro Beanfield War explores many classic themes of envi-
ronmental justice. Powerful outside interests control and finance the
large development, which is supported by politicians from the Governor
to the Mayor. The proposed project not only threatens the environment
by using scarce water and destroying trees and natural landscape, but
also threatens to destroy the local community. The promise of jobs is
unmasked; instead of prospering, local residents would wait tables, clean
rooms, repair cars, and perform other low-wage service jobs for the
wealthy outside vacationers. The developer would buy the local property
at cheap prices. So-called economic vitality would bring death to the
town of Milagro and its way of life. Racism among the developers, poli-
ticians, and federal and state law enforcement officials runs rampant.
Some local Hispanics have been co-opted with economic and political
incentives. There are two armed stand-offs, one between the locals and
the U.S. Forest Service officials; the other between the locals and the
state police. The heroes are an unemployed rebel (Joe Mondragon, who
plants the beanfield), a Latina community activist and car mechanic, a
local Anglo progressive lawyer who is enticed to abandon his self-
serving cynicism, a sheriff, and a crazy old man (or is he really that crazy
after all?) who talks with saints and a dead friend. Longstanding personal
conflicts and local quirks are initial obstacles to united community or-
ganizing. Milagro's victory comes not from litigation to stop the devel-
opment, but from community activism led by members of the commu-
nity. Magic abounds, and miracles occur.
Environmental justice is about the growing awareness of, and re-
sponse to, the distributional inequities of environmental and land use
policy in the United States. In the 1980s and 1990s, grassroots commu-
2. THE MILAGRO BEANFIELD WAR (Universal City Studios, Inc. 1988) (adapted from JOHN
TREADWELL NICHOLs, THE MILAGRO BEANFIEiD WAR (1985)). Milagro means "miracle."
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nity organizers and civil rights activists,' civil rights lawyers,' govern-
ment agencies,' legal scholars.' and other academics7 began to study and
3. See generally CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS
9 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993) [hereinaftr CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM] (addressing
aspects of environmental racism and racial prejudice); UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR at xvii-xix (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994) [hereinafter
UNEQUAL PROTECTION] (analyzing history of environmental racism and grassroots coalitions);
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMASSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, Toxic WASTES AND RACE A
NATIONAL REPO/r ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES
WTt HAzARous WASTE SITES at xv (1987) [hereinafter UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST REPORT]
(concluding that race was a factor in location of hazardous waste facilities in the United States).
4. See generally Luke W. Cole, Empowerment As the Key to Environmental Protection: The
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 621 (1992) [hereinafter Cole,
Empowerment] (examining -environmental poverty law' in the context of lawyering for social
change and social justice"); Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in
David's Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L3. 523 (1994) [hereinafter Cole, Litigation] (proposing litigation
strategies for environmental justice cases).
5. See generally FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY AND JUSTICE COMMISSION, FINAL
REPORT (1997) [hereinafter FLORIDA REPORT] (studying and compiling information implicating
environmental justice concerns in Florida); U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL
EQUITY: REDUCING RISKS FOR ALL COMMUNITIES (1992) [hereinafter EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL
EQUITY] (reviewing data on distribution of environmental exposures and risk across population
groups); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND
THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES
(1983) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (describing racial and economic characteristics of communities
near hazardous waste landfills in southeastern states); Rodger C. Field, Siting Justice and the Envi-
ronmental Laws, 16 N. ILL. U. L REV. 639 (1996) (considering the effects of environmental justice
on industrial development); Historic Environmental Racism Task Force Submits Recommendations,
TEX. NAT. RESOURCES REP., Aug. 25,1993, at 7.
6. See generally KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE:
READINGS AND COMMENTARY ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1995) (asserting that an
environmental lawyer's role is to guard the environment and to serve justice); Regina Austin &
Michael Schill, Black Brown, Poor & Poisroned: Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the
Quest for Eco-Justice, I KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69 (1991) (addressing aspects of the environ-
mental justice problem); Vicki Been, Analyzing Evidence of Environmental Justice, 1 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L 1 (1995) [hereinafter Been, Analyzing Evidence] (highlighting methodological issues
researchers need to address); Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the
Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1997)
[hereinafter Been & Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance] (studying demographics of host communities);
Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or
Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE LJ. 1383 (1994) [hereinafter Been, LULUs] (examining gaps in
research of how sites affect socioeconomic characteristics of communities); Vicki Been, What's
Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses,
78 CORNELL L REV. 1001 (1993) [hereinafter Been, Fairness] (discussing difficulties in concept of
fair siting programs); Denis Binder, Index of Environmental Justice Cases, 27 URB. LAW. 163
(1995) (providing an index of environmental justice cases); Robert W. Collin, Review of the Legal
Literature on Environmental Racism, Environmental Equity, and Environmental Justice, 9 J. ENVTT.
L. & LmG. 121 (1994) (providing overview of legal literature); James H. Colopy, The Road Less
Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title Vi of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13
STAN. ENVTL. J. 125 (1994) (exploring use of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act to protect commu-
nities from environmental racism); Dubin, supra note I (articulating a theory of a litigation enforced,
constitutional and statutory right to protective zoning for low-income communities of color); Pamela
Duncan, Environmental Racism: Recognition, Litigation, and Alleviation, 6 TUL. ENVT LJ. 317
(1993) (suggesting means for abolishing environmental racism); Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters:
The Quest for Environmental Justice, 20 ECOLOGY LQ. 721 (1993) (arguing that civil rights propo-
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nents should utilize environmental law framework to combat environmental racism); Eileen (auna,
Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the Road to Environmental
Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1995) (examining problems faced by low-income and minority com-
munities when bringing citizen suits under complex environmental statutes); Stephen M. Johnson,
The Brownfields Action Agenda: A Model for Future FederallState Cooperation in the Quest for
Environmental Justice?, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 85 (1996) (addressing whether the problem of
environmental justice should be addressed by federal or state govemment); Richard J. Lazarus,
Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw.
U. L. REv. 787 (1994) (offering a distributional perspective on environmental protection laws and
policies); Charles P. Lord & William A. Shutkin, Environmental Justice and the Use of History, 22
B.C. ENVTL AFr. L. REV. 1 (1994) (using historical analysis to explore two recent environmental
justice cases that perpetuated the problem); Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discrimi-
natory Siting: Risk-Based Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. LJ. 329 (1995)
(disagreeing with the assertion that disparate impact is necessarily attributable to discrimination);
Olga L. Moya, Adopting an Environmental Justice Ethic, 5 DiCK. J. ENvTL. L & POL'Y 215 (1996)
(examining moral and ethical responsibility of environmental lawyers); Peter K. Reich, Greening the
Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 271 (1992) (stating
that theories of equality, access to decision making, and community preservation offer recourse for
harm to racial minorities); Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, If Your Grandfather Could Pollute, So Can
You: Environmental "Grandfather Clauses" and Their Role in Environmental Inequity, 45 CATH. U.
L. REV. 131 (1995) (arguing that environmental advocates should seek to minimize protections
given to facilities by grandfather clauses); Symposium, Environmental Justice: A Growing Union,
96 W. VA. L. REV. 1015 (1994) (commenting that law professors play an important role by teaching
about environmental racism); Symposium, Race, Class, and Environmental Regulation, 63 U. COLO.
L. REV. 839 (1992) (identifying and discussing causes of environmental injustice); Symposium,
Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM L J. 425 (1994) (identifying and discussing causes of
environmental injustice); Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 394 (1991) (noting that racial minorities bear unequal burden of hazardous waste disposal).
7. See generally BRETT BADEN & DON COURSEY, THE LOCALITY OF WASTE SITES WrHIN
THE CITY OF CHICAGO: A DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Irving B. Harris
Graduate School of Pub. Policy Studies, Univ. of Chicago Working Paper Series 97-2, 1997) (ex-
ploring factors that explain the location of environmental waste sites in Chicago); ROBERT D.
BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990) (hereinaftr
BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE] (positing that black communities are targeted for sites due to eco-
nomic and political vulnerability); CONRON71NG ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 3 (ad-
dressing environmental racism and racial prejudice); ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICIES,
AND SOLUTIONS (Bunyan Bryant ed., 1995) (describing issues and policies of environmental jus-
tice); RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE (Bunyan
Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) [hereinafter RACE AND INCIDENE] (describing changes in com-
munity resistance since the United Church of Christ Report); ANDREW SZAsZ, ECOpoPULISM:
TOXIC WASTE AND THE MOVEMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1994) (addressing the history
of toxic waste); Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Equity: Examining the Evidence of Environmental
Racism, 2 LAND USE FORUM 6 (1993) [hereinafter Bullard, Environmental Equity] (examining
patterns of discrimination in siting decisions); Robert D. Bullard, Race and Environmental Justice in
the United States, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 319 (1993) [hereinafter Bullard, Race and Environmental
Justice] (focusing on connection between institutional racism and ecological disparities); Robert D.
Bullard, Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, 53 SOC. INQUIRY 273 (1983) [herein-
after Bullard, Solid Waste]; Terence J. Centner et al., Environmental Justice and Toxic Releases:
Establishing Evidence of Discriminatory Effect Based on Race and Not Income, 3 WIS. ENVTL. Li.
119 (1996) (revealing confusion about environmental problems faced by minorities); Thomas Lam-
bert & Christopher Boemer, Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14
YALE J. ON REG. 195 (1997) (noting that environmental justice studies have not taken housing
markets into account); Kathryn R. Mahaffey et al., National Estimates of Blood Lead Levels, United
States, 1976-1980, 307 NEW ENG. J. MED 573, 578 (1982) (finding that black children are exposed
to higher levels of lead than white children or adults); Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental
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demonstrate that low-income people and people of color bear a dispro-
portionately high burden of exposure to environmental hazards or un-
wanted land uses, particularly in the neighborhoods in which they live
and the environments in which they work.' Much of the attention has
focused on "environmental racism"-the discriminatory impact, and
arguably intentional discrimination, of environmental policy decisions on
people of color! The term "environmental justice," however, is used to
encompass class discrimination as well as racial discrimination,"° and
soften the divisive, emotionally charged connotation of the term "ra-
cism."" The term "environmental justice" also suggests actions that re-
spond to injustice, not merely identification of injustice." The response to
environmental justice has varied as widely as the range of conceptions
that underlie the term. 3 These responses have included litigation using
civil rights law and/or environmental law, opposition to administrative
permits, political protests, community organizing, legislative proposals,
Injustice: Weighing Race and Class As Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U.
COLO. L. REV. 921 (1992) [hereinafter Mohai & Bryant, Weighing Race & Class] (discussing recent
studies addressing the problem of race and class features in the distribution of environmental haz-
ards); Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Race, Poverty & the Distribution of Environmental Hazards:
Reviewing the Evidence, 2 RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T 3 (199111992) [hereinafter Mohai & Bryant,
Race, Poverty & Distribution] (discussing the results of studies addressing racially disproportionate
environmental hazard sitings).
8. See Carita Shanklin, Comment, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLx)GY L.Q. 333
(1997) (exploring the breadth and depth of materials on environmental justice).
9. See Austin & Schill, supra note 6. at 73; Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental
Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement, in CONFRoImNG ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM,
supra note 3, at 15, 15-22 [hereinafter Bullard, Anatomy]; Karl Grossman, The People of Color
Environmental Summit, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 3, at 272, 283-92. Civil rights leader
Benjamin Chavis coined the term "environmental racism." Poster, supra note 6, at 732; Grossman,
supra, at 278. See generally Edward Patrick Boyle, Note, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychol-
ogy of Racism, Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection
Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 937 (1993) (examining whether new understandings about racism
require a modification of equal protection analysis).
10. Cf. Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1383; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 621 (ex-
amining disproportionate burdens of pollution on low-income communities and poor people); Seth
D. Jaffe, The Market's Response to Environmental Inequity: We Have the Solution, What's the
Problem, 14 VA. ENVTL. U. 655, 658-59 (1995) (addressing how economic efficiency affects
environmental racism); Mohai & Bryant, Weighing Race & Class, supra note 7, at 921 (examining
race and class in addressing environmental justice problems associated with environmental hazard
siting).
11. See Lazanus, supra note 6, at 790; Gerald Torres, Race, Class, and Environmental Regula-
tion, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839, 839-40 (1992) (calling for sensitivity to the needs of disparate cul-
tural groups in environmental regulations).
12. See MANASTER, supra note 6, at 155. The term "environmental racism" labels the actions,
motives, and/or institutional biases of polluters and decision makers. The term "environmental
justice" focuses on the goals of low-income and minority communities and activists, even if it does
not describe the specific content of those goals. See Been, Fairness, supra note 6; see also Gauna,
supra note 6, at 7-8.
13. For a discussion of the terms "environmental racism," "environmental equity," and "envi-
ronmental justice," see MANAsTER, supra note 6, at 155; Major Willie A. Gun, From the Landfill
to the Other Side of the Tracks: Developing Empowerment Strategies to Alleviate Environmental
Injustice, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1227, 1227-28 (1996).
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an Executive Order, empirical studies, and scholarly writings." Minority
and low-income communities, like the fictional town of Milagro, N.M.,
are fighting back.
On the whole, though, the environmental justice movement and the
environmental justice literature have been reactive and remedial. It is
hardly surprising that neighborhood groups, civil rights activists, pro-
gressive lawyers, and grassroots environmentalists have responded to
decades of dumping hazards and LULUs in minority and low-income
communities with demands to stop and remedy the existing situations.
There is a continuing and pressing need to oppose current practices and
siting proposals that threaten these communities. Scholars have also
largely remained focused on environmental justice as a response to
power inequities, race and class discrimination, economic factors, and
inadequate environmental protections.
The next frontier for both the movement and the focus of environ-
mental justice scholarship, however, is land use planning by communi-
ties of color and low-income communities. Local neighborhoods can use
land use planning to articulate visions for what they want their commu-
nities to be, and negotiate land use regulations to implement these vi-
sions. In other words, they would not be merely late participants in using
existing rules to stop (or attempt to stop) current proposals for unwanted
land uses, but also pre-siting participants in developing the rules that will
determine what will and will not go in their neighborhoods. Land use
planning is prospective and proactive. It creates opportunities for resi-
dents, workers, and other members of local communities to decide and
seek what they want, not merely oppose what they do not want. The land
use planning and regulatory model, now emerging among a number of
low-income and minority communities, contributes to scholars' under-
standing of environmental justice problems. It also reflects the reality
that the law is about more than litigation, rights, courts, and jurispru-
dence. The law is about problem-solving, policy making, participation,
and regulation, all of which are part of the land use regulatory model."
14. See discussion irtra Part U.
15. Compare Dubin, supra note 1, at 779-800 (identifying statutory and constitutional rights
to protective zoning), with Torres, supra note 1, at 453-56 (recommending increased participation in
federal and state environmental regulation). For discussions of proactive, preventive approaches to
law, see Robert Blomquist, Government's Role Regarding Industrial Pollution Prevention in the
United States, 29 GA. L. REV. 349 (1995) (discussing preventionism as a cultural and policy idea
and the paradigm of pollution prevention, instead of pollution control); John J. Copelan, Jr. & Bar-
bara S. Monahan, Preventive Law: A Strategy for Local Governments in the Nineties, 44 SYRACUSE
L. Rev. 957, 957 (1993) (contrasting preventive law as a proactive approach with litigation as a
reactive approach); Stephen M. Johnson, From Reaction to Proaction: The 1990 Pollution Preven-
tion Act, 17 COLUM. J. ENV'L L 153 (1992) (discussing the proactive approach to pollution pre-
vention facilitated in part by the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990); Thomas R. Mounteer, The In-
herent Worthiness of the Struggle: The Emergence of Mandatory Pollution Prevention Planning As
[Vol. 76:1I
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Part II of this article describes five different conceptions of envi-
ronmental justice that pervade the actions of activists and the writings of
observers:'6 (A) evidentiary, (B) power, (C) legal, (D) environmental, and
(E) economic.'7 Part HI demonstrates how each of these conceptions is
largely reactive and remedial. Each is part of an opposition model of
environmental justice, i.e., focused on opposition to specific LULUs.
Part III turns attention from the distribution of specific LULUs to
the distribution of land use regulatory patterns. It contains the results of
an empirical study of zoning in thirty-one census tracts in seven cities:
Anaheim, CA; Costa Mesa, CA; Orange, CA; Pittsburgh, PA; San Anto-
nio, TX; Santa Ana, CA; and Wichita, KS. These results show that low-
income, high-minority neighborhoods contain a greater percentage of
industrial and other intensive use zones than do high-income, low-
minority neighborhoods. This new evidence, not previously documented
in the literature, suggests the need for attention to land use planning and
regulation in low-income neighborhoods of color and for additional re-
search.
Part IV introduces an alternative model of environmental justice, a
planning model built on the idea that land use plans and regulations are
needed as emerging strategies for achieving environmental justice." Part
IV describes the nature of land use planning and regulation, and how the
planning model differs from the opposition model that currently domi-
nates the environmental justice movement and literature. Case studies
an Environmental Regulatory Ethic, 19 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 251 (1994) (advocating morality-based
pollution prevention planning).
16. The "divide" between actions and writings is ambiguous and subtle, at best, and illusory,
at worst. Writing about environmental justice could be an action responding to the problem of envi-
ronmental injustice (however the writer conceives of it), a description of others' actions and reac-
tions, or both.
17. A conception of environmental justice is a way that someone thinks about---or mentally
constructs and interprets-the problem of LULUs and pollution among low-income and minority
people. See, e.g., Been, Fairness, supra note 6, at 1001-06 (describing environmental justice as an
equality movement resulting from the disproportionate siting of LULUs in low-income and minority
neighborhoods). The way that one conceives of the problem tends to influence one's response. If for
example, a scholar finds the issue to be largely a puzzle about distributional patterns, the scholar is
likely to respond by studying the patterns. Id. at 1028-40. If a community activist thinks about
environmental justice as primarily an issue of power, as opposed to an issue of legal rights or envi-
ronmental protection, the activist is likely to respond with political, as opposed to legal or regulatory,
activity. See, e.g., Austin & Schill, supra note 6, at 74-75 (describing grassroots organizations and
their efforts to combat environmental racism through political tactics based on cultural identity).
Thus, conceptions of environmental justice influence responses to environmental justice.
The five conceptions discussed here are reflected in scholarship, grassroots activity, legal
developments, public interest lawyering, and the like in varying degrees. Uneven treatment of the
five conceptions in this article merely reflects different amounts of breadth and depth needed to
describe them adequately. There is no attempt to proportionately describe which type of people
embrace the different conceptions.
18. There is no single correct way of thinking about environmental justice and no single
effective strategy for seeking it. For expansion of this concept, see infra note 533.
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provide qualitative empirical evidence" that grassroots environmental
justice advocates and low-income and minority neighborhoods are be-
ginning to develop land use plans and regulations to address the over-
concentration of intensive land use designations in their communities and
to define how they would like to see land used. The planning model, with
its opportunities and challenges, is emerging at the local level.
Part V explores the various land use regulatory mechanisms that
environmental justice advocates can use to implement their visions and
plans. These mechanisms include comprehensive planning; zoning
amendments (both text amendments and map amendments, but primarily
down-zoning); flexible zoning techniques, including conditional uses,
overlay zones and special districts, performance zoning, buffer zones,
and floating zones; and exactions. Judicial protections of private property
interests, state laws that preempt local rejection of LULUs, and the reali-
ties of local land use politics limit these tools. Nonetheless, they can be
effective when used by a politically active and "negotiation-savvy"
neighborhood group with a vision for the local community.
Although this article represents a different way of thinking about
environmental justice than the current literature and many activists de-
scribe, it does not offer any panaceas or comprehensive answers to envi-
ronmental injustice. Many communities are looking for milagros (mira-
cles). Much of the current literature about environmental justice demon-
strates that no single legal or political strategy will solve the underlying
problems. Similarly, land use planning and regulation will not solve the
multiple, complex problems behind environmental justice concerns: ra-
cism; class inequities; land market dynamics; limited natural, human, and
financial resources; the failure of humans to be good environmental
stewards; the limits of our legal and political systems; greed; envy; and
malice. Land use planning and regulation should be one of several
mechanisms we can use as we struggle to learn and embrace what is
good and right.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AS A REACTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL
INJUSTICE
The range of responses to environmental injustice in the United
Statese reflects the variety of conceptions of environmental justice, as
19. Qualitative evidence consists of facts and data that are not quantitative. This evidence may
include histories (or narratives) of specific communities' problems or legal and political struggles,
the results of in-depth interviews, and descriptions of people, groups, events, and the like. See dis-
cussion infra Parts IV.C.1-5.
20. Although environmental injustice and justice have important international dimensions, this
article concentrates solely on environmental injustice and justice in the United States. The impact of
U.S. laws and policies on U.S. communities receives more in-depth treatment here than would be
possible if the article had included the global perspective. For discussions of international environ-
mental justice issues, see Dana Alston & Nicole Brown, Global Threats to People of Color, in
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well as the complexity of the issues. This article is about the siting of
LULUs, which is a major issue in low-income and minority communi-
ties, a core focus of the environmental justice movement, and is ripe for
new ideas about harm prevention, especially through land use planning
and regulation. However, an initial background about environmental
justice, in its wide diversity and complexity, aids understanding of the
relevant land use issues.
There is confusion about the exact nature of environmental harms or
burdens that are distributed inequitably. Exposure to toxic or hazardous
substances has received the greatest attention among scholars and activ-
ists.' This exposure not only comes from neighborhood facilities, like
hazardous waste incinerators, petrochemical refineries, lead smelters,
solid waste landfills, and radioactive waste disposal sites, but also from
lead in home pipes and paint, pesticides in fields where farmworkers
work, urban automobile and stationary source emissions that pollute in-
ner city air, and fish from local waters that contain toxic pollutants.'
Others have focused on the siting of locally unwanted land uses in
low-income and minority neighborhoods. 3 The environmental justice
scholar or activist who focuses on LULUs is less concerned with evi-
dence of actual health effects or exposure to known harmful substances
than with the actual siting of land uses that pose risks either to the health
CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 3, at 179, 179-94; Harvey Alter, Halting the
Trade in Recyclable Wastes Will Hurt Developing Countries, in AT ISSUE: ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE 108 (Jonathan Petrikin ed., 1995); John Bellamy Foster, The Global Policies of the United
States Are Environmentally Unjust, in AT ISSUE: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra, at 100; Richard
D. Glick, Environmental Justice in the United States: Implications of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 69 (1995).
21. See, e.g., BULLARD, DUMPING IN DXIE, supra note 7, at 1-21; Austin & Schill, supra note
6, at 69; Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 15, 26-29 & tbl. (focusing on industrial toxins, air
pollution, and water pollution as byproducts of landfills, pollution by industry, and hazardous waste
treatment); Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 621-31; George Friedman-Jiminez, M.D., Achiev-
ing Environmental Justice: The Role of Occupational Health, 21 FORDHAM URB. Li. 605 (1994);
Marion Moses, Farmworkers and Pesticides, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra
note 3, at 161.
Hazardous substances are materials that present a threat to human health or the environment.
See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(B)(5) (1994). They are often ignitable, corrosive, chemically reactive, toxic, or
explosive. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20-.24 (1997) (providing the regulatory definition of the character-
istics of hazardous waste). Substances are toxic if low levels of exposure to them cause adverse
human health or environmental effects, including cancer, damage to the cardiovascular and respira-
tory systems, neurological disorders, and reproductive damage. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POUCY 463-64 (2d ed. 1996).
22. See sources cite supra note 21.
23. See, e.g., MANASTER, supra note 6, at 153-239-, Been, LULUs, supra note 6; Bullan,
Environmental Equity, supra note 7, at 6; Robert D. Bullard, Residential Segregation and Urban
Quality of ife, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE. ISSUES, POUCIES, AND SOLUTIONS 76-77, supra note
7 [hereinafter Bullard, Residential Segregation]; Centner et al., supra note 7, at 128-30. But see
Robertson, supra note 6, at 139 (arguing that, compared to existing sources of pollution and envi-
ronmental harm, very few new polluting facilities are sited in minority and low-income neighbor-
hoods).
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and safety of the residents or to the quality of neighborhood life.2 Thus,
while hazardous waste incinerators and toxic dumps are both LULUs and
sources of exposure to hazardous substances, an emphasis on the distri-
bution of LULUs would not include workplace exposures to toxins but
would include the siting of prisons, group homes, non-toxic but noisy or
unsightly industrial facilities, freeways, and other land uses unwanted by
the surrounding neighbors. 2
Some environmental justice activists and scholars look at the envi-
ronmental harm as the degradation or exploitation of natural resources,
such as the impact of industrial mining and timbering on Hispanic farm-
ers and ranchers in southern Colorado, the impact of water policy on
people of color,' and the limited access of low-income and minority
people to public beaches.' Others believe that any exposure to risk of
environmental harm is itself a type of harm. They reject risk management
and distribution, and instead call for the elimination of pollution alto-
gether." The final "environmental harm" that receives attention is proc-
ess-oriented: the real harm is the lack of full participation, information,
and self-determination for low-income and minority communities in en-
vironmental decision making."
To some degree, these various ideas about environmental harm are
not mutually exclusive. In fact, the First Annual People of Color Envi-
ronmental Leadership Summit's Principles of Environmental Justice
24. See, e.g., Bullard, Residential Segregation, supra note 23, at 7645.
25. See Been, Fairness, supra note 6, at 1001-06.
26. See, e.g., Devon Peia & Joseph Gallegos, Nature and Chicanos in Southern Colorado, in
CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 3, at 141 (examining the environmental,
economic, and sociological impact of strip-mining in Colorado's San LIis Valley); James Brooke, In
a Colorado Valley, Hispanic Farmers Try to Stop a Tinber Baron, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1997, at
A10 (describing the protest of a group of Hispanic Colorado residents to a proposed logging opera-
tion which potentially threatens area farmers' access to water through increased soil erosion and
earlier snow melt).
27. See, e.g., SANTOS V. GOMEz & ARLENE K. WONG, PACFIC INST. FOR STuDIES IN DEv.,
ENV'T, & SEC., OUR WATER, OuR FUTuRE: TiE NEED FOR NEw VOICES IN CALIFORNIA WATER
POUCY I (Working Paper No. 97-02, 1997) (commissioned by EDGE: The Alliance of Ethnic and
Environmental Organizations) (discussing concerns of people of color with respect to California
water rights).
28. See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Movement of the
1970s in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719,
745-47,811-12 (1996).
29. See, e.g., SZASZ, supra note 7, at 137; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 644; First
Nat'l People of Color Envtl. Justice Leadership Summit, Principles of Environmental Justice, RAC
POVERTY, & ENV'T, Fall 1991, at 31-32 [hereinafter People of Color, Principles of Environmental
Justice]; Gauna, supra note 6, at 27.
30. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 18-19, Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 628,
646, 674-79; Gauna, supra note 6, at 27-29; People of Color, Principles of Environmental Justice,
supra note 29, at 31; Reich, supra note 6, at 277. But see Naikang Tsao, Ameliorating Racism: A
Citizen's Guide to Combating the Discriminatory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L REV.
366, 368-78 (criticizing process-oriented approaches to addressing environmental injustice).
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contains all of them.3 ' However, those who speak and write about envi-
ronmental justice should be scrupulously clear about what problems they
are discussing. Indiscriminate inclusiveness tends to confuse the dis-
course, with different people talking about different problems under the
overly-broad truism that societal racism and classism result in many
harms to minorities and the poor. More importantly, the same response
may not be appropriate for different types of harms. For example,
changes in landfill siting processes to involve potentially affected neigh-
borhoods will do little to affect the impact of existing landfills on the
neighborhoods in which they exist." Pollution prevention strategies will
not necessarily resolve over-exploitation of natural resources harming
low-income communities or communities of color. Therefore, although
many types of environmental harms deserve attention, this article focuses
on the siting of LULUs. Many of the controversies receiving the most
attention from activists, media, government, and scholars concern pro-
posed new or modified toxic land uses in close proximity to the homes of
people of color and low-income people.
There is also confusion about what the environmental justice
movement is trying to achieve. Environmental justice has elements of
both environmentalism and civil rights. Merely labeling the environ-
mental justice movement as the juncture of grassroots environmentalism
and the civil rights movement, however, reveals very little about the
goals and strategies of environmental justice advocates. With respect to
the definition of goals, noted environmental justice scholar Vicki Been
has pointed out that valence terms like "fairness" are vague and general.'
Behind calls for "fairness," "justice," and "equity" are divergent concep-
tions about what is fair, just, and equitable." Furthermore, some in the
environmental justice movement have argued not for fairness in the dis-
tribution of environmental harms, but for the elimination of the risk of
environmental harm for all people-a universal human right to live,
work, and play in communities without exposure to environmental
31. People of Color, Principles of Environmental Justice, supra note 29, at 32; see Omar
Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need for a Disparate Impact Test and
Improved Notice Requirements in Facility Siting Decisions, 19 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 211, 216-17
(1994) (discussing the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit).
32. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 6, at 158 (arguing that existing sources of pollution am
often exempted from tougher new environmental laws).
33. Binder, supra note 6, at 163, 163 (recognizing "the coalescence of the environmental and
civil rights movements in the overlapping ara of environmental justice"); Cole, Litigation, supra
note 4, at 523-26; Steven Paul McSloy, Closing Remarks, Breaking the Power of the Power Bro-
kers, 9 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL CoMEN. 669, 670 (1994). However, for an argument that the envi-
ronmental justice movement, while drawing on both environmental and civil rights movements, must
necessarily emerge as a distinctly different movement, see Poirier, supra note 28, at 800-02. For an
argument that the environmental justice movement and the mainstream environmental movement
must integrate, see A. Dan Tarlock, City Versus Countryside: Environmental Equity in Context, 21
FORDHAM URB. LJ. 461 (1994).
34. Been, Fairness, supra note 6, at 1007.
35. Id.
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risks. ' Thus, thinking of environmental justice as environmentalist civil
rights does not identify whether the goal is to prevent identifiable racism
or classism in environmental decision making, or to correct past racism
or classism, or to prevent or correct disparate impacts across race or
class, or to ensure full access of minorities and the poor to decision
making, or to prevent or eliminate pollution, or any number of other pos-
sible goals. For example, Richard Lazarus states the environmental jus-
tice problem as one of unequal distribution of the burdens and benefits of
environmental protection policy!' In contrast, Been focuses on seven
different, and likely competing, theories about the fairness of the sub-
stantive inputs, substantive outputs (i.e., results), and process of LULU
siting decisions. Peter Reich urges three principles to eliminate envi-
ronmental racism: (1) "the equality principle," which would protect mi-
norities from disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards; (2)
"the access principle," which would remove or minimize barriers to pub-
lic participation in environmental decision making; and (3) "the commu-
nity preservation principle," which would recognize and avoid the dis-
ruption and psychological stress of minority neighborhoods stemming
from proximity to environmental hazards.' Many different goals and
theories exist.
With respect to the identification of strategies, the term "civil
rights" is equally unhelpful. The civil rights movement historically has
organized communities, engaged in political protest and civil disobedi-
ence, lobbied for public benefits, participated in policy formulation, im-
plementation and enforcement, educated the public, and pressured pri-
vate economic actors.' Civil rights strategies are litigated under a wide
36. See Cole, Empowermen, supra note 4, at 644-45; People of Color, Principles of Envi-
ronmental Justice, supra note 29, at 3 1-2.
37. Lazarus, supra note 6, at 793.
38. Been identifies seven different possible theories about fairness in the siting of LULUs:
First, fair siting could mean that LULUs are evenly apportioned among all neighbor-
hoods. Second, fair siting might mean that neighborhoods in which a LULU is not sited
must compensate the host community for its damages. Third, fairness could require "pro-
gressive siting," in which wealthier neighborhoods reeive a greater number of LULUs,
or pay a greater share of a host community's damages, than poor or minority neighbor-
hoods. Fourth, fairness could demand that all communities receive an equal number of
vetoes that they could use to bid against other communities for the privilege of excluding
a LULU. Fifth, fair siting might require that those who benefit from a LULU bear its
cost. Sixth, fairness could simply require that the siting process involve no intentional
discrimination against people of color. Seventh, fair siting could require a process that
shows equal concern and respect for all neighborhoods.
Been, Fairness, supra note 6, at 1008 (footnotes omitted).
39. Reich, supra note 6, at 287-90.
40. See generally THOMAS R. BROOKS, WALLS COME TUMBLING DOWN: A HISTORY OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1940-1970 (1974) (describing events in the history of the African Ameri-
can civil rights movement); THE EYES ON THE PRIZE: CIVIL RIGHTS READER (Claybome Carson et
al. eds., 1991) (compiling original materials and personal narratives from participants of the black
freedom struggle).
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range of theories-federal and state, constitutional and statutory." Just as
there is no single civil rights strategy, there is no single environmental
justice strategy.
What, then, are the primary conceptions of environmental justice?
This article groups the conceptions generally into five categories: (A)
evidentiary, (B) power, (C) legal, (D) environmental, and (E) economic.
Despite the differences among the categories, all constitute ways of
thinking about environmental justice as a response or reaction to existing
or imminent injustice. These responses are, respectively, (A) to study the
distribution and causes of environmental injustices, (B) to engage in po-
litical activism, (C) to use the law to protect the rights of the subordi-
nated, (D) to increase or improve enforcement of environmental laws,
and (E) to use market mechanisms to correct market inequities.
A. Study Responses (Evidentiary Conceptions)
Some view the problem of environmental injustice as an evidentiary
question.' Under this conception, the first steps to addressing environ-
mental justice are to identify and document its existence and its causes.
What reliable evidence do we have that environmental benefits and bur-
dens are distributed inequitably according to race and class in the United
States? Are the inequities greater according to race or to class or to some
combination of the two? What are the causes of these inequitable distri-
butions? When do the injustices arise? Are the causes contextual, varying
from case to case, hazard to hazard, or neighborhood to neighborhood?
41. See generally ROY L. BROOKS ELt AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LmGATION: CASES AND
PERSPECTIVES (1995) (documenting issues from several sociological perspectives on civil rights
litigation).
42. See, e.g., GAO REJOR'r, supra note 5 (presenting data on the correlation between race,
income and the location of hazardous waste landfills in the EPA's Region ); RACE AND
INCIDENCE, supra note 7 (compiling fourteen articles assessing statistical data regarding race, pov-
erty and the occurrence of environmental hazards); UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST REPORT, supra note
3, at xii-xiv (presenting findings from two studies on the correlation between demographic patterns
and commercial and non-commercial waste sites); Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1384-86 (asserting
that research showing a correlation between hazardous waste site selection based on race and/or
class discrimination fails to consider evidence relating to market dynamics affecting communities
hosting locally undesirable land uses); Been & Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance, supra note 6, at 9
(analyzing evidence of race and class composition in areas where locally undesirable land use sites
are located); Bullard, Environmental Equity, supra note 7, at 324-27 (arguing that empirical evi-
dence establishes a relationship between environmental inequity and race); Bullard, Race and Envi-
ronmental Justice, supra note 7, at 319-27 (expanding on the argument presented in Bullan, Envi-
ronmental Equity, supra note 7, that communities with large minority populations are victimized by
environmental racism); Mohai & Bryant, Race, Poverty & Distribution, supra note 7, at 3, 24-27;
Mohai & Bryant, Weighing Race & Class, supra note 7, at 921-32 (assessing data relating to haz-
ardous waste siting as it correlates to race and/or income). Those who think of environmental injus-
tice as something to study could include scholars whose livelihoods depend on studying social
phenomena, the curious, those who delay action by appointing committees and commissioning
studies, believers in the power of information and education to achieve social change, and instru-
mentalists who seek to use the data in responsive actions. Nonetheless, study is a response to envi-
ronmental injustice as much as litigation, lobbying, protesting, or negotiating.
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Those who ask these questions typically have three purposes in
mind. First, well-documented evidence of inequitable distribution of en-
vironmental harms is useful in responding to and resisting these prob-
lems. For example, studies may be used as evidence of disparate impact
in civil rights litigation, support for legislation or regulatory policies,
documentation of reasons for denying a permit, indication of a need for
tougher enforcement of existing regulations, or information for members
of a community about the problems and risks they face. Second, precise
identification of the cause(s) of environmental injustice will inherently
suggest which strategies might be the most effective in remedying and
preventing the injustices. Third, study of environmental injustice adds
much to our understanding of the rather murky juncture of the streams of
environmental regulation, market dynamics, and racism and civil rights.
1. Early Studies
One of the most significant early distributional studies arose after
civil rights protests against a decision to locate a polychlorinated by-
phenyl (PCB) landfill in mostly African American Warren County, North
Carolina.c The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) undertook an
investigation of the distribution of the four major hazardous waste land-
fills in the Southeast." The GAO found that of the four offsite hazardous
waste landfills ' in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's)
eight-state Region IV," three were in communities in which African
Americans were a majority of the population. At the time, only about
one-fifth of the population of Region IV was African American.' In ad-
dition, the percentage of people below the poverty level in these four
communities ranged from twenty-six percent to forty-two percent."
The GAO study, although the first of its kind, was quite limited in
both geography and type of environmental hazard: four major hazardous
waste landfills in eight states. In 1986, the United Church of Christ's
Commission for Racial Justice undertook a significant, agenda-setting
national study of demographic patterns associated with commercial haz-
43. GAO REPORT, supra note 5. at 2.
44. Id. The landfills addressed in the GAO Report consist of the following sites: Chemical
Waste Management, Sumter County, Alabama; industrial Chemical Company, Chester County,
South Carolina; SCA Services, Sumter County, South Carolina; and Warren County PCB Landfill,
North Carolina. ld.
45. Offsite landfills are those that are not part of or contiguous to an industrial facility. See id.
at 1.
46. Region IV encompasses Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
47. Id. The percentages of African Americans in the censs-identified townships or subdivi-
sions where the landfills were located were 90% (Sumter County, Ala.), 66% (Chester County,
S.C.), 52% (Sumter County, S.C.), and 38% (Warren County, N.C.). Id. at 4.
48. Bullard, Environmental Equity, supra note 7. at 8.
49. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
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ardous waste facilities and uncontrolled toxic waste sites." The study,
issued in 1987, found that three out of every five African Americans and
Hispanic Americans nationwide were living in communities with uncon-
trolled toxic waste sites.," Race was the most significant variable in the
distribution of commercial hazardous waste facilities, more important
than home ownership rates, income, and property values:
Communities with the greatest number of commercial hazardous
waste facilities had the highest composition of racial and ethnic resi-
dents. In communities with two or more facilities or one of the na-
tion's five largest landfills, the average minority percentage of the
population was more than three times that of communities without fa-
cilities (38 percent vs. 12 percent).52
Predominantly African American or Hispanic communities contained
three out of the five largest commercial hazardous waste landfills in the
United States, accounting for an estimated forty percent of the total
commercial landfill capacity nationwide.'
2. Additional Studies
The United Church of Christ Report called for more epidemiologi-
cal and demographic research on the distribution of environmental haz-
ards.' and many have responded." Several significant law review articles
have listed and summarized the large number of studies documenting the
racial and class distribution of environmental hazards and/or LULUs."
The studies cover hazards such as air pollution, lead poisoning, noise
pollution, pesticide exposure, rat bites, solid waste landfills, toxic and
hazardous waste sites (including landfills; treatment, storage, and dis-
posal facilities; and incinerators), toxic fish consumption, workplace
hazards, and occupational disease.' Some studies analyze national or
50. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST REPORT, supra note 3, at xiii.
51. Id. at xiv.
52. id. at xiii (footnote omitted). Even in communities with one commercial hazardous waste
facility, there were, on average, twice as many minority people as in communities that did not have
any such facility. Id.
53. Id. at xiv.
54. Id. at xvi.
55. See infra Part IV.C.1-5. In addition, the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial
Justice revisited its report in 1994, using data updated to 1993 from the 1990 census, and found
essentially the same disproportionately high percentages of minorities in areas with hazanous waste
facilities. See BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA FITION, Toxic WASTES AND RACE REVISITED: AN
UPDATE OF THE 1987 REPORT ON RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMUNrnES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES at i (1994).
56. See Been & Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance, supra note 6, at 4-5 & n.14; Cole,
Empowerment, supra note 4, at 622-30 & nn.8-18, 27; Mohai & Bryant, Weighing Race & Class,
supra note 7, at 926 & tbl. (listing studies).
57. See Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 622-24; Mohai & Bryant, Weighing Race &
Class, supra note 7, at 926 & tbl.1 (listing studies analyzing types of environmental hazards and
their correlation to race and class). Bunyan Bryant also argues that communities of color and low-
income communities get less than their fair share of (research) money, and that the working poor
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multi-city data, others analyze distributional data for particular metro-
politan areas," and still others provide detail-rich, contextual case studies
of particular communities that face high burdens of environmental harms
or LULUs.w
Among the national studies, the United Church of Christ Report
documented the location of commercial hazardous waste sites and un-
controlled toxic waste sites, which pose both a risk of exposure to haz-
ardous or toxic substances and a risk of actual harm to health!' In con-
trast, other national studies have documented actual exposure to health-
related environmental harm. For example, data from the National Health
and Nutrition Examination Survey showed that the percentage of African
American children, six months to five years old, with elevated blood lead
levels was six times higher than that of white children of the same ages.'
The percentage of children whose families' annual incomes were under
$6,000 and who had elevated blood lead levels was between two and
have less health care insurance protection proportionate to the amount of toxic-induced or -
aggravated health problems they suffer. Bunyan Bryant, Issues and Potential Policies and Solutions
for Environmental Justice: An Overview, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POUCIES, AND
SOLUIroNs, supra note 7, at 8, 8.
58. See, e.g., UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST REPORT, supra note 3,at 18-21 & fig.A-I & tbl.B-8
(analyzing data from several cities around the United States); Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle,
Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, A Special Investigation, NAT'L LJ.,
Sept. 21, 1992, at SI (examining how federal environmental law has reacted to polluters in predomi-
nantly minority and/or low-income communities throughout the United States); Mahaffey et al.,
supra note 7, at 573 (reporting findings of blood lead levels in children relative to race and family
income from sixty-four sampling areas across the United States).
59. See, e.g., ERIC MANN, LA.'s LETHAL Ati: NEw STRATmGIEs FOR POuCY, ORGANIZING,
AND ACTION (1991) (focusing on environmental hazards in Los Angeles, California); Bullan, Solid
Waste, supra note 7; Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evidence,
in RACE AND INCIDENCE supra note 7, at 163, 169-74 (presenting evidence from a Detroit area case
study on environmental racism); Patrick C. West, Invitation to Poison? Detroit Minorities and Toxic
Fish Consumption from the Detroit River, in RACE AND INCIDENCE, supra note 7, at 96-97 (assess-
ing environmental hazards in Detroit potentially caused by "greening" the Detroit River waterfront);
Patrick C. West et al., Minority Anglers and Toxic Fish Consumption: Evidence from a Statewide
Survey of Michigan, in RACE AND INCIDENCE, supra note 7, at 100-12 (discussing minority expo-
sure to contaminated fish in the Detroit River).
60. See, e.g., BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 7, at 45-78 (presenting case studies
assessing environmental disputes and resolution methods in five predominantly black communities,
Bullard, Race and Environmental Justice, supra note 7, at 329-33 (discussing an incinerator in Los
Angeles and a lead smelter in Dallas); Marcia Coyle, Say "No" to Cancer Alley, NAT'L L., Sept.
21, 1992, at S5 (examining environmental hazards in Wallace, Louisiana, a poor community of 750
residents, 98% of which are African American); Seth Mydans, Tribe Smells Sludge and Bureaucrats,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,1994, at A8 (reporting on a sewage sludge dump on the Tones Martinez Desert
Cahuilla Indian Reservation). See generally UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 3 (compiling articles
examining race, income and the distribution of environmental hazards); Moya, supra note 6, at 221-
26 (identifying and examining environmental injustices in eleven communities across the United
States).
61. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST REPORT, supra note 3, at xii.
62. Mahaffey, supra note 7, at 573,578.
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four times higher than for children of the same race whose families' an-
nual incomes were over $6,000.'
A further contrasting nationwide study, the National Law Journal
study," focused not on exposure to pollutants or siting of hazards, but on
government enforcement of environmental laws designed to reduce risk
of exposure and risk of harm among already-sited facilities that contain
or emit pollutants. The study found, among other facts:
Penalties under hazardous waste laws at sites having the greatest
white population were 500 percent higher than penalties at sites with
the greatest minority population.... For all the federal laws aimed at
protecting citizens from air, water, and waste pollution, penalties in
white communities were 46 percent higher than in minority commu-
nities.... Under the giant Superfund cleanup program, abandoned
hazardous waste sites in minority areas take 20 percent longer to be
placed on the national priority action list than those in white areas.
A representative local study, Robert Bullard's study of solid waste
disposal facilities in Houston from the late 1920s to the mid-1970s,
found that African American neighborhoods housed more than seventy-
five percent of the city's solid waste disposal facilities." In a case study,
Marcia Coyle described Formosa Plastics Corporation's attempt to locate
a rayon pulp processing plant, in Wallace, Louisiana, that had the capac-
ity to expand to a polyvinyl chloride plant.f Wallace is part of the area
known as "Cancer Alley"--for the large number of polluting chemical
and oil facilities along a 100-mile stretch from New Orleans to Baton
Rouge." This case study is one example of many that identifies the envi-
ronmental hazards which have been or are being sited in specific low-
income and minority communities."
3. Race and Income
One of the most important issues arising in many of the studies is
whether race or income is more significant in the distribution of envi-
ronmental injustice." Race often is the more important factor.7' Mohai
and Bryant have compared twenty-two studies of environmental injustice
63. Id.
64. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 58, at SI.
65. Id. at S2.
66. ROBERT D. BULLARD, INVISIBLE HOUSTON: THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN BOOM AND BUST
71-73 (1987) [hereinafter BULLARD, INVISIBLE HOUSTON).
67. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 58, at S5.
68. See id.
69. See sources cited supra note 58 (referring to case studies focusing on environmental haz-
ards, and race and socioeconomic dynamics within select communities).
70. See sources cited supra note 58 (referring to articles comparing race and income as the
two factors influencing the sitings of environmental hazards).
71. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 625; see BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 7;
Grossman, supra note 9. at 283-92. See generally Foster, supra note 6, at 731-32 (providing a
conceptual background of environmental racism).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
across race and/or income.' Of sixteen studies that examined both race
and class as factors in the distribution of environmental hazards, inequi-
table distribution by race was present in fifteen studies and inequitable
distribution by income was present in thirteen studies." Only ten studies
analyzed which of the two was more important: race was more important
in seven, while income was more important in three.' Six studies ana-
lyzed only one of the factors. Five of these six did not analyze race, of
which four showed inequitable distribution by income. One of the six
studies analyzing only one factor did not analyze income but showed
racial inequities. '
Some have mistakenly treated the question of whether race or in-
come is more important in patterns of environmental injustice as a ques-
tion of causation: 6 It is a question of distribution, more precisely the na-
ture of the distribution, not a question of what causes the distribution. In
other words, just because LULUs are distributed inequitably by race does
not necessarily mean that racism is the cause.
To be sure, inequitable distribution by race tends to support a causal
theory of racism. On the other hand, some might think that inequitable
distribution by class suggests that market dynamics cause environmental
injustice. However, mere correlation of hazards to a particular factor
does not prove that discrimination on the basis of that factor in siting
those hazards caused the inequitable distribution. For example, even if
income were the more important factor, decision makers might be moti-
vated by racism, and may merely use income as a surrogate for race,
either out of a desire to avoid liability for more overt racism or out of a
vague perception that lower income levels often correlate to racial mi-
nority status. Siting by income levels also might reflect class prejudices,
not market dynamics. Even if race were demonstrably more important
than class, environmental injustice might be the result of a subtle mixing
of both racism and classism. Also, inequitable distribution of environ-
mental hazards by race might not be due to racist siting decisions, but
instead the result of segregation and discrimination in housing markets,
72. Mohai & Bryant, Weighing Race & Class, supra note 7, at 926 & tbl.l. Mohai and Bryant
compared only 17 separate studies, but one of these studies covered five separate hazards, each
analyzed for inequitable distribution by race and class and each reported in Mohai & Bryant's table.




76. See, e.g., Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 21-22 (arguing that racism has created dispa-
rate living conditions); Centner et al., supra note 7, at 125 (asserting that discriminatory siting of
hazardous waste sites is not supported by statistics, and that other factors such as transportation,
housing, jobs and general market dynamics influence siting decisions); Foster, supra note 6, at 728
(arguing that the "Not In My Backyard" syndrome, or public opposition to the siting of locally
unwanted land use sites, has led to a disproportionate number of sitings in predominantly minority
communities).
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existing zoning laws, the combination of lack of mobility (due to housing
discrimination and income levels) and the decline of neighborhoods (due
to discrimination in zoning, municipal services, and lending practices),
past siting decisions which create presumptions that additional hazards
are compatible land uses, lack of political power and voice among certain
racial or ethnic groups, failure or inability of neighborhoods to organize
politically, lack of access to information about environmental or land use
decisions, or the need to be close to work environments (i.e., race differ-
entials in location of employment or transportation alternatives or both).
Even if racial discrimination pervades siting decisions, who is dis-
criminating? Is it the establisher or operator of the facility--perhaps a
private entity? Or the local land use authority? Or perhaps it is the state
environmental regulatory authority? Or the federal environmental regu-
latory authority? What about our political, economic, and social systems,
which are embedded with institutional racism? Maybe it is some combi-
nation of these sources? The distributional studies, while supporting as-
sumptions and fears that environmental racism and classism exist, simply
do not offer concrete, generalizable proof of the causes for the inequita-
ble distribution of environmental harms and LULUs. This observation
does not mean that the racism haunting so many other aspects of our
society is not also present in environmental issues. However, if we are to
remedy and prevent racism, or possibly classism, in environmental deci-
sion making, we need to understand not only its ultimate manifestations
but also its root sources.
4. Methodologies and Controversy
Recent studies, using increasingly sophisticated means of identify-
ing communities and changes in those communities over time, have
called into question some of the more significant distributional studies on
which the environmental justice movement has relied. One of the most
important developments in distributional studies has been to use census
77. We ae likely to understand the causes of environmental injustice only by engaging in
context-specific, detail-rich, longitudinal (i.e., historical, over time) case studies that document all
the factors that have gone into the existence of environmental hazards and LULUs in particular
neighborhoods. The causes are more complex, interrelated, and perhaps insidious than aggregate
data studies can show. For an excellent argument for the need to synthesize generalizable theories
about the impact of law with detailed contextual case studies, see RDBERT C. EWJCKSON, ORDER
WITHOtr LAW 1-11, 137-55 (1991). Ellickson's book is a particularly illuminating example of this
synthesis. Another good example is Nancy Obermeyer's study of the siting of a nuclear power
generating facility adjacent to the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore. NANCY J. OBERMEYER,
BUREAUCRATS, CLIENTS, AND GEOGRAPHY: THE BAiLLY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT BATTLE IN
NORTHERN INDIANA (1989). She related empirical case study research to organizational theory, Max
Weher's theory of bureaucracy, to show how a regulatory agency is often captured by a powerful
client to ensure the agency's organizational survival but occasionally reacts to an organized public
group to reestablish the agency's public legitimacy. id.; see also Lord & Sutkin, supra note 6, at I
(urging the use of historical study in examining environmental justice burdens and benefits).
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tracts as the unit of analysis, instead of zip codes or concentric circles
around selected sites.'
Census tracts are preferable to zip codes .... Census tracts are drawn
up by local committees, and are intended to reflect the community's
view of where one neighborhood ends and another begins. Zip codes
are drawn to enhance the efficiency of mail delivery; they are not in-
tended to reflect neighborhoods. Concentric circles are unlikely to
bear much relationship to the community's views of its borders,
which are often linked to natural or physical boundaries such as wa-
terways, highways, or major roads.79
Researchers who have used census tracts as the unit of analysis have
raised questions about the United Church of Christ Report. Researchers
at the Social and Demographic Research Institute (SADRI) of the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts examined the racial and socioeconomic charac-
teristics of communities containing commercial hazardous waste facili-
ties, just as the United Church of Christ study did. However, they used
the more community-based census tracts as the unit of analysis, instead
of zip codes, which the United Church of Christ study had used.' The
SADRI study showed that the differences between percentages of Afri-
can Americans in host tracts and percentages of African Americans in
non-host tracts were not higher with any statistical significance.' The
percentage of Hispanics was important, although employment in industry
was the most significant predictor of whether a tract contained a waste
site.' Thus, the SADRI analysis contradicts the United Church of Christ
analysis." Vicki Been, however, examined both studies, and using logis-
tical analysis of census tracts and controlling for population density,
found that the percentages of minorities, employment in manufacturing,
and unemployment percentages were each significant factors in predict-
ing the presence of a waste site. " The Been study, therefore, reached
different results than the SADRI study.
Researchers at the University of Chicago's Irving B. Harris Gradu-
ate School of Public Policy Studies have also discovered that studies of
78. See Been, Analyzing Evidence, supra note 6, at 4-5; Been & Gupta, Coming to the Nui-
sance, supra note 6, at 10-13; Paul Mohai, The Demographics of Dumping Revisited: Examining the
Impact of Alternate Methodologies in Environmental Justice Research, 14 VA. ENvTL LJ. 615,
618-19 (1995); Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Classification in Environmental Equity: How We Man-
age Is How We Measure, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 633, 652 (1994); John Fahsbender, Note, An
Analytical Approach to Defining the Affected Neighborhood in the Environmental Justice Context, 5
N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 120-121, 131. 138 (1996).
79. Been & Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance, supra note 6. at 11-12.
80. Andy B. Anderson et al., Environmental Equity: Evaluating TSDF Siting over the Past
Two Decades, WAsTE AGe, July 1994, at 84.
81. Id. at88.
82. Id. at 88-90.
83. But see Been, Analyzing Evidence, supra note 6, at 4 & n.18 (noting criticisms of SADRI
research).
84. Id. at 5-6.
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Chicago census tracts with Superfund list sites (CERCLIS' sites),
RCRA"6 treatment, storage and disposal (TSD) facility sites, RCRA haz-
ardous waste generators, and historical hazardous waste sites did not
confirm traditional assumptions about the location of environmental haz-
ards in African American neighborhoods.' Although historical solid
waste sites, primarily historical landfills, tended to exist in African
American neighborhoods in 1990, hazardous sites (CERCLIS and
RCRA) were not located in predominantly African American areas." In
1990, all waste sites, including hazardous sites were in areas with higher
percentages of Hispanics, lower population densities, and proximity to
highways and waterways." According to the authors, most of the His-
panic neighborhoods with waste sites had increases in Hispanic popula-
tion after the sites were already located in those neighborhoods. Also
significantly contrary to traditional assumptions, most of the waste sites
in 1990 were located in higher income, not lower income, areas.' The
authors attributed this fact to recent redevelopment of warehouse areas
for loft apartments and condominiums for affluent professionals wishing
to live near the river!' In fact, the Chicago study also examined the char-
acteristics of neighborhoods with waste sites in 1960, and found that
waste sites, particularly hazardous waste sites, were located at that time
in census tracts with lower median household income, low population
density, and proximity to commercial waterways." The sites in 1960 af-
fected African American communities only to the extent that they were
lower-income neighborhoods." "Environmental injustice in 1960 pre-
dominantly took the form of locating industrial areas in poorer commu-
nities." However, those areas have become gentrified, resulting in the
counter-intuitive correlation of higher income status and waste sites in
1990.
One of the significant aspects of the Chicago study, other than its
use of census tracts, was its analysis of site location and demographic
data from the past (1960) and comparison of that information to the then
present situation (1990). Vicki Been has contended that one of the weak-
nesses of earlier environmental justice studies was that they did not "es-
tablish that the host communities were disproportionately minority or
85. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Information Sys-
tem. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 11996).
86. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994 &
Supp. 111996).
87. Baden & Coursey, supra note 7, at 39-40.




92. Id. at 38.
93. Id. at 25.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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poor at the time the sites were selected." Without longitudinal studies-
studies of the demographics of, and LULU sitings in, particular neigh-
borhoods over time-researchers cannot prove that inequitable distribu-
tions of hazards and LULUs result from racial or class discrimination in
the siting process itself7 Even for studies that prove a correlation be-
tween race or income and the distribution of LULUs, market dynamics
might play a role either instead of or in addition to discriminatory siting
practices." In other words, people of color and low-income people might
move to neighborhoods with LULUs after they are sited there, because
of the availability of cheap housing in those neighborhoods, racial dis-
crimination in housing markets, residential segregation patterns, and
other market forces." In addition, neighborhoods over time might in-
crease in concentrations of minorities or poor people due to the departure
of the most market-mobile residents--"the least poor and those least
subject to discrimination"°°--as the neighborhood declines in environ-
mental quality, zoning, municipal services, and mortgage and investment
lending availability.' Therefore, according to Been, studies must focus
on demographic characteristics of areas at the time that siting decisions
are made, and how those demographic characteristics change after
siting."
Been reexamined the GAO study'" and the Bullard study'" by ana-
lyzing demographic data of the LULU-host neighborhoods prior to the
LULU siting, to the extent that such data was available, and recent
demographic data of those same neighborhoods." She found that LULUs
were sited in communities that were disproportionately minority and
low-income at the time of the siting.'" In the extension of Bullard's
study, Been discovered that the community became even more minority
and low-income over time, suggesting a significant exacerbation of the
siting injustices by market forces." The extension of the GAO study,
however, showed no effect of market forces on the distribution of envi-
ronmental harms and LULUs." Thus, longitudinal analysis confirmed
the burden of the actual siting decisions, not just the LULUs themselves,
on people of color and low-income people.
96. Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1384.
97. See id. at 1384-85.
98. Id. at 1385-86, 1388-92.
99. Id. at 1388-89.
100. Id. at 1390.
101. Id. at 1389-90.
102. Id. at 1384-87.
103. GAO REPORT, supra note 5.
104. Bullard, Solid Waste, supra note 7.
105. Been, LULU, supra note 6, at 1386-87, 1398-1406.
106. id. at 1387.
107. id. at 1386-87.
108. Id. at 1398-1406.
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James T. Hamilton of Duke University also evaluated demographics
at the time of hazardous waste processing facility sitings, expansion
plans, and reduction plans in the 1970s and early 1980s.'" He found: (1)
both race and median household income were statistically significant in
predicting sitings of hazardous waste processing facilities; (2) race and
income were not statistically significant in predicting expansion of ex-
isting facilities; (3) facilities were less likely to plan to reduce their ca-
pacity as their counties' minority population increased; and (4) percent-
age of registered voters (a measure of political efficacy) was statistically
significant in predicting expansion and reduction plans,"'
Perhaps the most significant recent study, Vicki Been and Francis
Gupta's Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudi-
nal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims,"' used census tracts as the
unit of analysis in longitudinal analysis to isolate siting decisions from
market dynamics. Been and Gupta performed "a nationwide study of the
demographics of the 544 communities that in 1994 hosted active com-
mercial hazardous waste treatment storage and disposal facilities
[TSDFs].""2 Although the areas hosting TSDFs were disproportionately
African American and Hispanic, facilities that began operating between
1970 and 1990 were not disproportionately sited in African American
areas. 3 Thus, while disproportionate siting of TSDFs in African Ameri-
can areas may have happened before 1970, it had not occurred in the
twenty-seven years preceding the Been and Gupta study."'4 The Hispanic
population of an area was statistically significant, however, in predicting
siting from 1970 to 1990."' Furthermore, "the analysis shows that the
very poor are not hosting a disproportionate share of facilities, and in-
deed, that neighborhoods with high levels of poverty appear to repel,
rather than attract, facilities. Instead, it is working class or lower middle
class neighborhoods that bear a disproportionate share of facilities.""
Finally, the results of the study did not support a market dynamic theory,
instead showing that communities did not significantly increase their
percentages of minority or low-income residents after siting."" Thus,
Hispanics, but not African Americans or the poor, bore the burdens of
TSDF sitings in the twenty-seven years preceding the study; African
Americans bore the burdens of living near pre-1970 TSDFs, whether due
to siting or market dynamics; and in the twenty-seven years preceding
109. James T. Hamilton, Politics and Social Costs: Estimating the Impact of Collective Action
on Hazardous Waste Facilities, 24 RAND. J. EcON. 101, 101 (1993). Hamilton used both 1970 and
1980 census data for counties. Id. at I 11.
110. Id. at 106-20.
11i. Been & Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance, supra note 6.
112. Id. at 9.
113. Id. at 9, 30-31.
114. Id. at 32-33.
115. Id. at 9,30-34.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 9,34.
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the study, market dynamics did not play a significant role in the racial or
socioeconomic demographics of communities hosting TSDFs.
5. The Need for More Study
The evidentiary conception, as reflected mostly in distributional
studies, contributes much to both the pursuit and understanding of envi-
ronmental justice. Nonetheless, it is marked by varying results, contro-
versies over methodologies, and inadequate proof of the causes of the
inequities. Much additional study remains to be done.
In addition, many of the studies are reactions either to communities'
complaints about existing hazards and LULUs or to previous studies. Of
course, researchers have every reason to examine claims of inequitable
distributions of waste sites, toxic substances, air pollutants, lead, and the
like. Initial research naturally leads to further research. However, most of
the studies reflect only a single perspective: identification of a particular
hazard or LULU, followed by analysis of the racial and socioeconomic
characteristics of the communities encumbered with that hazard or
LULU. Alternative perspectives would include: (1) identification of par-
ticular neighborhoods by racial and socioeconomic characteristics, fol-
lowed by analysis of all the land use patterns and health risks within
those neighborhoods;" ' (2) qualitative studies of specific siting proc-
esses; (3) historical studies of changes within particular neighborhoods,
perhaps in light of demographic, economic, and political trends;"9 and (4)
qualitative studies of minority and low-income neighborhoods' efforts to
define their communities and the results of those efforts.' In other
words, studies that use the communities, instead of the hazards or LU-
LUs, as the independent variable would supplement existing studies and
may help us understand better the nature, dimensions, and causes of en-
vironmental injustice. They may also help communities identify methods
of achieving long-range land use goals, and not just prevent or remedy
specific projects.
B. Political Activism (Power Conceptions)
1. Environmental Injustice As a Lack of Power
Although distributional studies have not identified the causes of
environmental injustice, many people argue that such injustice is the
result of a lack of power among people of color, low-income people, and
118. See generally discussion nfra Part II.C (detailing such racial and socioeconomic charac-
teristics). For an excellent empirical study of land use patterns in El Paso County colonias along the
Texas-Mexico border, see Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. LJ.
179(1995).
119. See Lord & Shutkin, supra note 6, at 1.
120. See infra notes 150, 287, 565 and accompanying text.
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their respective communities.'2 ' This lack of power-a result of racism
and classism, lack of financial resources, language barriers, residential
and workplace segregation, and lack of political mobilization--contrib-
utes to environmental injustice in three ways. First, environmental justice
advocates contend that the powerful often exploit the powerlessness of
poor and minority communities by making them the targets of LULUs.' "
Government and industry decision makers conclude that they will re-
ceive less opposition if they put the LULUs in poor and minority neigh-
borhoods than if they put them in more politically active and economi-
cally powerful higher-income, white neighborhoods."n
Second, according to political conception, low-income people and
people of color did not play a part in designing the environmental regu-
latory system, which institutionally discriminates against them.'"' Luke
Cole has identified several features of this system that keep low-income
and minority communities powerless."z The mainstream environmental
movement, composed primarily of lawyers and scientists and over-
whelmingly white and middle-class, emerged as a powerful force in the
late 1960s and early 1970s. ' It was responsible for an extensive array of
environmental legislation'"' that created a complex regulatory process
emphasizing legal and technical expertise.2 In fact, Cole calls the main-
121. See Conner Bailey et al., Environmental Justice ad the Professional, in ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: ISSUES, POuCIES, AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 7, at 35, 35; Bullard, Anatomy, supra note
9, at 23-24; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 642-52.
122. CERRELL ASSOCS., CAL. WASTE MANAGEMENT BD., POLITICAL DImcuLEs FACING
WASTE-TO-ENERGY CONVERSION PLANT SITING 17-30 (1984) (identifing types of communities
that are less likely to oppose siting of waste incinerators and recommending selection of sites in
these areas); SZASZ, supra note 7, at 75 ("As facility siting became more difficult in the 1980s, some
policy analysts began to advocate a strategy of siting in communities that are least capable of politi-
cally resisting or most amenable to accepting some form of financial compensation in exchange for
accepting the facility.'); Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 628; Rabin, supra note I (document-
ing the expulsive zoning practice of allowing and encouraging nonresidential uses in minority
neighborhoods); Tsao, supra note 30, at 366-68; Godsil, supra note 6, at 399.
123. The "Not in My Backyard" ("NIMBY") tactics of low-minority, high-income neighbor-
hoods in opposing LULUs may be a significant contribution to placement of LULUs in high-
minority, low-income neighborhoods. See Gauna, supra note 6, at 32-33; Robert Mata, Hazardous
Waste Facilities and Environmental Equity: A Proposed Siting Model, 4 FORDHAM URB. U. 375,
391 (1994).
124. See Bullard, Residential Segregation, supra note 23, at 78; Cole, Empowerment, supra
note 4, at 636-39.
125. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 639-41.
126. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 22; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 635-36,
640; Decohn Ferris & David Hahn-Baker, Environmentalists and Environmental Justice Policy, in
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSnCE: ISSUES, POLICIES, AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 7, at 66,69-72.
127. See generally JOHN P. DwYER & MARIKA F. BERGSUND, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS ANNOTATED (1994) (illustrating the large amount of environmental legislation enacted in the
last three decades).
128. Emphasis on legal and technical issues can hide the political nature of the issues and
discourage participation from those with very real personal and political stakes but little legal or
technical expertise. Bailey et al., supra note 121, at 44. "Legal and technical debates are the forte of
the professional, but are of secondary importance to strengthening the voice of affected communi-
ties." Id.; see Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 22, Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 635-36.
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stream environmental movement the "legal-scientific movement."'" He
argues that not only did the major environmental law groups ignore and
exclude members of grassroots communities, but they also launched a
system that was highly inaccessible to the non-lawyer and non-
scientist. '"°
The environmental regulatory system has institutionalized the power
of the mainstream national environmental groups, such as the Natural
Resources Defense Council, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund (formerly
known as the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund), and the Environmental
Defense Fund. "' These groups are major power brokers in negotiations
with government and industry over environmental legislation, regula-
tions, and permits. They have also shaped environmental law through
litigation.'" As Cole writes: "Lawsuits are now the primary, and some-
times only, strategy employed by mainstream groups. '' 3
According to critics of the mainstream environmental groups, these
groups have exercised their power without representing or including the
perspectives of grassroots activists in poor and minority communities.
The legal-scientific movement has emphasized protecting nature with its
aesthetic, recreational, and biological values, whereas people at the
grassroots want to emphasize protecting humans and human communi-
ties." The legal-scientific movement has also remained narrowly focused
on environmental matters, whereas low-income people and people of
color see environmental problems as part of a larger social justice
agenda."" The resulting regulatory system attempts to control pollution
129. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 635,642.
130. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 22; see Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 636-38.
131. See Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 634-36.
132. Id. at 636.
133. Id. Nonetheless, some groups like Greenpeace or the Nature Conservancy could be con-
sidered "mainstream" environmental groups, but do not rely heavily on litigation to achieve their
goals.
134. Id. at 639-40; see also Bulard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 22. The conflict between tradi-
tional environmental goals and social justice goals was highlighted by California Supreme Court
Justice Tobriner when he referred to "the conflict between the environmental protectionists and the
egalitarian humanists; a collision between the forces that would save the benefits of nature and those
that would preserve the opportmity of people in general to settle." Associated Home Builders v.
City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 488 (Cal. 1976) (reviewing validity of a no-growth voter initia-
tive).
135. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 23-24; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 640-
41; Gauna, supra note 6, at 27-29. One powerful example is the BFI recycling plant in the primarily
Hispanic Gardens neighborhood on the Eastside of Austin. Not only does a neighborhood of color
disproportionately bear the cost of recycling (including rats, roaches, blowing paper, noise, traffic,
and a plant fire), but it bears the costs of environmental degradation as well: In Eastside, community
groups strongly supported environmentalists' initiatives to protect water quality. Later, however, the
environmentalists did not come to the support of the Eastside residents. Kayte VanScoy, Residents Say
Recycling Plants Constitute Enviro-racLsm: Eastsiders Decry BFI (visited Nov. 10, 1998)
<htp://www.auschron.com/isRndvol6/issue39/pols.council.html>. Furthermore, some environmental
groups have blamed immigrant groups for US. environmental problems, exploiting legitimate con-
cerns about environmental protection to spread racist and xenophobic fears. Immigration and Envi-
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through technology and risk assessment: polluting facilities use tech-
nologies to reduce emissions of harmful pollutants to levels that scien-
tific experts and political policy makers decide pose a sufficiently low
risk to human health." In contrast, environmental justice advocates,
skeptical of decisions about how much pollution is "safe," seek pollution
prevention: elimination or prohibition of pollution so that there is no risk
to human health.' " The environmental regulatory system attempts to
control polluters through law: regulation and litigation." However, many
low-income and minority people distrust the law, have very little access
to the legal system, and do not have the special expertise that environ-
mental law emphasizes."' Reliance on legal solutions tends to disem-
power subordinated communities and people, who may come to depend
on lawyers, let lawyers control their struggle, and ignore needed commu-
nity organizing by relying on litigation." Reliance on legal solutions also
tends to ignore the larger power dimensions of the problem: "Using a
legal strategy, rather than a political one, would likely fail these commu-
nities: a legal victory does not change the political and economic power
relations in the community that led to the environmental threat in the first
place.''
Environmental justice advocates perceive that the traditional envi-
ronmental regulatory system has worked all too well."'4 The system views
the cause of pollution as a "single bad actor," whose pollution exceeds
socially acceptable levels and therefore must be controlled through
regulation and civil and criminal enforcement." However, environmental
justice advocates believe that the normal operation of U.S. political, so-
cial, and economic systems produces pollution.'" They point to the le-
gality of pollution that does not exceed legislated (or regulated) levels,
the lack of effective civil rights tools to challenge institutional biases,
ronment Campaign Factsheet #4, E-mail from Political Ecology Group to Conference "env.justice"
(Jan. 7, 1997) (on file with author).
136. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 644. Science and technology am heavily value-
laden. Bunyan Bryant argues that scientific researh is often detertmined by a political economy in
which governments and corporations, but not local communities, set the agendas. Bryant, supra note
57, at 11-13. Professional and technical people have a vested interest in pollution control strategies
that emphasize risk management and risk assessment Id. at 15-23. He also notes that the govern-
ment often will not regulate a substance at a particular level unless it has scientific proof that the
substance causes harm to human health. Id. at 9-10. Scientific certainty and proof of causality are
policy requirements that are used to rationalize government inaction, but people of color and low-
income people are "the recipients of uncertainty." Id. at 9-11.
137. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 644-45; see also SzAsZ, supra note 7, at 137; Bry-
ant, supra note 57, at 9-12 (urging a more precautionary principle of protecting health even in the
absence of scientific certainty and proof that substances harm health).
138. Cole, Enpowerment, supra note 4, at 635-36.
139. Id. at 635-36, 647-48, 650-51.
140. Id. at 649-54.
141. Id. at 648-49.
142. See id. at 643.
143. Id. at 642.
144. Id. at 642-43; see also Bryant, supra note 57, at 15-23.
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and the effectiveness of many high- and middle-income, white neighbor-
hoods in using environmental laws to keep out LULUs, which then are
located in low-income, minority neighborhoods.' " Thus, Cole argues, the
environmental regulatory system perpetuates political inequity and
causes environmental injustice.146
Third, low-income people and people of color historically have had
very few real options to prevent exposure to environmental harms and
LULUs. According to noted economist Albert Hirschman, the two ways
that people express dissent in social organizations, including political
society, is to exercise voice by expressing their dissatisfaction or pro-
testing to those with authority, or to exit by leaving the environment or
situation, often physically.'" Low-income and minority communities
have often been excluded from participating in decisions about the pres-
ence of LULUs and environmental hazards in their neighborhoods, either
by decision makers or by lack of political organization and
involvement.'" Thus, they have not had an effective voice in the envi-
ronmental and land use decision making process. People of color and
low-income people have also not been able to "vote with their feet" by
moving to other neighborhoods or communities because housing dis-
crimination, exclusionary zoning patterns, redlining, and other market
forces limit their residential mobility.' Their lack of power has kept
them subjected to unwanted hazards and facilities. Furthermore, some
145. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 643-44, 646-47. The use of NIMBY (Not In My
Back Yard) strategies by those with power arguably hurts those without power, turning into a
PIBBY (Place In Blacks' Back Yard) situation. Id. at 646-47. The environmental laws provide tools
that can perpetuate existing power inequities. Id.
146. Id. at 643.
147. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
148. See Torres, supra note 1, at 450 ('It is lack of informed participation and legal or regula-
tory experience that leaves many communities helpless against an agency's decision to locate a solid
waste facility in their community."); see also Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 18-19 (suggesting
systematic exclusion of people of color from governmental boards, commissions, and agencies that
make siting and zoning decisions); Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 628, 646, 674-79 (arguing
that poor people remain grossly underrepresented in the political processes of siting polluting facili-
ties and documenting the refusal of the Kings County Planning Department, California, to translate
into Spanish a 1,000-page Environmental Impact Report on toxic waste incinerators even though
70% of local residents spoke Spanish); James S. Freeman & Rachel D. Godsil, The Question of Risk:
Incorporating Community Perceptions into Environmental Risk Assessments, 21 FORDHAM URB.
LJ. 547, 553 (1994); Reich, supra note 6, at 277; Saleem, supra note 31, at 236-45 (positing that
federal notice requirements regarding waste facilities am ineffective and undermine participation in
the siting process); Eleanor N. Metzger, Comment, Driving the Environmental Justice Movement
Forward: The Need for a Paternalistic Approach, 45 CASE W. RES. L REV. 379, 385-88 (1994).
149. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 21-22; Bullard, Residential Segregation, supra note 23,
at 78-81; Gauna, supra note 6, at 32-33. For evidence of the persistence of racial segregation, see
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (describing practices of redlining, racial steering, and failure
of institutions to support recently integrated neighborhoods with credit); RESIDENTIAL APARTHEID
THE AMERICAN LEGACY (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 1994) (describing the lack of access to finan-
cial institutions for people of color and the direct relationship of redlining to neighborhood decline).
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argue that the lack of power and resources will often lead people of color
and low-income people to embrace industrial and toxic activities and
land uses that they believe will provide much-needed jobs and tax reve-
nues."s This economic vulnerability invites "environmental job black-
mail,"'' by which impoverished communities trade health and environ-
mental harms for employment and economic growth. '" However, the
promised economic benefits may not materialize or may be less than
imagined.
The political conception of environmental justice insightfully names
power as a key element to overcoming injustice and boldly critiques tra-
ditional ways of approaching both environmental and civil rights prob-
lems. However, the political conception is itself subject to critique. For
example, mainstream environmentalism and grassroots social justice
activism arguably are not nearly so much at odds as some argue. " Fur-
thermore, a merger of environmental and civil rights agendas could be
far more effective at achieving the goals of both camps than emphasizing
conflicts and differences."' Environmental litigation can be an effective
political tool, despite its limitations.'" Professional community organiz-
ing has the potential to be as paternalistic and controlling of the struggles
of people affected by environmental injustice as does environmental or
civil rights lawyering. In addition, environmental justice activists tend to
reject that a low-income or minority community could reasonably choose
to accept LULUs rather than fight the existing power distribution. This
assumption is reductionist. It moves the environmental justice movement
away from the empowerment of self-determination and towards an in-
strumentality of radical pollution prevention politics. The result could be
that residents of neighborhoods have no effective voice for their own
goals but instead have a voice directed and developed by professional
activists or a limited cadre of grassroots leaders. The political conception
of environmental justice has both potential and limits.
150. Even when people of color gain political power, as manifested in holding elected local
office, economic empowerment eludes them. See generally IN SEARCH OF THE NEW SOUTH: THE
BLACK URBAN EXPERIENCE IN THE 1970S AND 1980S (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1989) (describing case
studies of several major Southern cities showing the persistence of residential segregation, redlining,
declining infinstrucatue, unemployment, inadequate public transportation, discriminatory real estate
practices, and social and physical deterioration of central city ghettos);, SZASZ, sUPra note 7, at 109 (ad-
dressing how the poor have less economic power to prevent facilities from siting in their communities).
151. See Guana, supra note 6, at 32-33 (discussing "environmental jobmail" as a form of
environmental blackmail).
152. See Austin & Schill, supra note 6, at 70; Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 18-19; Gauna,
supra note 6, at 38-39; Boyle, supra note 9, at 974-77.
153. Austin & Schill, supra note 6, at 70.
154. See infra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 439-53 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 194-222 and accompanying text.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1
2. Activism and Empowerment
For those who see power inequities as the core of environmental
injustice, the necessary response is political activism or community
empowerment.'- Instead of top-down approaches that perpetuate existing
power relationships, environmental justice advocates seek to change
power relationships by using grassroots ("bottom-up") political tools.
The number of grassroots groups throughout the United States that are
combining civil rights and environmental goals in the quest for environ-
mental justice is large and growing.'" Circumstances that threaten family,
home, and community thrust the typical organizer of an environmental
justice group into leadership. Many of these organizers are women. The
groups often have multi-issue agendas. The movement as a whole is ra-
157. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 33-39; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 661-
73. But see Metzger, supra note 148, at 389-96 (arguing for short-term paternalistic government
policies because affected communities lack the information, education, and ability to organize
quickly).
158. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 648-49. Terms like "grassroots" and "politically
active" can have more than one meaning. Grassroots environmental justice groups are generally
local not only in membership but also in leadership and activity. They differ from other interest
groups that political scientists describe as engaging in grassroots lobbying, which involves national
professional staff of the interest groups mobilizing their members (i.e., local citizens) to contact
public officials--a top-down, centralized approach. See Burdett A. Loomis, A New Era: Groups and
the Grass Roots, in nnSr GROUP POLTcs 169, 169 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds.,
1983). Although environmental justice groups have formed national networks, lobbied for national
environmental justice policy, and brought environmental justice issues to the attention of the national
media, the American public, and the federal government, their actions are primarily focused on the
welfare of specific communities (e.g., particular neighborhoods or work environments), and are led
by members of those communities. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for All, in
UNEQUAL PROTECTON, supra note 3, at 3, 7 [hereinafter Bullard, Environmental Justice for All]
(describing the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, a national move-
ment for environmental justice); Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 639-40 (positing that third
wave environmentalists have an immediate and material stake in environmental problems). In fact,
even at a purely neighborhood-based level, some environmental justice groups have rejected hierar-
chical group decision making structures. Instead these groups selected either consensus-based,
leaderless forms (often impractical) or a committee-based structure in which all members have input
at the committee level, but overall group leadership comes from an executive committee of elected
representatives from the committees. Collette, supra note 3, at 3, 5. In addition, most of the political
participation by local communities on environmental justice issues is community initiated, not gov-
ernment sponsored and government managed. See Lynn W. Bachelor & Bryan D. Jones, Managed
Participation: Detroit's Neighborhood Opportunity Fund, 17 J. APPLIED BEUMV. So. 518, 519
(1981) (analyzing government-sponsored participatory structures designed to elicit neighborhood
input into city policy but often limiting such input to "safe" issues, and contrasting these structures
with "authentic grass-roots organizations").
159. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 24; Ken Geiser & Gerry Waneck, PC~s and Warren
County, in UNEQUAL PRoTSCnON, supra note 3, at 43, 48-49. In 1993, the Citizens Clearinghouse
for Hazardous Wastes estimated the number of grassroots environmental justice groups at 7,000
nationwide. Dorceta E. Taylor, Environmentalism and the Politics of Inclusion, in CONFRONTrNG
ENVIRONMENTAL RActsM, supra note 3, at 53, 53-54. In October 1991, representatives of more than
300 environmental groups of color attended the First National People of Color Environmental Lead-
ership Summit in Washington, D.C. See Bullard, EnvironmentalJusticeforAll, supra note 158, at 59.
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cially diverse.'" Many of these groups use "confrontational direct action
strategies similar to those used in earlier civil rights conflicts."'"' In fact,
some authors trace the origins of the environmental justice movement to
a specific political protest response. 2 In 1982, both African American
and white protesters organized a campaign to stop the location of a PCB
landfill in predominantly African American Warren County, Pennsylva-
nia.' Although the campaign ultimately failed to stop the siting of the
disposal facility, it resulted in the arrest of more than 500 civil rights
protesters, drew national attention to environmental injustice, and in-
spired the first studies of racial inequities in the distribution of environ-
mental hazards.
3. Types of Activism
The use of terms like "political activism" and "community
empowerment" begs two questions. First, what actions qualify as politi-
cal activism or community empowerment?'" Second, for what purposes
are people of color and low-income people active or empowered?'"
A wide range of strategies or actions may be relevant here. One
significant, common response to environmental injustice is community
organizing.'" Community organizing is the process of informing affected
160. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 30, Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 636-37;
Taylor, supra note 159, at 56-57. For A discussion of the role of women of color and feminist per-
spectives in grassroots environmental justice activism, see Celene Krauss, Women of Color on the
Front Line, in UNEQUAL PROTECION, supra note 3, at 256, 256; Cynthia Hamilton, Concerned
Citizens of South Central Los Angeles, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 3, at 209, 216. As
Hamilton notes: "Minority women.., are responding not to 'nature' in the abstract but to their
homes and the health of their children." Id. at 210.
161. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 24.
162. See Tortes, supra note 1, at 434-35; Godsil supra note 6, at 394. But see Bullard, Envi-
ronmental Justice for All, supra note 158, at 3-4 (suggesting that the environmental justice move-
ment began in late 1960s when predominantly African American Texas Southem University students
rioted over the drowning of an eight-year-old African American girl at a garbage dump in the middle
of African American neighborhood, and when the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. was murdered
after going to Memphis to seek better working conditions for African American garbage workers);
Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 523 (tracing environmental justice movement to a Texas civil rights
case challenging the siting of a solid waste facility in a mostly African American Houston neighbor-
hood); Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 126, at 67-68 (stating that environmental justice visibly
emerged in the late 1970s when civil rights leaders began discussing environmental concerns with
environmental leaders).
163. See Geiser & Waneck, supra note 159, at 43 (analyzing the relationship of PCBs and the
Warren County controversy); Torres, supra note 1, at 434-35; Godsil, supra note 6, at 394.
164. Luke Cole defines "empowerment" as "a process which enables individuals to participate
effectively in collective efforts to solve common problems." Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at
661.
165. See infra notes 239-80 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of empowerment).
166. See Citizens' Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste, Six Steps to Action, J. PESTCIDE
REFoRM. Fall 1989, at 13 ('History shows us that the only effective way to resolve a toxic problem
is for citizens to join together. By doing so, they create enough pressure on government and corpo-
rations to ensure that the needs and concerns of people are addressed."); see also Bullard, Anatomy,
supra note 9, at 33; Will Collette, What Works and What Doesn't, in HE BEST OF ORGANIZING
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people (e.g., neighborhood residents), organizing them into a group to
identify goals and responses, and mobilizing them to act." For example,
Mothers of East Los Angeles (MELA) began because California
Assemblywoman Gloria Molina told Juana Beatriz Guti6rrez about a
plan by the California Department of Corrections to build a state prison
in East Los Angeles." Gutidrrez, who was a homemaker, mother of nine,
and Neighborhood Watch Program organizer, held a meeting of other
Neighborhood Watch block captains and neighborhood religious leaders
in her home. At this meeting, the participants formed an organization to
oppose the prison. The group began to grow through word of mouth,
contacts between Assemblywoman Molina's office and community and
business leaders, petitions circulated among neighborhood church pa-
rishioners, weekly candlelight vigils, well-organized and well-prepared
lobbying campaigns, the framing of the issue as protection of children's
safety, and a priest's suggestion of the organization's name: "Mothers of
East Los Angeles."''
TOOLBOX (1993) at 2, 3 (hereinafter Collette, What Works and What Doesn't]; Hamilton, supra note
160, at 207-08.
167. See Collette, What Works and What Doesn't, supra note 166, at 2 C'Organizing is bringing
people together for a common purpose and for mutual support to get the power they need to take
control of their lives."); see also Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 669; Will Collette, Making
That First Contact, in THE BEST OF ORGANIZING TOOLBOX, supra note 166, at 4, 4. For recruitment
of members, the Citizens' Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste suggests developing a simple fact
sheet for potential members, selecting a name with which people can identify, going door-to-door to
talk with people one-on-one, and informing the public at large. The development of goals and action
plans should focus on three questions: (1) What do the group members want? (2) Who can give it?
(3) How can the group make them do it? Id.
168. Gabriel Gutidrrez, Mothers of East Los Angeles Strike Back, in UNEQUAL PROTcrION,
supra note 3, at 220, 220.
169. Id. In the last two decades, many residents of low-income and minority communities have
engaged in grassroots community organizing to respond to environmental injustices. See Bullard,
Anatomy, supra note 9, at 24. For example, African American citizens of Richmond, California,
formed the West County Toxics Coalition to address toxic emissions from a cluster of 350 facilities
that handle hazardous waste. Id. at 29. In response to a Greenpeace organizer's tip about a Chemical
Waste Management proposal to build a toxic waste incinerator at a Class I toxic landfill in 95%
Hispanic Kettleman City, California, local residents formed a community group, El Pueblo para el
Airm y Agua Limpio (People for Clean Air and Water). Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 674.
Residents, mostly women, of an almost exclusively minority South Central Los Angeles neighbor-
hood founded Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles to oppose a municipal solid waste
incinerator slated for their neighborhood. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 28; Hamilton, supra
note 160, at 207-19. Members of the Rosebud Reservation in South Dakota organized the Good
Road Coalition to fight a proposed 6,000-acre municipal landfill on Sioux lands. Bullard, Anatomy,
supra note 9, at 29. An example of a group that began with professional public interest organizers
who mobilized a local community is People United for a Better Oakland (PUEBLO), which initially
was a project of the Oakland-based Center for Third World Organizing (CTWO). See Francis Cal-
potura & Rinku Sen. PUEBLO Fights Lead Poisoning, in UNEQUAL PROTECtON, supra note 3, at
234 (describing PUEBLO's organizing strategy and efforts to combat lead poisoning). However,
failure to address the economic concerns of low-income people of color can prevent their mobiliza-
tion against environmental hazards, especially when neither civil rights leaders nor environmental
leaders make the connections between the two movements clear, tangible, and immediate. See Con-
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Education is another type of response." It involves the relationship
between information and power."' Environmental justice advocates typi-
cally both educate the affected community and involve the affected
community in fact-gathering. They use the information to build the
movement (i.e., gather members and outside supporters), understand the
risks and harms the community faces, make decisions about strategies,
educate and persuade the public and decision makers (e.g., government
policy makers), and support their cases against the LULUs. When com-
munity residents are the experts, both telling their experiences and in-
formation in their own words and engaging in problem-solving research,
they are empowered.'" This empowerment comes from the validation of
their experiences, their participation in public debate and policy making,
and the impact of their perspectives on others.
In MELA's battle against the proposed prison in East Los Angeles,
the group members educated themselves about the political and legal
processes involved in prison siting and impressed state legislators with
their knowledge. They not only educated themselves, but also persis-
tently educated state officials, the media, and the public about their
struggle.'" Members of Kettleman City's El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua
Limpio (People for Clean Air and Water) wrote letters, almost all in
Spanish, to the Kings County Planning Department about a proposed
toxic waste incinerator. These letters expressed the local residents' con-
cerns and their own stories of health symptoms they experienced in con-
nection with an existing toxic waste dump operated by the incinerator
proponent. The letters also questioned the Environmental Impact Report
(EIR) process and the Planning Department's refusal to translate the
documents into Spanish, even though seventy percent of the local resi-
dents spoke Spanish in the home. This strategy of community residents
educating the decision makers affined the power of the community's
ner Bailey et al., Environmental Politics in Alabama's Blackbelt, in CONFRONTING
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 3, at 107, 107.
170. Bullard. Anatomy, supra note 9, at 33; Hamilton, supra note 160, at 213.
171. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 668-69 As noted by Cole: "By increasing the com-
munity's knowledge, and others' knowledge of the community's problems, the community's persua-
sive power is necessarily suengthened." Id. at 668.
172. Luke Cole persuasively argues for the value of community residents telling their experi-
ences and knowledge in their own words, a strength that can be threatened by reliance on legal and
scientific "expertise" that either conflicts with their perspectives or shifts their struggle to arenas
where they have little power or input. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 649-52. 662-63, 668-
69, 675-79. Bunyan Bryant also persuasively argues that community residents can and should
participate in scientific research, thus demystifying expertise for them, using their intelligence and
concern, and shifting environmental problems from technical or academic matters to political
concerns. See Bryant, supra note 57, at 13 (describing several examples of trained community
residents engaging in studies of the health impacts of toxic substances); see also Geiser & Waneck,
supra note 159, at 49 (discussing citizen groups using power to advocate progressive solutions to
toxic chemical contamination).
173. Guti6rrez, supra note 168, at 224-27.
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own expertise and its own voice.7 A different type of community educa-
tion is occurring among the Environmental Health Coalition and local
grassroots groups in San Diego, CA. They are using community right-to-
know laws to inform themselves about toxic air emissions from indus-
tries and military installations, which could pose high risks of cancer.
They have settled a lawsuit that forces the San Diego County Air Pollu-
tion Control District to notify them about emissions.' This example
highlights the importance of using open records and community right-to-
know laws'7 to obtain information about pollution and of strengthening
and enforcing those laws.'"
Another method of political activism is to use institutional political
processes to influence and persuade policy makers." Environmental jus-
tice activists have lobbied public officials individually, spoken at public
hearings, participated in joint conferences with environmental agencies,
circulated petitions, and worked at election campaigning to defeat oppo-
nents of their cause and elect sympathizers. They have sought to influ-
ence specific siting or permitting decisions, enforcement of environ-
mental laws, and general policies that would better protect low-income
and minority communities. They have directed their activity at local,
state, and federal officials of all types, and have often also tried to influ-
ence corporate decision makers to agree voluntarily to stricter environ-
mental standards.
A few of the many successes of political activism by environmental
justice advocates illustrate the variety of activities. Houston's Northeast
Community Action Group brought intense political pressure to bear on
local and state government bodies that were responsible for permitting a
proposed solid waste facility in an African American neighborhood.'7 ' As
a result, the city council voted to prohibit city-owned garbage trucks
from dumping at the landfill and to restrict the construction of solid-
waste sites near public facilities like schools and parks." Furthermore,
the Texas Department of Health revised its landfill permit application
requirements to include detailed land use, economic impact, and soci-
174. Cole, Epowerment, supra note 4, at 674-79. In addition, the educational methods em-
ployed by El Pueblo reached a wide public audience and pushed the dispute onto prime-time news-
casts. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 32.
175. Working Group on Community Right-to-Know, WORKING NOTES ON COMMUNITY RIGHfT-
TO-KNOW (U.S. Pub. Interest Research Group Educ. Fund, Wash., D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 1.
176. E.g., Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-
11050 (1994); California Public Records Act, CAL GOVT. CODE §§ 6250-6270 (1982 & Supp.
1997).
177. See Geiser & Waneck, supra note 159, at 49; Outlook for 1997: A Full Year, WORKING
NOTES ON COMMUNITY RIGTrr-To-KNow (U.S. Pub. Interest Research Group Educ. Fund, Wash.,
D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 1, 1,3.
178. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 33; Hamilton, supra note 160, at 213.
179. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 33.
180. Id.
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odemographic information for proposed sites."' MELA, in its opposition
to a prison in its community, lobbied state legislators and circulated anti-
prison petitions, gathering as many as 900 signatures on one Sunday
alone.'" Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles made an issue
of a proposed solid waste incinerator in a low-income neighborhood of
color in local elections. The group contributed to the defeat of pro-
incinerator city council president Pat Russell and the election of envi-
ronmental advocate Ruth Galanter.'" The Southwest Organizing Project
(SWOP), a community-based social justice organization in Albuquerque,
sent a letter to the EPA Administrator about the EPA's role in environ-
mental injustice, gave the Administrator tours of polluted low-income
and minority communities, lobbied federal officials for regulations to
protect those communities, and lobbied national environmental groups to
share power over the environmental agenda.'" When a multi-racial coali-
tion, a local chapter of Citizens for a Better America, organized a grass-
roots effort to oppose the federal siting of a nuclear waste depository in
an African American area of Halifax County, Virginia, more than 1,400
residents attended a public meeting to express their opposition. In the
face of organized opposition, the Department of Energy decided to re-
move Halifax County from its list of potential nuclear waste sites.'" The
Good Road Coalition of the Rosebud Reservation convinced a majority
of residents to defeat both a landfill proposal and candidates who sup-
ported the proposal in a tribal election."
Despite the success of many environmental justice groups in the
political arena, decision makers do not always listen to conventional po-
litical messages from low-income people and people of color.' Those
who typically have had little influence through traditional political means
often use extra-institutional responses, like lawful public protest and
181. Id. at 33-34.
182. Gutidrrez, supra note 168, at 223-26. After seven years of conflict between California
Governor Pete Wilson and MELA, Governor Wilson signed a bill in 1992 that killed the prison
proposal. Id. at 233.
183. Hamilton, supranote 160, at 213.
184. Richard Moore & Louis Head, Building a Net That Works: SWOP, in UNEQUAL
PROTECTION, supra note 3, at 191,200-02.
185. Robert W. Coffin & William Harris, Sr., Race and Waste in Two Virginia Communities, in
CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 3, at 93, 98-100. However, Residents In-
volved in Saving the Environment (RISE) used similar tactics--225 citizens attended a public hear-
ing and 947 citizens signed a petition opposing a landfill in a predominantly African American
neighborhood-but were unable to persuade the King and Queen County, Virginia, Board of Super-
visors to reject the facility. Id. at 95-96.
186. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 37-38.
187. See, e.g., Collin & Harris, supra note 185, at 95-96 (describing unsuccessful opposition to
a landfill siting through traditional hearing system): Grossman, supra note 9, at 287-88 (describing
unsupportive atmosphere of Washington, D.C. in the 1980s and early 1990s); Mydans, supra note
60, at AS (describing unsuccessful attempts by Native Americans to use agency channels to protest a
human waste dump).
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demonstrations, civil disobedience, and violent protest.'" MELA held
weekly candlelight vigils, which included marches on the Olympic
Boulevard bridge that attracted more than 3,000 participants.'" Protestors
against dumping PCBs at a landfill in predominantly African American
Warren County, North Carolina, blocked roads with their bodies to pre-
vent trucks from carrying PCB-laden soil to the site, and over 500 pro-
testors were arrested." Similarly, members of the Torres Martinez Desert
Cahuilla Indian Tribe created a blockade on the edge of a sewage sludge
disposal site on their California desert reservation to prevent as much as
1,000 tons of sewage sludge per day from reaching the site, having re-
ceived little help from officials at the Bureau of Indian Affairs.'"
Perhaps one of the most extreme power-based responses to envi-
ronmental justice is rioting, such as the riots by Texas Southern Univer-
sity students in the late 1960s over the drowning of an eight-year-old
African American girl at a garbage dump in the middle of an African
American neighborhood.'" Protests not only challenge the existing power
structure and pressure decision makers, but also educate the public about
environmental justice issues, as illustrated by the national attention re-
ceived by the Gulf Coast Tenants Organization's Great Louisiana Toxics
March through the Cancer Alley area of Louisiana.'
4. Litigation As a Political Tool
Litigation also has the potential to be a political tool. Many envi-
ronmental justice groups have brought lawsuits. Robert Bullard's study
of nine grassroots environmental groups showed that six groups used
litigation as a reform tactic.'" What is unclear, though, is whether envi-
ronmental justice groups are using litigation for empowerment or merely
as a legal answer to a political problem.
Luke Cole, one of the nation's leading public interest environmental
justice lawyers,'"m has analyzed the strategic and tactical problems of liti-
188. See Bullani, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 33; Hamilton, supra note 160, at 213. "In the
1990s, activists of color continue to campaign, match, and protest against environmental racism."
Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 122, at 68.
189. Gutifrrez, supra note 168, at 224.
190. Geiser & Waneck, supra note 159, at 43-44.
191. Mydans, supra note 60, at AS.
192. See Bullard, supra note 158, at 3. See generally JOE R. FEAGIN & HARLAN HAHN,
GHErTo REVOLTS: THE POLTICS OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN CITIES (1973) (discussing riots as
modes of political influence, aimed not only at gathering attention to a problem but also at chal-
lenging existing institutional power structures). Nonetheless, violent responses to environmental
injustice are fighting one wrong with another Fortunately, nearly all documented protests by envi-
ronmental justice activists have been non-violent.
193. See Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 126, at 69.
194. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 35.
195. Cole is General Counsel of the Center on Race, Poverty & the Environment, and a staff
attorney with the California Rural Legal Assistance. He represented El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua
Limpio in the Kettleman incinerator dispute. See supra note 169.
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gation from a community empowerment, or environmental poverty law-
yering, perspective.'" He argues that a victory in a lawsuit will not
change the political and economic relationships that created the envi-
ronmental injustice, and therefore a legal response to environmental in-
justice may be inappropriate for a political problem.'" In Cole's view, the
use of litigation tends to disempower low-income people and people of
color. It moves the struggle from the streets, where people have power,
to the courts, where polluters can afford the best legal and scientific ex-
pertise and where historically minorities and the poor have experienced
oppression, intimidation, and distrust.'" It also takes the struggle away
from the people and gives it to the lawyer who may paternalistically im-
pose on the people ideas and actions that come from the lawyer's per-
spective.'" According to Cole, litigation tends to focus on serving indi-
vidual clients, rather than building, educating, and empowering groups.
If victims of environmental injustice win a lawsuit, they may not be or-
ganized to take advantage of it or may not have any lasting political
struggle around which to build a long-term community power base.'
Finally, use of the law tends to legitimize existing power relationships
and institutional structures and may deter low-income and minority peo-
ple from exploring actions that challenge the current social structure. '
There is, however, a tension between Cole's critique of litigation as
an environmental justice strategy and the empirical reality that many
environmental justice groups choose to bring lawsuits.' Cole recognizes.
that litigation may be a legitimate choice if part of a general
empowerment strategy. He proposes a model of environmental justice
lawyering that is community-based, builds the victims' control over their
struggle and capacity to solve their own problems, favors group repre-
sentation (as opposed to individual representation), treats legal tactics as
means for empowerment (not as ends in themselves), and uses non-legal
tactics.' Legal tactics are acceptable only if they educate people, build
196. See Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 661-73 (analyzing the impact of pollution on
underrepresented communities and positive effect that legal community can have); see also Cole,
Litigation, supra note 4, at 524 (weighing costs and benefits of litigation). For an example of envi-
ronmental poverty lawyering with an emphasis on community empowerment, see Dale H. Seamans,
A Unique Community Law Partnership: Environmental "Network" Lends Voice to Neighborhood
Concerns, MASS. L. WKLY., Jan. 29, 1996, at B 1.
197. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 648-49.
198. Id. at 647-48,650.
199. Id. at 649-50.
200. Id. at 651-52, 663-67. But see Moya, supra note 6 (urging lawyers to adopt an environ-
mental justice ethic as part of a larger plan to achieve environmental justice).
201. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 651.
202. Id. at 652.
203. See Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 524.
204. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 652, 654-68. Nonetheless, many grassroots groups,
people of color, and low-income people are highly skeptical of lawyers, fear or resent the control
that lawyers exercise, and believe that legal tactics should be avoided or carefully controlled. See
SOtrHWST NETWORK FOR ENVTL. & ECON. JUSTICE & ENVTL. LAW INST., WORKING WITH
LAWYERS: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY RESIDENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ACTIVISTS
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1
the environmental justice movement and community groups, and address
the root of the problem, rather than merely a symptom.' Cole's model
reflects the most compelling and influential current theories of public
interest lawyering.'
Litigation can serve several political functions.A First, some low-
income people and people of color may feel more empowered by appro-
priating some of the social system's power, particularly through the law
and the courts, and working within the system, than by fighting the entire
power structure.' Second, a lawsuit may be a visible manifestation of a
community's struggle around which community organizing activities
may take place." Although some community members may view litiga-
tion as an opportunity or necessity to turn over responsibility for their
problems to a lawyer,t ° others may be attracted to a group that is boldly
fighting for the community's rights in the courts, especially if the entire
group is actively involved in directing and participating in the
(1997); CITIZEN'S CLEARINGHOUSE FOR HAZARDOUS WASTES, A USER'S GUIDE TO LAWYERS
(1985); Marcia Coyle & Claudia MacLachlan, Getting Victimized by the Legal System, NAT'L. L.,
Sept. 21, 1992, at $8. Environmental justice advocates have expressed the same concerns to law
schools that have begun environmental justice clinics. See Open Letter from Bay Area Environ-
mental Justice Activists to Environmental Law Clinic Proponents at Boalt Hall Law School, Golden
Gate Law School & Stanford Law School (Dec. 20, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Open
Letter to Environmental Clinics].
205. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 668-70.
206. For further information on approaches to public interest lawyering, see GERALD P. LPm,
REBELUOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACIICE (1993); Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALE U. 470 (1976); Joel F. Handler, Community Care for the Frail Elderly: A
Theory of Empowerment, 50 OHIO ST. U. 541 (1989); Gerald P. LUpez, The Work We Know So
Little About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1989); Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE
U. 1049 (1970); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and
Power, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 699.
207. Bell, supra note 206, at 513.
208. People of color have relied heavily on legal rights to fight oppression. See PATRICIA J.
WII.JAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 163-64 (1991) (expressing the growth of rights for
African Americans as a process of empowerment). Legal representation can empower people with-
out power. See Austin Sarat, "... The Law Is All Over": Power, Resistance and the Legal Con-
sciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 363-64 (1990). For a view that those
who challenge the conventional power structure (i.e., reform movements) either are integrated into
that structure as it changes incrementally or are suppressed, see JEFFREY BURTON RUSSELL, DISSENr
AND ORDER IN THE MIDDLE AGES: THE SEARCH FOR LEGmMATE AUTroirT 101-02 (1992).
Dissent and order, acceptable reform and unacceptable reform, are the same evolving movement in
healthy tension. Id.
209. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 542 (describing publicity benefits of lawsuits generally
and the local and national attention that the Kettleman City incinerator struggle received after the
filing of a civil rights and environmental suit). In addition, a publicity-generated lawsuit may inspire
other similar communities. Id. A client may identify similarly situated people, such as neighbors, and
meet with them about the problem, thereby building a group. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at
666.
210. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 650 n.l16, 661-66 & n.182. In addition, there may
be a similar temptation to allow the movement to be shaped and directed by professional community
activists or organizers.
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litigation."' Third, a lawsuit, if conducted according to Cole's public
interest lawyering model, could involve affected people in the solution of
their problem by relying on them to make decisions about litigation strat-
egy and tactics, share their expertise on the environmental injustices they
experience, gather facts, develop contingency plans for various out-
comes, and do a variety of other tasks like media work and community
education.2 Fourth, litigation can educate the community, policy mak-
ers, and the public about environmental injustices and the rights of those
affected. " Fifth, publicity surrounding litigation not only educates peo-
ple about the particular conflict and encourages others .to fight against
environmental injustice, but it also puts pressure on corporate and gov-
ernment decision makers. 14 Sixth, litigation may be a rallying point for
attracting other groups' support, such as the assistance of civil rights
groups for an environmental justice civil rights case?' Seventh, litigation
may educate the courts about environmental injustices and facilitate
changes in legal doctrine that are more favorable to the environmental
justice movement.216 Eighth, environmental justice groups bring lawsuits
so that they can participate in government decisions or have access to
information about the impacts or potential impacts of various projects;
they often base these suits on statutes that require public participation,
environmental impact study, or information disclosure.2 ' Ninth, both the
credible ability to threaten litigation and the development of legal doc-
trine that favors environmental justice claims enhance the bargaining
power of grassroots community groups in non-judicial, political arenas.t5
Similarly, lawsuits may bring the polluter and/or government agency to
the bargaining table with the affected community residents.219 Tenth,
"[b]ringing a civil rights suit against local government officials can be
very satisfying for the community group involved, because it calls the
problem what it is: a violation of civil rights. It is one high-profile way of
saying that the official being sued is engaging in racist practices.'" Fi-
nally, despite Cole's concerns that lawsuit victories may derail organiz-
ing and empowerment efforts,"' some groups may be energized and em-
211. Id. at 661-68.
212. See id. at 661-63, 665.
213. Id. at 664, 668-69; Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 542-43.
214. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 542.
215. Id. at 543.
216. id. at 543-44.
217. Id. at 528-30.
218. This is known as "bargaining in the shadow of the law." Robert Cooter et aL, Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, I I J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 225-26
(1982); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950,968-69 (1979).
219, The Coalition for Community Action in Alsen, Louisiana (part of Cancer Alley) brought a
lawsuit against Rollins Environmental Services incinerators, which was settled out-of-court for an
average of $3,000 per resident and reduced emissions from the Rollins facilities. Bullard, Anatomy,
supra note 9, at 27-28,37.
220. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 541-42.
221. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 651.
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powered by a victory and especially by the prevention or elimination of
the environmentally harmful LULU.' Thus, litigation is sometimes a
powerful political response to environmental injustice.
5. Networks and Coalitions
Environmental justice advocates typically enhance their political
responses by developing networks and coalitions among environmental
and social justice groups, as well as with political, business, and civic
leaders.' Coalitions involve separate groups that cooperate and support
one another on specific issues or conflicts, often in a particular commu-
nity (even if not all the groups in the coalition exist in that community).'
Networks, on the other hand, are multi-issue, regional or national asso-
ciations of grassroots groups, united to share information, advance the
environmental justice movement generally, and seek a range of govern-
ment policies and processes.'m An example of coalition building is the
work of Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles in obtaining
the support and cooperation of various groups in opposing a solid waste
incinerator. The group of mainly women of color maintained control of
their struggle while forging alliances with Greenpeace, Citizens for a
Better Environment, the National Health Law Program, the Center for
Law in the Public Interest, and two white Westside "slow growth"
groups.' Historically, environmental justice groups were more likely to
receive support from social justice groups than from mainstream envi-
ronmental groups. However, increasingly groups in the affected neigh-
borhood lead environmental justice struggles, while a diverse range of
groups--social justice and environmental, minority and white, low-
income and high-income, grassroots and professional, local and na-
tional--support and assist in the struggle. ' The support of these groups
can be quite valuable. For example, MELA relied on the technical ad-
222. See, e.g., National Oil Refinery ACTION! Network/Communities for a Better Environ-
ment, Sun Oil Reaches Good Neighbor Agreement with NeighborslWorkers 12-30-97 (visited Nov.
11, 1998) <http://www.igc.org/cbesf/flash.html> [hereinafter NORAN/CBE, Sun Oil]; Chester
Residents Concerned for Quality Living, Federal Court Gives Green Light to Environmental
Racism Suit Against PA DEP (visited Nov. I1, 1998) <http://www.enviroweb.org/pen/crcql/
lawsuit_victory l.html>.
223. See SzAsz, supra note 7, at 70-71, 74-76; Gauna, supra note 6, at 11.
224. See SzAsz, supra note 7, at 74-76.
225. Id.
226. Hamilton, supra note 160, at 212-13. For an example of a grassroots group that gathered
the support of state and local politicians, business leaders, community leaders, and religious leaders,
see Colln & Harris, supra note 185, at 100 (describing organizational efforts of Citizens for a Better
Environment against proposed waste dump).
227. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 24, 30-33; Gauna, supra note 6, at 78-79. Envi-
ronmental justice groups also work collaboratively with university centers, such as the Deep South
Center for Environmental Justice at Xavier University in New Orleans, and law school clinics, such
as those at Boalt Hall, Golden Gate, and Stanford Law Schools. See Beverly Wright, Environmental
Equity Justice Centers: A Response to Inequity, in ENvIRoNMENrAL JusnIC: ISSUES, POLICIES,
AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 7, at*57, 63-65; Open Letter to Environmental Clinics, supra note 204.
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vice, expert testimony, lobbying, research, and legal assistance of groups
like Greenpeace, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Citizens'
Clearinghouse on Hazardous Waste, and the Western Center on Law and
Poverty. =
Networks can be equally valuable. 1990 and 1991 were especially
important years for building networks among environmental justice ad-
vocates. In 1990, the University of Michigan School of Natural Re-
sources held a nationally important conference of leading scholars, ac-
tivists, and government officials concerned with environmental justice
issues, resulting in the establishment of an environmental justice working
group within the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.' Also in 1990,
the Southwest Organizing Project (SWOP) sponsored the People of
Color Regional Activist Dialogue for Environmental Justice (RAD), at-
tended by one hundred activists from eight Southwestern states.2"' Out of
RAD came the Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic
Justice (SNEEJ), and the Southwest Training and Action Institute.
23'
SNEEJ consists of grassroots groups from throughout eight Southwestern
states; it facilitates the exchange of ideas and experiences among activ-
ists, and provides for mutual support and consideration of regional per-
spectives on local struggles.2 ' With the strength of numbers greater than
any individual group, SNEEJ also lobbies for national policies, both leg-
islative and regulatory, that will promote environmental justice.' The
Institute studies environmental justice issues, gathers and disseminates
technical information, and trains leaders of grassroots groups.' In addi-
tion to SNEEJ, other regional networks include the Indigenous Environ-
mental Network and the Southern Community Labor Conference for
Environmental Justice.'
At a more national level, the First National People of Color Envi-
ronmental Leadership Summit was held in Washington, DC in October
1991.' More than 600 people of color, representing more than 300
groups, attended the conference and labeled the impact of environmental
racism on people of color as "environmental genocide."237 The partici-
pants issued a set of seventeen principles of environmental justice, fo-
228. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 32.
229. Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 126, at 69; see also Maria Ramirez Fisher, Comment, On
the Road from Environmental Racism to Environmental Justice, 5 Viii. ENVTL. LJ. 449, 467-74
(1994) (urging the formation of coalitions between grassroots groups and mainstream environmental
organizations).
230. Moore& Head, supra note 184, at 191.
231. Id. at 192.
232. id. at 192-94.
233. Id. at 200-02
234. id. at 194. Leadership development includes training on the history and culture of the
Southwest and the interrelationship between economic and environmental issues. id.
235. See Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 126, at 69.
236. Grossman, supra note 9, at 272.
237. Id. at 272-73; see Bullard, Environmental Justicefor All, supra note 158, at 7.
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cusing on both environmental and social justice goals for government
policy, economic markets, and societal attitudes and actions." By or-
ganizing into networks, grassroots groups are enhancing their
empowerment strategies so that they influence the national agenda.
6. Goals of Empowerment
The second question concerning the meaning of "community
empowerment" and "political activism" asks: For what purposes are
people of color and low-income people active or empowered? Is their
only goal to remedy or prevent environmental injustices, or do they have
broader, more visionary goals? In other words, are they empowered only
to keep out of their neighborhoods, workplaces, and other common areas
what they do not want, or are they empowered to define and achieve
what they do want in their communities?
By and large, grassroots environmental justice activists' political
responses have been reactions to proposed or existing environmental
hazards, usually LULUs.' Bullard's case studies of nine grassroots envi-
ronmental justice groups show that all were formed in response to com-
munity disputes over either existing or proposed facilities in low-income
or minority neighborhoods.' In many ways, suggestions that these
communities should think more broadly or in more visionary terms are
unfair and unrealistic. These people are fighting for their lives, families,
homes, and neighborhoods against existing or impending environmental
harms; they are reacting to crisis situations." Furthermore, community
organizing and political activity may be easier when the community has
a concrete and immediate danger to fight or conflict to address.'
Nevertheless, environmental injustice is a political problem in part
because people of color and low-income people have not played a role in
developing the general policies that govern the siting of LULUs, pollu-
tion standards, community participation, and neighborhood land use pat-
terns . ' One type of political response to environmental injustice is to
lobby for generally applicable and prospective rules and policies to pro-
tect all minority and low-income communities from pollution and LU-
238. Grossman, supra note 9, at 272-75.
239. See Poirier, supra note 28, at 798 ("These movements typically originate in issues specific
to a particular geographic location or a particular land use controversy."); see also Bullard, Anatomy,
supra note 9, at 27-28, 37 (Coalition for Community Action response to existing incinerators in
Alsen, Louisiana); Collin & Harris, supra note 185, at 95-96 (citizen group petitioned Board of
Supervisors to reject proposed landfill); Guti6rrez, supra note 168, at 220, 221-25 (MELA reaction
to proposed state prison).
240. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 24-39 & tbl. 1.
241. See Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 639-40 (comparing the motivations of the
"mainstream environmentalists," mainly lawyers, responding to the social ferment of the sixties, with
the motivations of non-lawyers directly affected by environmental problems in iheir communities).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 647-49.
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LUs. Environmental justice groups are increasingly engaged in this type
of lobbying-especially as they become better organized, more estab-
lished, more vocal, and better connected to one another in regional and
national networks? '
For example, environmental justice activists in Florida sought leg-
islation to create the Florida Environmental Equity and Justice Commis-
sion, which studied whether minority communities bear a greater con-
centration of environmental hazards than the general population. The
Commission proposed changes in statewide policies to address environ-
mental justice needs.' Other states have acted as well, enacting statutes
that prohibit over-concentration of LULUs in any host communities (i.e.,
geographic dispersion requirements),24 statutes that require agencies to
consider the impacts of their environmental decisions on host communi-
ties and on the input of those communities,' and joint resolutions that
call for environmental justice.' Many other state legislatures have con-
sidered environmental justice bills.'
Legislation has also been introduced in Congress. These bills in-
clude the Environmental Justice Act of 1992, ° the Environmental Justice
244. It is unclear whether political leaders will believe their self-interest will be served by
supporting the environmental justice movement. Compare Guti6rrez, supra note 169, at 222-25
(detailing the assistance given to California Assemblywoman Gloria Molina by the Mothers of East
Los Angeles), with Randy Lee Loftis, Controversy in the Air: Civil Rights Act Invoked in Protest
over Chemical Plant Plan, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 9, 1997, at 24A (reporting the hostility of
Louisiana Governor Mike Foster to the environmental justice movement's opposition to a Shintech
polyvinyl chloride plant in an African American area already hosting several chemical plants). For
an argument that politicians may support social justice causes, despite political costs, because of
personal moral views about the public good, see Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Beyond Self-
Interest: Policy Entrepreneurs and Aid to the Homeless, 18 PotL'Y STUD. J. 47, 48 (1989).
245. See 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 94-219; FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 5; Environmental Equity &
Justice Commission, ENVTL. JUSTICE WATCH! (Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. (LEAF), Tallahas-
see, Fla.), Feb. 28, 1995, at 2 (LEAF wrote the Model Legislation Environmental Equity and Justice
Act, which formed the basis for the Florida statute).
246. See, e.g., 1993 Ark. Act 1263; see also Mary Lou Gallagher, New York City Fair Share
Process, 58 PLANNING 13 (1992) (discussing New York City's charter provision for the equitable
siting of public facilities).
247. See 1993 La. Act § 767; 1997 Md. Laws ch. 741.
248. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 662, 1994 Reg. Ses. (Mich. 1994); H.RJ. Res. 146, 1993 Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 1993); H.RJ Res. 529, 1993 Reg. Sess. (Va. 1993).
249. See, e.g., S. 713, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1997); H.R. 2572, 43d Leg., 1st Reg. Ses. (Ariz.
1997); S. 451, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997); S. 1348, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997); S. 1354, 1997
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997); H.R. 945, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997); H.B. 518, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (1L.
1997); H.B. 447, 1997 Reg. Ses. (Miss. 1997); H.R. 238, 98th Gen. Assembly, Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo.
1997); S. 2096, 220th Ann. Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1997); S. 5594, 220th Ann. Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1997);
H.R. 726, 100th Gen. Assembly, (Tenn. 1997); S. 1049, 75th Reg. Ses. (Tex. 1997); S.B. 7576,
219th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996); S.B. 6583, 219th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 1996); H.R. 2321, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1996); H.R. 3224,1995-96 Reg. Sess. (I01. 1995);
H.R. 1049, 1995 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1995); S. 3393,219th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995);
S. 2252, 219th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995); S.B. 434, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Wisc.
1995); see also KATHLYN GAY, POt.LrION AND THE PowERLEss 108-09 (1994).
250. H.R. 2105, 103d Cong. (1993).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Act of 1993, ' the Environmental Health Equity Information Act of
1993,t " the Department of the Environment Act of 1993,03 the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection Act,' the Public Health Equity Act,2 '
and the Environmental Risk Evaluation Act of 1995.' These bills have
simultaneously received praise as national attempts to address environ-
mental injustice, and criticism as being largely procedural and symbolic
without effective and timely implementation mechanisms or reform of
state and local siting policies.' Congress has not yet passed a compre-
hensive environmental justice act. '
Environmental justice advocates have had more success in lobbying
the Executive Branch than achieving federal legislation. In response to
the rising environmental justice movement, the EPA formed the Envi-
ronmental Equity Workgroup in the early 1990s.' In 1992, the Work-
group issued a report assessing the evidence that poor and minority
communities are at greater risk of exposure to environmental hazards
than more affluent white neighborhoods.' The report received wide-
spread criticism from environmental justice advocates, who contend that
the EPA views environmental justice as primarily a public relations
problem for government officials to manipulate and favors mere redistri-
bution of risk (environmental equity), instead of pollution reduction (en-
vironmental justice)." The EPA has created several agency offices to
address environmental justice concerns: the EPA Office of Environ-
mental Equity, the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council,
and the Office of Solid Waste and the Emergency Response Environ-
mental Justice Task Force. ' On February 11, 1994, President Clinton
issued Executive Order 12,898, creating an Interagency Working Group
on Environmental Justice to coordinate environmental justice policy
251. S. 1161, 103d Cong. (1993).
252. H.R. 1925, 103d Cong. (1993).
253. S. 171, 103d Cong. (1993).
254. H.R. 3425, 103d Cong. (1993).
255. S. 1841, 1O3d Cong. (1994).
256. S. 123, 104th Cong. (1995).
257. See iUnda D. Blank, Comment, Seeking Solutions to Environmental Inequity. The Envi-
ronmental Justice Act, 24 ENvTi. L. 1109, 1120-21 (1994) (commending the aims of the EJA of
1992, but arguing that it fails to effectively address the real problems associated with environmental
justice); Claire L Hasler, Comment, The Proposed Environmental Justice Act: "I Have a (Green)
Dream," 17 U. PUGE SOUND L REv. 417,451-57 (1994) (arguing the EJA of 1992 avoids many of
the issues associated with environmental justice concerns).
258. Public interest groups are also lobbying Congress for legislation to expand the public's
right to information about toxic substances and products. See Outlook for 1997: A Full Year, supra
note 177, at 1-3.
259. Carol E. Dinkins, Impact of the Environmental Justice Movement on American Industry
and Local Government, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 337, 338 (1995).
260. EPA, ENVIRONMENrAL EQUrIY, supra note 5, at 11-24.
261. See Robert D. Bullard, Conclusion: Environmentalism with Justice, in CONFRONTING
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 3, at 195, 195; Gauna, supra note 6, at 27-29.
262. Dinkins, supra note 259, at 339-40.
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among federal agencies. The Order required every federal agency to de-
velop an agency-wide environmental justice strategy within ten months
and to report periodically to the Working Group on its implementation of
the strategy.' The Order further directed agencies to gather data on dis-
parate environmental risks and health effects, assess programs for impact
on minority and low-income populations, and improve public participa-
tion and access to information related to federal programs and policies. '
It is unclear whether the Executive Order achieved its intended ef-
fect on substantive policy decisions. The fate of the proposed Louisiana
Energy Services (LES) uranium enrichment plant near Homer, Louisi-
ana, illustrates the ambiguity. On May 1, 1997, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's (NRC) Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ALSB) de-
nied a license for the LES plant. The denial was partly because both the
license application and the NRC staffs review of the application did not
comply with Executive Order 12,898.2 The ALSB mandated that NRC
staff re-investigate the impact of the project on African American resi-
dents surrounding the proposed plant, and examine whether racial dis-
crimination played a role in the selection of the site.' " The NRC, how-
ever, reversed the ALSB on the environmental justice issue, on the basis
that the only applicable law in the case was the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),' which the NRC held could not be used as
a tool for inquiry into racial discrimination.' The NRC stated that the
Executive Order created no new rights or remedies and therefore could
not form the basis of a "non-discriminatory directive" on which the
ALSB could require inquiry into whether LBS officials intended to dis-
criminate on the basis of race.' According to the NRC, the ALSB had
"no clear legal basis or clearly discernible objective" in reviewing
siting decisions for racial discrimination, but upheld the ALSB's re-
quirement that the NRC staff consider the social impacts of the proposed
plant on the surrounding neighborhood, particularly pedestrian traffic
and property values.Y The NRC decision was a stunning blow to the
meaningful implementation of the Executive Order and to the local
community's attempt to have input into the placement of a uranium en-
richment plant in their midst. The NRC's insistence that NEPA was the
only applicable law ignored the applicability of federal civil rights stat-
utes, such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,m which prohibits
263. Exec. Order No. 12,898,3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
264. Id.
265. In re Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P., 45 N.R.C. 367,367 (1997) (final initial decision).
266. Id. at 390-97.
267. Pub. L. No. 91-190,83 StaL 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 432 1-4370e (1994)).
268. In re Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P., 47 N.R.C. 77, 100-06 (1998).
269. Id. at 102.
270. Id. at 101.
271. Id.
272. Pub. L. 88-352, § 601, 78 Star. 241, 252 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994)).
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racial discrimination in federal programs and funding.' In addition, if
the decision to site the LES plant near Homer, Louisiana, were based on
intentional racism, the federal approval of the siting decision could be a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 '
Ultimately, though, LES withdrew its application for a permit and license
for the uranium enrichment plant, bowing to local opposition and charges
of environmental injustice.' The NRC refused to reconsider its far-
reaching statements about the Executive Order and dismissed the case as
moot.' Thus, the opponents of the plant defeated it, but the long-term
impact of the Executive Order is in question."
Environmental justice activists are also increasingly participating in
administrative rulemaking on environmental matters. The New York
City Environmental Justice Alliance, supported by forty other civil rights
and, environmental groups from New York City, submitted comments
favoring the EPA's proposal for stricter air pollution standards governing
ozone and particulate matter, and pointing to the higher incidence of
asthma in inner cities due to ambient air pollution.' Communities for a
Better Environment have petitioned the EPA to list dioxin on the Toxics
Release Inventory (TR, and various groups regularly comment on the
EPA proposed rules and programs that relate to the availability of infor-
mation about toxic pollution. '
Finally, as demonstrated later in this article, environmental justice
advocates are also beginning to seek land use regulations that will protect
low-income and minority neighborhoods against LULUs and other envi-
ronmental harms.' However, the political conception of environmental
justice remains largely focused on preventing harms. More often than
not, what a community is seeking is defined in the negative-no dumps,
no more group homes, no dirty air, no racism in enforcement practices-
instead of in the positive-zoning and financing for small business de-
velopment, more parks, clean air, or neighborhood participation in en-
forcement decisions. Communities "fight back," instead of "fight for."
Of course, the distinction between the two is sometimes not so clear,
273. See infra notes 299-338 and accompanying text.
274. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see infra notes 288-98 and accompanying text (discussing
constitutional protections against environmental racism); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 16
(1948) (holding government enforcement of private discrimination is state action in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause).
275. In re Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P., 47 N.R.C. 113, 114(1998) (order).
276. In re Louisiana Energy Servs., 47 N.R.C. at 114.
277. However, responding to the Executive Order, the EPA has successfully put pressure on the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection to deny a permit for a sewage sludge treatment
works in a Newark neighborhood of color. See Michael B. Gerrard & Monica Jahan Bose, The
Emerging Arena of "Justice," N.Y. LJ., July 25, 1997, at 3.
278. Justice in the Air?, 120 MOBILIZING THE REGION I (Apr. 4, 1997) (visited Oct. 21, 1998)
<http:J/www.tstc.org/bulletin/1997040/mtrl2005.htm>.
279. See Working Group on Community Right-to-Know, supra note 175, at 1, 3.
280. See infra Part V.
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occasionally even merely semantical. For example, community organiz-
ing to stop air pollution and community organizing to achieve clean air
may be quite similar, although the latter would likely be far more crea-
tive and have a far broader agenda than the former. The former, fighting
against a public "bad," would rightly target polluters and government
agencies that permit pollution, whereas the latter, fighting for a public
"good," would do the same but also seek non-polluting technologies,
push for cleanup of the local air basin, and consider what the local
neighborhood could do to contribute to improved air quality. A commu-
nity that is under siege from pollution and LULUs will naturally react,
but long-term empowerment will come from participating in, and influ-
encing, generally applicable policy that will shape all sorts of future ac-
tions and conflicts that could affect that community.
C. Rights Protection Responses (Legal Conceptions)
Environmental justice activists have not confined themselves to
political strategies but have also used the law both to protect the rights of
those harmed by environmental injustices and to remedy those harms'
Environmental justice scholars have also devoted much attention to judi-
cial remedies.'m As Denis Binder has written, the amount of initial envi-
ronmental justice literature seemed to exceed greatly the number of pub-
lished court opinions on the issue.m However, "[e]nvironmental justice
issues often lurk in the background of cases, but are not necessarily pres-
ent on the surface,"' and the amount of environmental justice litigation
has grown significantly in the last few years. In addition, legal strategies
often overlap with political and enforcement strategies, such as when
grassroots groups lobby for legislation or regulations (i.e., laws of gen-
eral applicability) or push for enforcement of existing laws to a particular
proposal or facility.'
The legal theories behind environmental justice litigation reflect the
convergence of environmental law and civil rights law.' Under this con-
281. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 523-26.
282. Collin, supra note 6, at 134. See generally Binder, supra note 6 (providing a list of envi-
ronmental justice cases); Cole, Litigation, supra note 4 (discussing judicial remedies for siting dis-
putes); Colopy, supra note 6 (discussing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a judicial rem-
edy); Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title Vi of the Civil Rights Act,
25 ENVrL. L 285 (1995) (opining that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a viable judicial
remedy); Gauna, supra note 6 (analyzing citizen suits under environmental statutes); Stephen M.
Johnson, NEPA and SEPA's in the Quest for Environmental Justice, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 565
(1997) (discussing NEPA and SEPAs as judicial remedies); Lazarus, supra note 6, at 827-42 (out-
lining various judicial remedies); Reich, supra note 6 (concluding federal law offers inadequate
remedies); Godsil, supra note 6, at 408-27 (exploring the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection
Clause as judicial remedies).
283. Binder, supra note 6, at 163.
284. Id. at 164.
285. See supra Part I.B (discussing political activism); infra Part I.C.3 (discussing statutory
rights to enforcement of environmental laws); see also Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 524-25.
286. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 530.
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ception, environmental injustice violates the rights of minorities and the
poor. The causes of action are based on five different types of rights: (1)
the constitutional right against intentional racial discrimination; (2) the
statutory and regulatory right against racial discrimination, whether by
intentional action or unjustifiable and measurable impact; (3) the statu-
tory right to have the substantive environmental law applied and en-
forced; (4) the statutory right to certain procedures, participation, and
information in environmental decision making; and (5) the right to com-
pensation for harms caused by others. Each type of right and applicable
causes of action will be described. There are far too many cases, how-
ever, to describe all of them, and thorough analyses of individual cases
exist elsewhere in the literature.'
1. Constitutional Rights
An obvious source of legal relief for claims of environmental racism
is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.!" Commu-
nity groups and individuals have brought numerous suits against gov-
ernment decision makers for decisions to approve the siting of LULUs in
minority areas, arguing that these racially discriminatory decisions vio-
lated the plaintiffs' equal protection rights.' Government actions based
on race, a suspect classification, are subject to strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause, requiring the government to prove that its ac-
tions were "narrowly tailored" to meet a "compelling governmental pur-
pose[]." m However, to establish a successful equal protection claim that
triggers strict scrutiny, a plaintiff must prove that the government deci-
sion makers intentionally discriminated on the basis of race, not merely
287. See id. at 527 & n.16; Collin, supra note 6, at 134-41; Colopy, supra note 6, at 145-50.
Binder compiled an excellent index of environmental justice cases from 1886 to 1992. Binder, supra
note 6, at 165-67. By cases, I do not mean exclusively published opinions, which far too often am
the primary or sole focus of law review articles. Sometimes the mere filing of a lawsuit or the set-
tement of a pending suit may protect the rights of the plaintiffs, especially if it is part of an overall
grassroots organizing and empowerment plan. See, e.g., Vemice D. Miller, Planning, Power and
Politics: A Case Study of the Land Use and Siting History of the North River Water Pollution Con-
trol Plant, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 707,721 (1994); NORAN/CBE, Sun Oil, supra note 222.
288. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Equal protection claims may be brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1994), which provides a federal cause of action for deprivation of federal constitutional rights
under color of state law.
289. See, e.g., Lake Lucerne Civic Ass'n. v. Dolphin Stadium Corp., 801 F. Supp. 684, 699,
701 (S.D. Fla. 1992); R.LS.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149 (E.D. Va. 1991); East Bibb
Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n. v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp.
880, 881 (M.D. Ga.), affd, 888 F.2d 1573, op. amended & superseded on denial of reh'g, 896 F.2d
1264 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Coalition of Bedford-Stuyvesant Block Ass'n. v. Cuomo, 651 F. Supp. 1202,
1208 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 675
(S.D. Tex. 1979); Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining the Env't v. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918, 926-
27 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
290. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
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show the discriminatory impact of their decision."' Virtually no plaintiff
in any of the many different environmental justice civil rights cases na-
tionwide has prevailed on an equal protection claim; none has been able
to meet the Supreme Court's intent requirement.'m Legal scholars agree
that absent the overruling of Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights,
which established the intent requirement, or a rare case in which a plain-
tiff can uncover evidence of discriminatory intent in government deci-
sion making, the Equal Protection Clause offers little promise of success
for environmental justice claims.' Federal legislation to replace the dis-
criminatory intent standard with a disparate impact test for environ-
mental permitting decisions is not politically viable. Even if such leg-
islation were passed, it could be subject to protracted litigation over its
constitutionality as an exercise of congressional power to implement the
Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to Section Five of the Amendment.'
In some jurisdictions, a more viable alternative to a federal equal
protection claim is an equal protection claim under the state constitution.
Peter Reich has demonstrated that several states use a disparate impact
analysis for their more broadly-interpreted equal protection guarantees.m
He speculates that many environmental justice suits, based on well-
established evidence of "actionable disparate impact," " could be suc-
cessful if they included state constitutional equal protection claims and
were brought in states with "expansive judicial interpretations of equal
protection. ' '
291. E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-
65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239 (1976).
292. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 538-39. However, if denial of municipal services or
provision of substandard municipal services to minority neighborhoods based on intentional racial
discrimination is considered an environmental justice issue, some equal protection claims have been
successful. See, e.g., Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982,987-88 (QIth Cir. 1986); Dowdell v. City
of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (1ith Cir. 1983); Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp.
571, 579 (M.D. Fla. 1986). But see Wilkerson v. City of Coralville, 478 F.2d 709, 711 (8th Cir.
1973) (viewing city's refusal to annex an impoverished area as not violating the Equal Protection
Clause).
293. See Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 538-41 & nn.87-88; Colopy, supra note 6, at 351-
52; Pamela Duncan, Environmental Racism: Recognition, Litigation, and Alleviation, 6 TUtL ENVrL
LJ. 317, 341-53 (1993); Lazarus, supra note 6, at 829-34; Reich, supra note 6, at 290-97; see also
Been, Fairness, supra note 6, at 1004. However, filing equal protection claims may have political
value to emphasize that the particular govemment action is a violation of minorities' civil rights.
Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 540-44; Godsil, supra note 6, at 420-21.
294. See Reich, supra note 6, at 294-97. For criticisms of existing equal protection analysis, see
Boyle, supra note 9, at 950-67; Leslie Ann Coleman, Comment, It's the Thought That Counts: The
Intent Requirement in Environmental Racism Claims, 25 ST. MARY's LJ. 447, 471-75 (1993).
295. See Boeme v. Floics, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171-72 (1997) (invalidating the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act as beyond congressional Section Five power to implement the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
296. See Reich, supra note 6, at 301-05 & n. 18 1 (citing cases from Arkansas, California, Con-
necticut, West Virginia, and Wyoming).
297. Id. at 304.
298. Id. at 305.
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2. Statutory Civil Rights
Environmental justice plaintiffs can also bring civil rights claims
under Tide VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;' Tide VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968;' and 42 U.S.C. § 1982."' For a variety of reasons
discussed below, federal civil rights statutes and the regulations that im-
plement them offer greater legal protections against racial disparities in
environmental burdens and harms than does the federal Equal Protection
Clause.'
Tide VI provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." It is essen-
tially a prohibition on federal funding of programs that discriminate on
the basis of race. As with the Equal Protection Clause, litigants suing
under Title VI itself must prove intentional racial discrimination.' Many
federal agencies, however, have adopted implementing regulations that
prohibit funding of programs with racially discriminatory effects or im-
pacts.! The U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that litigants suing under
Title VI regulations need only show unjustified disparate impact' but
the availability of a disparate impact private cause of action under Title
VI regulations remains uncertain.' To establish a prima facie case that a
federally funded program or activity violates Title VI regulations, the
plaintiff must provide evidence of definite and measurable disparity in
299. Pub. L. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994)).
See generally Steven A. Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Is Title VI a Magic Bullet? Environmental
Racism in the Context of Political-Economic Processes and Imperatives, 2 ICH. J. RACE & L. 1
(1996) (discussing the effectiveness of Title VI as a litigation strategy to fight environmental ra-
cism).
300. Pub. L 90-284, § 801, 82 Stat. 73, 81 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631
(1994 & Supp. U 1996)).
301. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994).
302. See Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 530-31; Colopy, supra note 6, at 152.
303. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
304. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,293-94 (1985).
305. E.g., 7 C.F.R. § 15.3(b)(2) (1998) (Department of Agriculture); 10 C.F.R. § 1040.13(c)-
(d) (1998) (Department of Energy); 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)i), (3) (1998) (Department of Housing and
Urban Development); 32 C.F.R. § 195.4(2) (1997) (Department of Defense); 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b)
(1997) (Environmental Protection Agency); 43 C.F.R. § 17.3(bX2)-(3) (1997) (Department of Inte-
rior); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2)-(3) (1997) (Department of Health and Human Services); 49 C.F.R. §
21.5(bX2)-(3) (1997) (Department of Transportation).
306. See Choate, 469 U.S. at 293-94.
307. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 927 (3d Cir.
1997) (holding that plaintiff's argument that disproportionate siting according to racial composition
of the neighborhood violates Title VI regulations could maintain a private cause of action, and that
plaintiffs need only prove disparate impact, not discriminatory intent), vacated and remanded with
instructions to dismiss, 119 S. CL 22 (1998); see also South Bronx Coalition for Clean Air, Inc. v.
Conroy, 20 F. Supp.2d 565, 572 (recognizing lingering questions about Title VI disparate impact
private causes of action).
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the program's impact, sufficiently substantial to raise an inference that
the impact is the result of racial discrimination.' The defendant then
may rebut the prima facie case by showing that its program has a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory purpose.' The plaintiff has the ultimate burden
of proving illegal discrimination and must show that there is a less dis-
criminatory alternative that adequately serves the defendant's legitimate
interests. 3
0
In addition to the disparate impact standard, Title VI offers several
advantages to environmental justice plaintiffs. The courts recognize an
implied private cause of action for individuals who have suffered dis-
criminatory impact that violates Title VI regulations.'" Plaintiffs can sue
either the federal funding agency, which has provided federal financial
assistance to a discriminatory program, or the fund recipient itself, which
has discriminated through the impact of its program."' Aggrieved per-
sons can seek redress through federal litigation, an administrative com-
plaint process, or both.!' However, there is generally no requirement that
a plaintiff exhaust his or her administrative remedies before filing a suit
under Title VI regulations!"
Nonetheless, Title VI plaintiffs encounter some hurdles. Those who
choose to file administrative complaints, in contrast to (or in addition to)
litigating, are not entitled to any particular formal means of participating
in the administrative process?" Particularly relevant to those who raise
environmental justice claims, the EPA has not given Title VI enforce-
ment a high priority, although the EPA under the Clinton administration
is devoting more attention to Title VI environmental justice concerns
than it has historically."' Those who sue must establish a sufficient nexus
between the environmental injustice and federal funding.!" To have
standing, they might also have to show that they were the intended bene-
ficiaries of the federal funds." Plaintiffs also must prove the disparate
308. See NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1332-34 (3d Cir. 1981); Scelsa v. City
Univ. of N.Y., 806 F. Supp. 1126, 1141 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
309. Medical Or., 657 F.2d at 1333.
310. ld.at 1336 n.17.
311. Serf, 132 F.3d at 937; see Colopy, supra note 6, at 156; Lazarus, srpra note 6, at 835. The
U.S. Supreme Court, however, has not squarely resolved the issue, and uncertainty persists. See
cases cited supra note 307.
312. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 157; Fisher, supra note 282, at 317.
313. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 168-80; Fisher, supra note 282, at 313.
314. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 156-57 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 707 n.41 (1979)); see also Fisher, supra note 282, at 313 & n.137 (citing Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 593-95 (1983)).
315. See Fisher, supra note 282, at 316 & n.154 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 706 n.41).
316. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 180-88; Fisher, supra note 282, at 313-16.
317. See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 835. Most state environmental programs receive federal
funding, thereby providing the required nexus. ld. at 836.
318. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 166-67; Fisher, supra note 282, at 317-19. The standing
requirements in suits against federal funding recipients remain unclear, but environmental justice
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impact?" and that it was unjustified.!" They may also encounter difficul-
ties proving causation. For example, in a recent celebrated environmental
justice case, a Michigan state judge rejected the disparate impact chal-
lenge to a state agency's pattern of granting permits to polluting facilities
in minority areas of Genesee County. 2 The theory failed because the
plaintiffs did not prove that the state permitting process, which failed to
consider the race of the siting community, caused either the concentra-
tion of pollution in the area or the location of African Americans near the
polluting facilities.' 2 Most of the polluters were located in those areas
before they developed significant African American populations, and
most of the pollution in the area was due to sources other than the per-
mitted polluting facilities.' Finally, unless the violation is intentional
thereby allowing damages recovery, plaintiffs successful under Title VI
are entitled only to declaratory and injunctive relief.3 Despite these hur-
dles, though, Title VI holds much promise as an effective civil rights tool
against environmental injustice, even if initially actual cases and benefi-
cial results have been slow in coming:'
Title VII prohibits racial discrimination "against any person in
the.., sale or rental of a dwelling or in the provision of services or fa-
cilities in connection therewith,"'32 and the refusal "to sell or rent.., or
otherwise make unavailable, or deny, a dwelling to any person because
of race."32 In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 states that all U.S. citizens
plaintiffs should not have difficulty with the intended beneficiary doctrine because all local residents
ar beneficiaries of federal funds to their state's and locality's environmental programs. Id.
319. Fisher, supra note 282, at 322-28. Proving disparate impact involves questions concerning
(1) the units of measure and comparison for establishing the disparity, (2) how tangible the impact
must be (Mere proximity to a polluting facility? Decline in the enjoyment or value of property?
Measurable physical harm?), and (3) the availability of nondiscriminatory alternatives that ade-
quately meet the program's legitimate objectives. Id.
320. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 160; Fisher, supra note 282, at 321; see also Coalition of
Concerned Citizens v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 127 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (holding that although
plaintiffs established prima facie case of disparate impact, the government officials successfully
responded with legitimate reasons for location).
321. NAACP-Flint Chapter v. Engler, No. 95-38228-CV, at 35-36 (Mich. Cir. CL 1997) (tran-
script of decision read from the bench), rev'd on other grounds, NAACP-Flint Chapter v. Governor,
No. 205264 (Mich. C. App. Nov. 24, 1998) (unpublished opinion).
322. Engler, No. 95-38228-CV at 35-36. However, the trial judge sua sponte held for the
plaintiffs on substantive and procedural environmental claims under state constitutional and statutory
law. Id. at 17, 39-45. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial judge lacked
the authority to consider the issues sua sponte. Governor, No. 205264, at 1-2,4.
323. Engler, No. 95-38228-CV at 35-36.
324. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 165; Fisher, supra note 282, at 328-31.
325. See Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 531-34; Lazarus, supra note 6, at 836-39. Bat see
Light & Rand, supra note 299, at 5 (expressing caution about the effectiveness of Titie VI suits and
arguing in support of the need for political and economic strategies). See generally Colopy, supra
note 6, at 158-181 (exploring ways in which Title VI can be used to protect minority communities
from environmental racism); Fisher, supra note 282, at 311-12 (arguing that it is possible to use
Title VI to solve the problem of environmental discrimination).
326. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1994).
327. Id. § 3604(b).
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"shall have the same right... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property."'' A Title VIII claim does not require
proof of intentional discrimination; disparate impact is sufficient. ' A
Title VHI claim thus follows the same general pattern as a Title VI
claim: a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact, the
defendant rebuts with nondiscriminatory justification(s), and the plaintiff
responds with evidence of less discriminatory means that adequately
satisfy the legitimate reason(s) for the defendant's action!" Although
Title VIn, unlike Title VI, does not require a federal funding nexus, it
does require that the impact relate to fair housing opportunities."' How-
ever, Luke Cole has suggested that building on Title VII's application to
local government zoning, environmental justice advocates could use Ti-
tle VIII to attack land use decisions, such as the siting of LULUs in mi-
nority neighborhoods, that have the effect of increasing segregation by
triggering "white flight."m Title VIII has rarely been used in environ-
mental justice cases so far.m Section 1982 has also not been widely used
in environmental justice suits, but Richard Lazarus suggests that envi-
ronmental justice advocates could use it to challenge government actions
that depreciate the value of property owned by African American citi-
zens. ' However, Lazarus believes that the courts are likely to resolve
uncertainties about whether disparate impact is enough under section
1982 in favor of requiring proof of intentional discrimination.!
Use of civil rights statutes to pursue environmental justice claims
reflects a theory that the unequal distribution of environmental burdens
violates minorities' civil rights." However, this strategy, unlike the use
of the Equal Protection Clause, also reflects the view that not only bad
motives by government decision makers, but also official actions that
have racially differential effects violate minorities' civil rights.' This
theory addresses, at least partly, institutional discrimination which may
persist despite the motives and behavior of individual actors. '
328. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994).
329. See Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 534-35; see also Lazarus, supra note 6, at 839-40.
330. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 534-35.
331. See id. at 535; Lazarus, supra note 6, at 840.
332. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 535-37. In the context of this discussion, "white flight"
refers to the departure of whites from the neighborhood.
333. Id. at 534.
334. Lazarus, supra note 6, at 842.
335. Id. at 842-43.
336. See Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 530-31.
337. Id.
338. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 188-89.
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3. Statutory Rights to Enforcement of Environmental Laws
Statutory substantive environmental law rights' are rights embed-
ded in federal and state environmental statutes that allow citizens to sue
to enforce those statutes.' Olga Moya and Andrew Fono succinctly de-
scribe citizen suits:
There are two types of citizen suits. First is the "enforcing" citizen
suit. Here, a citizen files suit against a party who is alleged to have
violated environmental laws or regulations. The second type is an
"agency-forcing" citizen suit. Here, an individual sues a government
agency that is alleged to have failed to aggressively pursue its non-
discretionary duties.m'
Private citizens essentially act as "private attorneys general,"
compensating for government underenforcement of environmental laws
by pursuing civil actions against alleged polluters and suing government
officials to compel them to perform non-discretionary duties' 0 Courts
may compel polluters to comply with the statutory or regulatory re-
quirements (e.g., an air emission limit or a standard for storage of
wastes), force polluters to clean up contaminated areas (e.g., remediation
of soil and groundwater contaminated with hazardous wastes), impose
administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions on polluters, direct govern-
ment agencies to act, and award attorneys' fees to successful litigants.3
Most major federal environmental statutes contain citizen suit pro-
visions.' Generally, a plaintiff who wants to bring an environmental
citizen suit must give at least sixty days notice of intent to bring the suit
339. Here, "substantive" means rights under environmental statutes to pollution control (i.e., by
enforcement of environmental statutes and regulations against polluters or by challenges to agencies
for failure to implement environmental statutes properly), in contrast with private citizens' rights to
participate in or receive information about environmental decision making (i.e., strictly procedural
rights). See Fisher, supra note 282, at 306-09 (discussing how lawsuits under environmental statutes
are allowing communities to compel compliance with the law, and how NEPA's procedural reme-
dies offer only a reprieve, rather than a remedy). But see Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 527-28
(arguing that environmental statutes and rights are procedural in focus).
340. E.g., Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994); Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659
(1994).
341. OLGA L. MOYA & ANDREW L. FONO, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE USER'S
GuiDE 27 (1997).
342. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737-38 (1972) (discussing standing and the
ability of the Sierra Club to act as a "private attorney general").
343. Gauna, supra note 6, at 4; see also Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 737-38.
344. See MoYA & FONO, supra note 341, at 26-28.
345. E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994); Clean Water Act §
505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994 & Supp.
It. 1996); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4911, 6972, 7604, 9659 (1994); Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1994).
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to the alleged violator, the state, and the EPA.' In addition, citizen suits
often are barred if the EPA or the state has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting enforcement against the alleged violators.' Although envi-
ronmental groups' use of citizen suits historically has not benefited low-
income and minority communities,' the environmental justice move-
ment increasingly uses environmental law citizen suits to combat envi-
ronmental injustice.' In fact, Cole places suits under environmental stat-
utes at the top of his hierarchy of environmental justice litigation strate-
gies!-'
However, Eileen Gauna has identified several obstacles to the ef-
fective use of citizen suits by grassroots environmental justice groups.
First, a group with limited resources and technical and legal knowledge
may have difficulty detecting and proving industry noncompliance with
applicable environmental laws, which may be embedded in statutes,
regulations, permits, administrative or court orders, or even state and
local implementing plans."' The group would need reliable data about
industry activity sufficient to prove a violation, and information about
applicable legal requirements, which may be far from clear.!" Second,
citizen suits are expensive and require mobilization of resources and par-
ticipation. ' Third, fee-shifting provisions which provide for the award of
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party may provide an incentive to bring
citizen suits in general, but not enough of an incentive in the typical envi-
ronmental justice context. Recovery of fees occurs at the end of a suc-
cessful enforcement action, and cannot be adjusted for the contingency
nature of environmental civil suits, thus deterring both private attorneys
and legal services groups from fronting the high litigation costs of citizen
suits." Fourth, successful groups generally cannot receive damages. Al-
though some environmental groups receive the benefit of civil penalties
by developing environmental mitigation projects that can be funded with
penalties collected from citizen suits, low-income and minority commu-
nities have limited capacity to develop these projects." Fifth, the ability
to bring a suit may be limited until, or if, the government takes action,
346. Gauna, supra note 6, at 44 & n.153. The courts strictly interpret the notice provisions of
environmental statutes. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1989).
347. Gauna, supra note 6, at 44 n. 154.
348. Fisher, supra note 282, at 302-03; Gauna, supra note 6, at 5.
349. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 526-28 (suggesting a litigation hierarchy for use in
environmental siting cases); Fisher, supra note 282, at 306-07. One example of a promising success
is NAACP-Flint Chapter v. Engler, holding that the Michigan Constitution requires the state envi-
ronmental agency to conduct risk assessments that consider cumulative impacts on the health of
local residents when permitting facilities. NAACP-Flint Chapter v. Engler, No. 95-38228-CV, at 39-
43 (Mich. Cir. CL 1997).
350. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 526.
351. Gauna, supra note 6, at 43-46, 50-57, 63-64.
352. Id. at 45-47, 50-56, 63-64.
353. Id. at 44-46,73-74.
354. Id. at 76-79.
355. Id. at 47-48.
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thus making the environmental justice group dependent on government
enforcement decisions.' Sixth, the standards that regulated entities must
meet may not adequately protect low-income or minority communities. '
Seventh, the government often has discretion about the application of
environmental laws and the content of environmental standards and
regulations. Agency-forcing suits apply only to non-discretionary duties
and as a practical matter, often involve efforts to force the agency to set
standards when it has failed to do so at all.'m In fact, decisions about
whether to consider environmental justice and equity factors in environ-
mental decisions is discretionary and generally cannot be forced directly
through citizen suits. ' Finally, the technical complexity of citizen suits
has the potential to derail political goals and activities of grassroots
groups.' Nevertheless, Gauna, while urging reforms, also urges envi-
ronmental justice advocates to use citizen suits to vindicate the rights of
low-income and minority people to have the environmental laws en-
forced.:"
4. Participatory Rights Under Environmental Statutes
Federal and state environmental statutes have not only substantive
pollution control and cleanup standards that may be enforced by private
citizens, but also procedural requirements. These procedures ensure that
government agencies consider the environmental consequences of their
activities and that the public can participate in environmental decision
making and have access to information. '
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)W and state envi-
ronmental policy acts (SEPAs)' lie at the core of the public's right to
356. Id. at 61-62,64,74-75 (examining CERCLA, which prevents an enforcement action until
the EPA has issued an order that is not complied with, and RCRA, in which a citizen suit is barred if
the EPA or State initiates proceedings).
357. Id. at 48-50.
358. Id. at 70-76.
359 . Id.
360. Id. at 39-40 (noting that environmental justice suits typically begin as political and eco-
nomic struggles, not legal ones).
361. Id. at 86-87.
362. See generally Reich, supra note 6, at 297-98,305-11 (addressing the avenues of access for
minorities through federal translation requirements and the broad scope of SEPA access mandates).
363. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994 & Supp. L
1996).
364. NEPA and SEPAs provide the public with access to information and analysis of the envi-
ronmental impacts of the government's decisions. For examples of SEPAs, see CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-I to -lh (West
1995 & Supp. 1998); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-981 to -990 (1995 & Supp. 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. §§
343-1 to -8 (1993 & Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1 1-1-1 to 13-15-10-6 (Michie 1996); MD.
CODE ANN., NAT. RES. I §§ 1-301 to -305 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 30, §§ 61-62H (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116D.01-.07 (West 1997);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to -324 (1997); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to -0117
(McKinney 1997 & Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-1 to -10 (1997); P.R. LAWS ANN. lit.
[Vol. 76:1I
19981 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND LAND USE REGULATION 59
governmental study and consideration of the environmental impacts of
its decisions, participation in the study and consideration process, and
access to the resulting information and analysis. Under NEPA, a federal
agency must prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for
"major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment."' The agency prepares an Environmental Assessment
(EA) to determine if the proposed action is a major federal action and has
a significant impact on the environment.s' The EA, which is a less de-
tailed document than the EIS, includes a brief discussion of the need for
the proposed action, any alternatives to the action, and environmental
impacts of both the action and its alternatives. ' If an EIS is not required,
the agency issues a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI).' If an
agency must prepare an EIS, however, it must issue public notice in the
Federal Register that it intends to prepare an EIS, and solicit public input
concerning the scope of the study.' The EIS is a detailed study of the
direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the proposed action on the
environment, unavoidable adverse effects of the proposed action, and
possible alternatives to the proposal, including mitigation measures and
the alternative of "no action." Public hearings are not required unless
the agency's regulations so provide, but the agency must publish notice
of the draft EIS and circulate it to any interested person, as well as gov-
ernment agencies that have jurisdiction or expertise over the subject."'
After receiving comments, the agency prepares, circulates, and gives
public notice of the final EIS, which must include responses to all of the
comments the agency received.m
SEPAs provide a similar process for state and local government
actions, but often are more stringent and guarantee greater public partici-
patory rights than NEPA.' 3 SEPAs often apply to a wider range of pri-
vate activities than does NEPA, because of the wide range of private
activities subject to state and local permitting requirements, including
12, §§ 1121-1142 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 34A-9-1 to -13 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1998);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21C.010-.914 (West 1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1.11 (West 1996).
365. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Major federal actions include federally funded projects and deci-
sions by federal agencies to grant permits to regulated private activities. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1997).
366. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b).
367. Id. § 1508.9 (establishing the requirements for an environmental assessment (EA)).
368. Id. § 1501.4(e) (setting forth that a FONSI is issued when the agency decides not to pre-
pare a statement based on the environmental assessment).
369. Id. §§ 1501.7, 1503.1(aX4).
370. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (listing congressionally mandated components of an EIS); 40
C.F.R. §§ 1508.8, 1508.25 (expanding on which effects the EIS should address and the scope of the
coverage of the EIS).
371. 40C.F.R. §§ 1501.7(a)(1), 1502.9(a), 1502.19, 1506.6, 1503.1.
372. Id. §§ 1502.9, 1502.19, 1503.4(a), 1506.6(b), 1506.9, 1506.10.
373. Johnson, supra note 282, at 566-67; Reich, supra note 6, at 305-07.
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land use permits. "7 State and local agencies often must consider a broader
scope of impacts than the federal government, including health, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural impacts& SEPAs "require a more thorough
review process with additional opportunities for participation" than does
NEPA.' These requirements include more circulation of draft studies,
more public notices, more hearings, and greater public and government
review opportunities&n SEPAs are broadly interpreted to encourage and
facilitate public participation.' For example, in one instance a particular
SEPA was interpreted as including the requirement that environmental
impact documents be translated into Spanish for the siting of a toxic
waste incinerator in a community that was almost forty percent monolin-
gual Spanish-speaking. ' Although some federal agencies provide non-
English translations of environmental studies and documents, NEPA
does not require it."m Finally, some SEPAs are not only procedural but
also substantive: agencies are required to avoid negative environmental
impacts." In contrast, NEPA is solely a procedural statute; once a federal
agency studies and considers environmental impacts, it is not prohibited
from proceeding with its proposed action even if it will greatly harm the
environment.'
NEPA and SEPAs provide valuable means of seeking environ-
mental justice goals through the participation of low-income and minor-
itypeople in governmental decisions and by attacks on the environmental
decision making process.m Stephen Johnson has summarized the advan-
374. Cf. Johnson, supra note 282, at 567, 595 (describing Congress's initial vision that NEPA
serve as a model for state environmental review laws, and the current situation where state laws can
be used as a model for NEPA).
375. Id. at 566-67; see Reich, supra note 6, at 311-13 (arguing that these factors allow for
consideration of the action's impact on community preservation).
376. Reich, supra note 6, at 307.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 307-11.
379. El Pueblo Pam el Aim y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, [1992] 22 ENVrh. L. REP.
(Envt. L. Inst.) 20357, 20358 (Cal. Super. Ct, Dec. 30, 1991) ("[The residents of Kettleman City's]
meaningful involvement in the CEQA review process was effectively precluded by the absence of
the Spanish translation"). This environmental justice case involved a significant victory for the
residents of Kettleman City to participate meaningfully in the environmental study process and local
decision making about the incinerator, as well as a strategic advance for the rights of low-income
and minority people to participate in environmental decision making generally. See Cole, Litigation,
supra note 4, at 528-30; Reich, supra note 6, at 308-11. However, the court held that the EIR,
although written in technical language, was understandable by interested laypersons. El Pueblo,
[19921 22 ENvTh L REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20358.
380. Johnson, supra note 282, at 602.
381. Id. at 597-99; see, e.g., California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 21002.1(b) (West 1996).
382. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (empha-
sizing the procedural nature of duties imposed on agencies by NEPA, and the discretion agencies
must have in the face of judicial scrutiny).
383. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 528 (placing use of participatory and procedural rights in
environmental law--"environmental law, with a twist"--high in the hierarchy of environmental
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tages of NEPA (and implicitly the similarly structured SEPAs) to the
environmental justice movement:
NEPA's public participation provisions empower communities by
enabling them to provide input into the federal government's deci-
sion-making process and to educate the government about the dispa-
rate impacts proposed actions may have on communities.... [Tihey
also give the communities valuable information about public health
and safety and the government's decision-making process. If the gov-
ernment decides to take an action that disparately impacts a minority
or low-income community, community leaders can use the informa-
tion they receive through the NEPA review process to organize the
community against the government action.
The NEPA review process can also advance environmental jus-
tice by delaying the federal government in taking actions that could
disparately impact communities. The delay provides communities
more time to organize their opposition to the government actions. The
cost of the environmental review process might also derail govern-
ment projects, including those which could have a disparate impact
on communities.
Finally, in many cases, NEPA requires the federal government
to consider certain health and socioeconomic impacts of proposed ac-
tions before taking the actions. Through this process, the government
should be able to identify whether proposed actions will have a dispa-
rate impact on minority or low-income communities. The government
can then avoid taking those actions.'"
Beyond NEPA and SEPAs, environmental justice advocates might
seek to enforce environmental participatory, procedural, and informa-
tional rights through open meetings laws that require government meet-
ings to be open to the public, open records laws that give private citizens
access to government documents, and procedural requirements of spe-
cific environmental statutes that either require or allow public participa-
tion and input in decisions made under those statutes. ' In addition, the
justice litigation strategies). Peter Reich believes that SEPAs are superior to NEPA for addressing
environmental injustice because of the limited scope of NEPA as a guarantor of access; however,
Stephen Johnson's concern that SEPAs do not apply to federal action leads Johnson to encourage the
use of NEPA as it exists now, and advocate reforms of NEPA to make it more like progressive
SEPAs. Compare Reich, supra note 6, at 306-07, with Johnson, supra note 282, at 566-69. How-
ever. a recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission finding asserts that NEPA does not authorize inquiry
into whether racial animus motivated a siting decision. In re Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P., 47
N.R.C. 77, dismissed as moot, 47 N.R.C. 113 (1998).
384. Johnson, supra note 282, at 571 (footnotes omitted).
385. MANASrER, supra note 6, at 133-52 (discussing access to environmental decisions and
data); see Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio
1984) (involving a community group's challenge via Federal-Aid Highway Act public involvement
requirements); NAACP-Flint Chapter v. Engler, No. 95-38228-CV, at 43-45 (Mich Cir. CL 1997)
(holding that governments and residents of localities adjoining the jurisdiction in which polluting
facility is to be sited have state constitutional and statutory right to participate in decisions about
siting), rev'd on other grounds, NAACP-Flint Chapter v. Governor, No. 205364, at 1-2,4 (Mich. C.
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Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)'
and similar state and local lawse" require that facilities with hazardous or
toxic substances notify local communities of the presence of those sub-
stances and promptly report any releases, such as spills or emissions, of
those substances into the environment. These laws are designed to in-
form local residents of toxics in their neighborhoods, help prepare them
to respond to accidents, and immediately notify them of any potentially
harmful accidents. One recent environmental justice litigation success
involved a suit by low-income residents of north central Denver neigh-
borhoods against the Vulcan Chemical Company for failure to notify
local authorities after a rail car spill of muriatic and hydrochloric acid.'
A federal judge ruled that EPCRA allows citizens to sue a company for
its failure to notify and to obtain civil penalties of up to $25,000 per
day.' According to a lawyer for the grassroots groups involved in the
action against Vulcan Chemical, the lawsuit sent a message to hazardous
materials handlers that neighbors have a right to the reporting of spills
and will demand it.' The lawyer also stated that it possibly could deter
companies from storing or transporting as many toxic chemicals in
neighborhoods. " ' Similarly, grassroots groups in San Diego, by bringing
litigation that was ultimately settled, forced the San Diego County Air
Pollution Control District to publish multilingual notices in fourteen
community newspapers about toxic air emissions from area industries
and military installations.' The District also had to mail additional in-
formation to residents living in the zones of highest cancer risk. The
plaintiffs brought this suit under the California Toxics Hotspots Act!'
Through enforcement of community right-to-know laws, environmental
justice groups act on procedural rights that enable them to monitor envi-
App. 1998) (holding that trial court lacked the authority to consider the issues sua sponte when
plaintiffs failed to plead the claims).
386. 42U.S.C.§§ 11001-11050(1994).
387. See Alan E. Seneczko, The Right-to-Know and the Trucking Industry: Regulating Regula-
tions, 14 TRANSP. LJ. 347, 359-61 & nn.39 & 48 (1986).
388. Neighbors for a Toxic Free Community v. Vulcan Materials Co., 964 F. Supp. 1448, 1448
(D. Colo. 1997). The U.S. Supreme Court has recently cast doubt on the long-term impact of this
Colorado case and grassroots groups' ability to recover damages for past violations of EPCRA. In
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the court held that Citizens for a Better Environment,
an environmental justice group, lacked standing to sue under EPCRA for "historical" violations of
the Act because none of the possible relief would remedy the harm of late reporting of spills. 1 18 S.
Ct 1003, 1020 (1998).
389. Neighbors for a Toxic Free Community, 964 F. Supp. at 1449-54.
390. Federal Judge Gives Residents of Poor Neighborhoods the Right to Sue Company for
Failing to Report Chemical Spill, NEWS RELEASE (Ecological Consultants for the Pub. Interest),
Apr. 30, 1997.
391. Id.
392. See News & Notes, WORKING NOTEs ON COMMUNITY RIGHT-To-KNow, supra note 175,
at 1.
393. d.
394. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13390-13396 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998).
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ronmental harms in their neighborhoods, holding both the government
and possible polluters accountable.
5. Common Law Rights
Finally, seekers of environmental justice rights use common law
remedies to seek redress for harms to people and property caused by an-
other private person or entity!" The legal theories of liability for envi-
ronmental harms, on which environmental-justice toxic tort claims are
based, are strict liability, negligence, negligence per se, trespass, battery,
and nuisance.'
Deriving from the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher," the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts section 519 recognizes strict liability for
harm to other people or their property from abnormally dangerous (ultra-
hazardous) activities." In determining what activities are abnormally
dangerous or ultrahazardous, courts balance six factors related to the
utility of the activity and the risk and degree of harm: (1) the existence of
a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land, or chattels of an-
other, (2) the likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(3) an inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(4) the extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (5)
the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and (6) the extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by
its dangerous attributes.' Some courts have found the storage, disposal,
and even use of hazardous and toxic substances to be abnormally dan-
gerous and thus a basis for strict liability. ' while other courts have re-
395. See Duncan, supra note 6, at 355-57; Melissa Thorme, Local to Global: Citizen's Legal
Rights and Remedies Relating to Toxic Waste Dumps, 5 TUL ENvTL. J. 101, 115-21 (1991). See
generally Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1993) (examining envi-
ronmental tort litigation and its social utility).
396. See Wedein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 907 (D. Minn. 1990) (recognizing battery
claims), vacated in part, 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992) (vacating ruling to certify class action
claims involving distinct and completed phases); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp.
303, 308 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (predicating right to recover damages on common law tort claims),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (overturning issues relating to jurisdiction,
class action, causation, and damages); Bagley v. Controlled Env't Corp., 503 A.2d 823, 826-27
(N.H. 1986) (analyzing negligence per se); Duncan, supra note 6, at 355 (giving an overview of
toxic tort claims based on nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability); Thorme, supra note
395, at 115-21 (discussing common law tort claims).
397. 3 L.R.-E. & L App. 330,342 (1868).
398. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1965).
399. Id.§ 520.
400. Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 311-16 (finding strict liability for contamination of neighboring
wells due to operation of a 242-acre burial site for chemical wastes from manufacturing plant);
Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1948) (finding strict liability for harm from fumigating a
small shop with hydrocyanic acid gas, a deadly chemical); New Jersey v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d
150, 157-60 (NJ. 1983) (finding strict liability exists for pollution of creek from mercury processing
operations of chemical corporation). As stated by the New Jersey court "[lt is time to recognize
expressly that the law of liability has evolved so that a landowner is strictly liable to others for harm
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jected this proposition.' The idea that low-income and minority plain-
tiffs harmed by toxic uses of nearby property are entitled per se to re-
cover on an ultrahazardous activity theory is complicated by some
courts' acceptance of hazardous substances and waste as normal in an
industrial society and particularly in neighborhoods that contain several
intensive uses.
Negligence and negligence per se are alternative general toxic tort
causes of action. For example, one court held a chemical corporation
liable on a negligence theory for contaminating neighboring property
owners' home wells with migrating chemicals from a 242-acre burial
site."2 The court held that the corporation owed a duty "to protect others
from unreasonable harm arising from the dumping of... chemicals"''
and breached its duty by its failure to investigate the conditions of the
site selected, install proper monitoring mechanisms, use state-of-the-art
methods of operation, and respond to leaks adequately.' In another case,
the owner and developer of a planned residential community, which
dumped oil, grease, and other waste materials onto its property, was held
liable for soil and groundwater contamination on adjoining property.'
The actions constituted negligence per se because the defendant failed to
obtain a permit for hazardous waste disposal, a violation of state law.'
When a defendant intentionally pollutes and that pollution comes
into contact with a plaintiff's property or person, the plaintiff may have a
cause of action in trespass or battery, respectively.
To recover in trespass, a plaintiff must show: (1) An invasion affect-
ing an interest in the exclusive possession of the property, (2) an in-
tentional doing of the act which results in the invasion, (3) reasonable
foreseeability that the act done could result in an invasion of plain-
tiff's possessory interest, and (4) substantial damage to the res, or
property.4
caused by toxic wastes that are stored on his property and flow onto the property of others." Ventron,
468 A.2d at 157.
401. Avemco Ins. Co. v. Rooto Corp., 967 F.2d 1105, 1109 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding storage of
hydrochloric and sulfuric acid not ultrahazardous, even though disgruntled former employee illegally
spilled 6,000 gallons of acid); Axawana Mills Co. v. United Tech. Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238, 1251-
52 (D. Conn. 1992) (holding neither operation of metal finishing business nor storage and use of
hazardous materials is abnormally dangerous per se); Fritz v. E.L DuPont De Nemours & Co., 75
A.2d 256, 261 (Del. 1950) (finding use of chlorine gas at manufacturing facility not abnormally
dangerous in light of the well-recognized industrial use of the property).
402. Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 306, 316-17.
403. Id. at 316.
404. Jd. at 316-17.
405. Bagley v. Controlled Env't Corp., 503 A.2d 823, 824 (N.HL 1986).
406. Bagley, 503 A.2d at 827.
407. Thorme, supra note 395, at 118 & n.104 (citing Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d
523,523-24 (Ala. 1979)).
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In Bradley v. American Smelting & Refining Co.," a copper smelter's
emission of particulate matter, including arsenic and cadmium, into the
air and onto the plaintiff's property was actionable trespass, as well as
nuisance.a In Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,"0 trespass occurred when
an aluminum reduction and manufacturing plant emitted invisible fluo-
ride gases and particulates into the air and onto neighboring property,
making it unfit for raising livestock.' Thus, an actionable trespass may
be a direct or indirect invasion of property by substances which, although
concrete, may be microscopic. A court, however, may require a showing
of actual damages,"2 and there are many recognized defenses to trespass
claims."3
A defendant may be liable for battery if the defendant disposes of a
toxic material with the intent to cause an offensive or harmful contact
with the plaintiff or knows that the contact is substantially certain to oc-
cur.""' Neighbors of an Army ammunition plant defeated summary judg-
ment on a battery claim against a tenant who disposed of highly toxic
substances directly above a regional aquifer." The claim was not dis-
missed because there was evidence that the tenant "knew that its conduct
was substantially certain to cause an offensive or harmful contact.""'
Nuisance law is a frequently discussed basis for remedying envi-
ronmental wrongs.4'7 Two types of nuisance actions exist: private and
public."' A private nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a plain-
tiff's right to the use and enjoyment of his or her property.""' A public
408. 709 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985).
409. Bradley, 709 P.2d at 788.
410. 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959).
411. Martin, 342 P.2d at 791-92.
412. Bradley, 709 P.2d at 791-92. But see Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303,
317-19 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (allowing in a trespass action, not only actual damages to real property,
but also consequential and special damages related to emotional distress, fear of falling property
values, and fear of potential health hazards), affid in part, rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir.
1988) (overturning issues relating to jurisdiction, class action, causation, and damages).
413. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 167-213 (1965).
414. See Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887,907 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated in part, 793
F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992) (vacating ruling to certify class action claims involving distinct and
completed phases).
415. Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 907.
416. Id. at 907.
417. See Duncan, supra note 6, at 355-56. See generally Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping
Pigs Out of the Parlor: Using Nuisance Law to Affect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENvTL L 403
(1997) (discussing the origins of nuisance law and its use against pollution); Ronald Rychlak. Corn-
mon-Law Remedies for Envirownental Wrongs: The Role of Private Nuisance, 59 MisS. LJ. 657
(1989) (focusing on the attractive features of nuisance law as a remedy for environmental wrongs);
Thorme, supra note 395, at I 15-18. Nuisance law was the basis of a lawsuit challenging the siting of
a PCB landfill in Warren County, North Carolina, an issue that played a formative role in the devel-
opment of the environmental justice movement. See Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp.
276,280 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
418. Thormesupranote395,at 115.
419. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303,319 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
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nuisance is an "unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public."'  Among the activities found to interfere with private
property rights, thereby constituting private nuisances, have been the
operation of a chemical waste burial site that contaminated plaintiffs'
home water wells,' 1 the maintenance of a hazardous waste dump site that
exploded into an unquenchable blaze,n and the operation of a large ce-
ment plant that emitted dirt, smoke, and vibrations.' Fear of future in-
jury alone, however, cannot support a private nuisance action:' None-
theless, a plaintiff who can prove that a LULU or environmentally harm-
ful activity actually interferes with his or her use or enjoyment of his or
her property can recover damages for emotional distress, inconvenience
and disruption of daily life, and the enhanced risk of disease. '
To establish a public nuisance claim, a private plaintiff must dem-
onstrate a special injury that is different in kind, not just degree, from
that suffered by other members of the public.'' For example, evidence
that plaintiffs suffered leukemia and other illness from exposure to water
contaminated by defendants was sufficiently distinct from general public
harm to support a public nuisance claim.' However, claims of aggra-
vated allergies and respiratory disorders from air pollution emitted by a
fiberglass manufacturing plant were insufficient because plaintiffs al-
leged injury to the air quality and health of citizens of the entire county.'
Toxic tort claims might effectively remedy the physical and prop-
erty harms caused by environmental injustice.' The common law rights
protected here, however, are largely rights to compensation for the harm,
and typically not rights to prevent the harm. Preliminary injunctions to
prevent a polluting facility from starting its operations and purportedly
committing toxic harms are not generally available because of the diffi-
culty in establishing imminent irreparable harm.' Thus, common law
rights do little directly to keep LULUs out of minority and low-income
neighborhoods initially. Plaintiffs might be able to obtain an injunction
to prevent future harm from an existing activity that they have proved
420. RMATEMENT (SFoND) TORTS § 821B (1979).
421. Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 319-23.
422. Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1245 (R.L 1982).
423. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870,871 (N.Y. 1970).
424. Koll-Irvine dr. Property Owners Ass'n v. County of Orange, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664, 667-
68 (CL App. 1994) (discussing the operation of jet fuel storage tanks at airport).
425. Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 320-23.
426. Koll-Irvine, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 666.
427. Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219,1232-34 (D. Mass. 1986).
428. Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 358 (CL App. 1971).
429. Thorme, supra note 395, at 115.
430. Id. at 152 n.94; see also Koll-Irvine, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 667-68 (holding the fear of future
injury not actionable); Nicholson v. Connecticut Half-way House, Inc., 218 A.2d 383, 386 (Conn.
1966) (noting that fear of future criminal activity from proposed halfway house for prison parolees
could not justify granting an injunction). But see Freedman v. Briarcroft Property Owners, Inc., 776
S.W.2d 212,216 (Tex. CL App. 1989) (allowing an injunction to prevent a threatened injury).
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harms them.0 ' Courts, however, are increasingly willing to allow eco-
nomically beneficial but environmentally harmful activity to continue
and instead require operators of these nuisances to compensate sur-
rounding property owners.' Furthermore, even toxic tort plaintiffs who
seek compensatory damages, instead of abatement of the tortious activ-
ity, often encounter difficulties proving causation, i.e., linking evidence
of health effects to the specific pollutant or industrial activity."3 Even if
compensatory and punitive liability for toxic wastes and hazardous land
uses at common law indirectly discourage would-be polluters, this
method of controlling or preventing environmental injustices is ineffi-
cient and uncertain.'' Plaintiffs must have the resources to litigate these
claims; even if an attorney will take a toxic tort case on a contingency fee
basis, the costs of gathering and presenting evidence of the harm and its
cause can be great03 Court decisions about which activities are action-
able torts are ad hoc, fact specific, and unpredictable. ' Judicial standards
to protect low-income and minority neighborhoods from toxic torts could
take decades to develop case-by-case. Courts will likely be reluctant to
declare a LULU a nuisance if it has received approvals from federal or
state environmental agencies under applicable laws. Finally, victims of
environmental injustice may receive very little actual compensation.
Toxic tort suits "have disempowered and disillusioned many low-income
communities and communities of color. While some community mem-
431. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 166 (7th Cir. 1979).
432. E.g., Baldwin v. McClendon, 288 So. 2d 761,767 (Ala. 1974); Boomer v. Atlantic Ce-
ment Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872-74 (N.Y. 1970); Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 172 N.W.2d 647,
653-54 (Wis. 1969). If the court decides that the challenged activity has greater social utility than
the court's perception of the harm, it may determine that the activity is not a nuisance. Thorme,
supra note 395, at 118.
433. Thorme, supra note 395, at 115 n.89.
434. Brennan, supra note 395, at 6-7. As stated by Brennan: "Empirical evidence suggests that
environmental torts suits ... send a weak deterrent signal." Id." at 6. For skepticism about the impact
of common law rules on human behavior, see ELLICKSON, supra note 77 (discussing alternative,
informal norms to dispute resolution); Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common-
Law Rules, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1717 (1982) (discussing the need to be cautious when assigning social
and economic consequences to common law rules because of institutional and intellectual restraints);
John Griffiths, Is Law Important?, 54 N.Y.U. L REv. 339, 343-54 (stating that direct effects of
legal rules on human behavior is empirically questionable at best, and indirect effects ae difficult to
ascertain). For discussion of the limits of the adjudicative process, see James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L3. 467, 495-501
(1976).
435. Vincent Robert Johnson, Ethical Limitations on Creative Financing of Mass Tort Class
Actions, 54 BROOK. L REv. 539, 545-48 (1988).
436. See Elinor P. Schroeder, Legislative and Judicial Responses to the Inadequacy of Compen-
sation for Occupational Disease, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 151, 162 (1986) C'[Tihe very nature
of the common law dictates that tort rules will change slowly, sporadically, and inconsistently."); see
also Henderson, supra note 434, at 468; Thorme, supra note 395, at 118. Compare State Dep't of
Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 160-64 (NJ. 1983) (holding the storage of toxic
wastes is an abnormally dangerous activity for which storage facility is strictly liable), with Arawana
Mills Co. v. United Tech. Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238, 1252 (D. Conn. 1992) (storage of hazardous
materials is not an abnormally dangerous for strict liability purposes).
437. See Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276, 285 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
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bers may in the long run receive compensation for their injuries, many
plaintiffs in such suits see little money, if any at all, in these suits, which
often last for years."'e Therefore, common law rights have limited utility
for the environmental justice movement.
6. The Reactive Nature of Rights
Legal conceptions of environmental justice--whether grounded in
constitutional law, statutes, or common law, and whether concerning
civil rights, environmental rights, or tort rights-are essentially
reactive.' Legal rights depend considerably on judicial enforcement." °
Joel Handler has written:
Our legal system is not proactive. In order for the system to work
there must be a complaining client. People have to know that they
have suffered a harm, they have to blame someone rather than them-
selves for that harm, they have to know how to pursue the remedy,
they have to have resources to pursue the remedy, and the potential
benefits of winning have to outweigh the potential costs. All of these
conditions are essential; if there is a failure to satisfy any one condi-
tion, then the remedy will fail."'
Legal actions develop in response to violations of those rights, or at
least in response to threats to those rights. There must be a claimant who
is willing and able to bring a lawsuit, and the court's action is limited to
responding to the particulars of the claims presented."' Litigation, in
contrast to proactive zoning regulation, results in fewer restraints on
harmful land uses and is rarely an early preventive strategy." Through
litigation, the law develops incrementally, based on case-by-case, fact-
specific decisions." Court orders are poor tools to develop policy, as
courts are ill-equipped to balance competing policy goals, consider po-
litical factors, and control the unintended consequences of litigation out-
438. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 545 n.5.
439. See William A. Shutkin & Charles P. Lord, Environmental Law, Environmental Justice
and Democracy, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1119(1994) (positing that citizen suits are ex post facto
remedies).
440. See S. Mark White, State and Federal Planning Legislation and Manufactured Housing:
New Opportunities for Affordable, ingle-Family Shelter, 28 URB. LAW. 263, 271-72 (1996) (char-
acterizing litigation over exclusionary zoning as reactive, adversarial, and supervised by courts, in
contrast with proactive planning and policy development by local governments).
441. Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the ModerniPostmodern Search for the
Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1019 (1988).
442. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 4(1988).
443. See Shelley Ross Saxer, When Religion Becomes a Nuisance: Balancing Land Use and
Religious Freedom When Activities of Religious institutions Bring Outsiders into the Neighborhood,
84 Ky. U. 507, 512 (1995-96); Tores, supra note 1, at 451 ("[Bjy the time a lawsuit is filed, it is
often too late for the minority community to participate in the political process in any meaningful
way. Political choices have already been made; bargains struck.').
444. See Schroeder, supra note 436, at 162 (cautioning that changes are slow in developing and
sporadic in nature).
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comes."' Lawsuits to enforce rights, even if successful, do not necessar-
ily result in improved conditions, justice, or empowerment of the subor-
dinated."6 In fact, litigation may take the struggle away from the people
involved and move it to the disempowering forum of legal expertise.'
Finally, research suggests that litigatiob is a poor agent of social
change.'
D. Heightened Enforcement Responses (Environmental Conceptions)
Although the vast majority of environmental justice writing reflects
a social justice conception of the topic,"' some authors view the problem
as primarily an environmental problem, requiring either more careful
regulation or greater enforcement of existing regulation. ' This view
takes several different forms.
Some suggest that federal laws designed to control and prevent haz-
ardous and toxic pollution have been regulatory failures, never having
been implemented effectively or enforced thoroughly."' Thus, more
stringent and consistent enforcement of existing laws would reduce the
environmental burdens that low-income and minority communities expe-
rience. A closely related perspective maintains that environmental justice
groups should use citizen suits to compel implementation and enforce-
ment of existing environmental laws and regulations.' While the former
perspective urges the agencies to enhance enforcement, the latter calls
for grassroots litigation to force agencies to implement the laws fully.
However, both reflect some degree of faith in existing environmental
laws as a means of securing healthy and safe environments for low-
income people and people of color.
Others believe that increased participation by low-income people
and minorities in government environmental decision making will ad-
445. Susan V. Demers, The Failures of Litigation As a Tool for the Development of Social
Welfare Policy, 22 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1009, 1010 (1995).
446. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 648-49, Torres, supra note 1, at 450-51.
447. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 647-52. Nonetheless, litigation may be a useful
political tool, if properly constrained. id. at 654,667-68.
448. See generally JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A
THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978) (examining the attempts of social move-
ments to use court action to achieve concrete changes); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (arguing that courts am not effective
tools for social change).
449. See, e.g., Bullaid, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 23-24; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at
640-41; Gauna, supra note 6, at 27-29.
450. Despite the importance of the environmental conception of environmental justice as a
distinct way of thinking about the issue, very little has been written about environmental justice from
this point of view.
451. See SzASz, supra note 7, at 137-38; Colin Crawford, Strategies for Environmental Jus-
tice: Rethinking CERCLA Medical Monitoring Lawsuits, 74 B.U. L. Rnv. 267, 276-77 (1994) (dis-
cussing problematic, costly, and inefficient CERCLA litigation); Lazarus, supra note 6, at 816-19;,
Robertson, supra note 6, at 134-40.
452. See supra notes 339-60 and accompanying text.
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dress and prevent environmental injustices.' This perspective closely
relates to political conceptions of environmental justice, ' but it also has
faith in the system of federal and state environmental regulation, if prop-
erly informed and influenced by the historically excluded, to achieve
environmental justice.
Others have faith in the role of lawyers in achieving both environ-
mental protection and environmental justice goals. They argue that attor-
neys have a duty to advise and assist their clients to pursue environmen-
tally sound actions.' The wise and ethical attorney will "inform clients
that environmental justice changes are forthcoming ... [and] assist the
client in seeking site or operational alternatives with results that fall
within the bounds of environmental justice."
Some believe that grassroots activists' critiques of traditional envi-
ronmental law' are misplaced: greater efforts to achieve "consistent,
equal enforcement of existing laws and regulations... regardless of the
racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic status of a community'" should be fa-
vored over attempts to protect low-income and minority communities,
and additional scientific research assessing human health risks of expo-
sure to pollutants should be favored over rejection of science-based risk
assessment and precautionary protective measures.' Similarly, Dan
Tarlock calls for integration of the environmental justice movement into
the mainstream environmental movement in the pursuit of sustainable
development, and in particular, sustainable cities. He argues that the
environmental justice movement's civil rights orientation and suspicion
of regulatory power and methods-including risk assessment and man-
agement, cost-benefit analysis, and market incentives--are too narrow
and ineffective, as is the cautious rejection of all LULUs. ' Instead, envi-
ronmental law, currently moving in the direction of sustainable develop-
453. See Rodolfo Mata, Environmental Equity: The Next Generation of Facility Siting Pro-
grams, 16 CHiCANO-LATINO L. REv. 1, 37 (1995); Torres, supra note 1, at 453-54; Heather E. Ross,
Note, Using NEPA in the Fight for Environmental Justice, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVrL. L. 353, 373-
74(1994).
454. See supra notes 98-241 and accompanying text.
455. See generally MANASTER, supra note 6 (addressing the lawyer's role in balancing client
needs and environmental justice); Moya, supra note 6, at 217-18, 263-66 (calling on attorneys to
perform pro bono environmental work and the ABA to adopt the Environmental Bill of Rights).
456. Moya, supra note 6, at 263.
457. See supra notes 102-24.
458. John R. Kyte, Comment, Environmental Justice: The Need for Equal Enforcement and
Sound Science, 11 J. CoNTmp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 253,279 (1994).
459. Id. at 257, 272-73, 276-79 (1994); see also Gauna, supra note 6, at 18 (reporting EPA's
response to environmental justice criticisms of its enforcement patterns).
460. Tarlock, supra note 33, at 464-66, 469; see also Collin, supra note 1, at 544-46 (urging
merger of environmentalism and concepts of equity as represented by environmental justice).
461. Tarlock, supra note 33, at 463-66.
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ment theory and practice, has the capacity to reconcile protection of the
natural environment with human needs and interests, including fairness.'
Tarlock's vision, like many others in the environmental concept of
environmental justice, offers the advantage of seeking reconciliation of
traditional environmental goals with the distributive concerns of envi-
ronmental justice advocates. Although some have argued that the main-
stream environmental movement historically ignored the concerns of
low-income and minority communities,.' perpetual conflict between the
two may limit the effectiveness of both." Protection of ecosystems and
biodiversity is not necessarily in conflict with protection of human
health, even though reconciliation of ecological needs and human needs
may require careful and sometimes difficult balancing of competing val-
ues. " In addition, observations that residents of low-income and minor-
ity neighborhoods are more concerned about immediate health hazards
than biological, recreational, or aesthetic goals' risk becoming reduc-
tionist assumptions that low-income people or people of color possess
only anthropocentric values and cannot possess ecocentric or biocentric
values. Instead, environmentalism is alive and well within low-income
and minority communities.'
The environmental model of environmental justice ignores several
important factors, though, that limit its effectiveness. First, scarce gov-
ernment agency resources, political pressures, scientific and legal uncer-
tainty, and the problem of agency capture result in limited implementa-
tion of environmental policy, at best, and implementation failure in some
cases. ' Reliance on agency enforcement of environmental laws may not
462. Id. at 491-92; see also THE ECOLOGICAL CrrY: PRESERVING AND RESTORING URBAN
BIODIVERITY 10-14 (Rutherford H. Platt et al. eds., 1994).
463. See supra notes 113-20.
464. Poirier, supra note 28, at 800-02; Tarlock, supra note 33, at 465-66.
465. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Conserving Habitats and Building Habitats: The Emerging
Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Land Use Development, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (1991);
Tarlock, supra note 33, at 486.
466. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 22; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 639-40.
467. Cad Anthony, Why African Americans Should Be Environmentalists, RACE, POVERTY &
THE ENVT., April 1990, at 5, 5-6; Karl Lin, Inner Cities to Join Ecology Debate, RACE, POVERTY
& THE ENV'T, July 1990, at 1, 11; Stephen J. Newell & Corliss L. Green, Racial Differences in
Consumer Environmental Concern, 31 J. CONSUMER AFF. 53 (1997) (noting no significant differ-
ences in environmental attitudes based solely on income or race, but lower levels of concern among
African Americans with lower levels of education and income and significant differences in envi-
ronmental attitudes based on education level generally); Julie Anderson, Environmental Coalition
Picks Board Members, Group Aims to Improve Inner City, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, June 21, 1996,
at 13SF; Caroline Keough, Seniors Find Home in Barrio Chicano Federation, Others Contribute to
Make Villas, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 8, 1996, at B6; Teaching Inner-City Kids About the
Environment, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept 24, 1992, at B05; Melinda Voss, Beauty Spots Transform a
Neighborhood, DES MOINES REG., Oct 4,1996, at 1.
468. See Barry Boyer & Errol Mcidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 837 (1985);
Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENV'Lt.
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always protect against environmental harm. ' Second, initial empirical
evidence suggests that the EPA enforces environmental laws less rigor-
ously and quickly in communities of color than in white communities. '
In the absence of concrete proposals about how to make enforcement and
implementation fairer, criticisms that the environmental regulatory sys-
tem is inherently biased remain unanswered. Third, to the extent that the
environmental concept of environmental justice depends on existing
regulatory standards and processes to prevent or remedy injustice, it is
reactive in the administrative arena, much in the same way that the rights
concept is reactive in the judicial arena or the power concept is reactive
in the political arena. The local community waits for either a proposed
LULU siting to evaluate its environmental impact through the permitting
process, or evidence that an existing LULU is violating regulatory stan-
dards, such as compliance monitoring and administrative, civil, and
criminal enforcement. If, on the other hand, the environmental concept
calls for redefinition of regulatory standards and processes to reflect en-
vironmental justice concerns-such as levels of acceptable risk, local
participation, and sustainable development goals"-it is a proactive ap-
proach.
E. Market Responses (Economic Conceptions)
One of the most controversial views of environmental injustice as-
serts that it is an economic, or market, problem.' Several significant
variations on the market theory exist. One perspective posits that LULUs
are distributed inequitably by income, not by race." Another perspective
holds that minority and low-income people voluntarily move to neigh-
borhoods already containing LULUs because property and rents are
cheaper-an action called "coming to the nuisance."'' 4 A third perspec-
tive states that racial disparities in LULU locations derive from discrimi-
nation in the operation of the private market, not in government decision
making.' A fourth perspective finds that regardless of the causes of en-
L. 1647, 1666-77 (1991); Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of
Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROwS. 311,314(1991).
469. Reliance on agencies may be more effective than reliance on the courts. See Tarlock,
supra note 33, at 465, 469; Torres, supra note 1, at 450-53, 456.
470. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 58, at S I.
471. Mata, supra note 123, at 447-65; see Tones, supra note 1, at 453-61.
472. See, e.g., Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1384-93; Lambert & Boemer, supra note 7, at
197. Even more controversial is a perception that there is no injustice in the distribution of LULUs.
This theory is built on the idea that LULUs are necessary, they are distributed efficiently according
to land costs, and economic efficiency is the proper determinant of distributive justice.
473. See Jaffe, supra note 10, at 658-59.
474. See Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1385; Lambert & Boemer, supra note 7, at 197.
475. See Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1390-92 (explaining that the market disfavors the poor
by favoring existing distribution of economic resources, and disfavors people of color through racial
discrimination in residential markets); see also Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimi-
nation in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARv. L. REV. 817, 818-20 (1991). See generally MASSEY
& DENTON, supra note 149 (arguing that racial residential segregation is the principal structural
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vironmental injustice, the means for compensating host neighborhoods
exist and offer an equitable and efficient solution to distributional ineq-
uities.' A final market perspective contends that prospective landowners
and developers, who themselves may not have been involved in the ini-
tial siting of LULUs, lack the economic incentives to clean up and revi-
talize industrial and contaminated sites in low-income and minority
neighborhoods."
Environmental justice advocates criticize the economic approach as
both immoral and a disregard for the racial and power aspects of envi-
ronmental injustice.' However, if market dynamics or economic factors
are important to the distribution of LULUs, policies that ignore these
factors will fail.' More importantly, the supposed tension between eco-
nomics and race as the explanation for environmental injustice may be a
false dichotomy. Either multiple factors, such as racism, classism, market
dynamics, and/or political inefficacy, may be interrelated causes, or mar-
kets themselves may contain institutional or subconscious racism, in
which case market discrimination would be the cause.4w In any event, not
all economic responses to environmental injustice simply call for paying
poor people to endure exposure to toxic land uses.
One proposed type of response to market forces in LULU siting is
government regulation. This response is built on either the idea that the
market, although efficient, is not fair (market injustice)," or the idea that
the market is not efficient because bargaining inequities prevent local
communities from forcing LULU owners to internalize the social costs of
their facilities (market inefficiency).' The market injustice view empha-
sizes discrimination in housing, lending, and other markets; lack of eq-
uitable distribution of resources with which to participate in the market;
and limited access to economic opportunity. ' Because the market will
not produce fair outcomes, the government must regulate private behav-
ior to prevent discriminatory market outcomes, such as private actors
feature of American society responsible for the perpetuation of urban poverty and represents a pri-
mary cause of racial inequality in the United States).
476. See Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay Attention?, 21
FORDHAM URB. LJ. 787, 788 (1994) (hereinafter Been, Compensated Siting Proposals].
477. See Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams"? Challenges and Limits of Voluntary Cleanup
Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 914.
478. See BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 7, at 91 (stating that advancing the eco-
nomic approach without thought to racial and power aspects may lead to discrimination); Lambert &
Boemer, supra note 7, at 200-01 (reporting criticisms of authors' market studies of environmental
justice).
479. Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1385-86.
480. Id. at 1384.
481. Jaffe, supra note 10, at 655-56,659-60.
482. Id. at 656.
483. See supra notes 121-25; see also Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1388-92 (maintaining
that racial discrimination in the sale and rental of property can place people of color in less desirable
areas and this, in turn, can lead to discrimination in development and enforcement of zoning and
environmental laws).
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favoring low-income or minority neighborhoods for LULU sites, or the
market funneling of poor people and people of color to areas around
LULUs.,
The market inefficiency argument maintains that low-income and
minority host communities do not have the bargaining power to force
proponents of LULUs to internalize the social costs associated with the
resulting pollution and other impacts on the neighborhood and property
values.' Responsive policies would boost the bargaining power of host
communities either by providing information, access to the regulatory
process, and legal and technical assistance, or by giving them legal and
regulatory tools with which to prevent sitings, thus bringing the develop-
ers to the community's bargaining table.' These tools might include
command-and-control regulation of LULU sitings, ' common law reme-
dies for harms suffered, ' statutorily mandated negotiations, or compen-
sation with participation by the host community or those who would be
exposed to risk.' Much of the economics-oriented discussion about
market inefficiency focuses on compensation of affected people and
communities as a way of addressing the problem of externalities, which
are costs imposed by the LULU on others-for example, neighbors. '
Externalities may be both inefficient and inequitable.' The market effi-
ciency theory rests on the assumption that some people or communities,
if adequately compensated,' will rationally choose to accept LULUs. '
That choice, however, may be rational only in the sense that the recipi-
ents so lack economic resources and power that they are willing to ex-
pose themselves to harm for money, which implicates the market justice
problem and the specter of "environmental job blackmail."' Vicki Been
484. See Lambert & Boemer, supra note 7, at 212-13.
485. Jaffe, supra note 10, at 656,660.
486. Id. at 660.
487. Lambert & Boemer, supra note 7, at 224-25.
488. Id. at 223-24.
489. Id. at 226-27; see also Mank, supra note 6, at 424 (stating that legislatures should adopt
proposals to allow the communities in the affected areas to select representatives to negotiation and
compensation committees rather than expand the ability of minority groups to bring suits clalming
substantive fairness).
490. See generally Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 476 (analyzing whether
the difficulties of siting LULUs efficiently and fairly can be resolved by adequately compensating
individuals for the burdens the LULU imposes); Lambert & Boemer, supra note 7 (discussing the
need to develop policies that compensate individuals living near industrial sites as a way to secure
environmental justice); Mank, supra note 6 (proposing a risk-based way to represent and compensate
those affected by a siting decision). Compensation can take different forms: direct money payments,
mitigation of the LULU's effects, or community services and infrastrUcture. SZASZ, supra note 7, at
108-09.
491. Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 476, at 791.
492. The compensation may take the form of "a remedy, a preventative measure, or a reward."
Id. at 792.
493. See id. at 790; Jaffe, supra note 10, at 659-60.
494. Gauna, supra note 6, at 38-39;, see Boyle supra note 9, at 975-76; see also SZASZ, supra
note 7, at 109-10 (criticizing distributional implications of compensation proposals).
[V/ol. 76:1
1998] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSICE AND LAND USE REGULATION 75
has noted that compensated siting programs are, as a matter of practical
reality, well established but could be objectionable if they (1) violate
social norms against the commodification of exposure to health risks; (2)
exploit general distributional inequities in society; (3) fail to adequately
protect future generations; and (4) result in agreements that are far from
truly informed and voluntary.' In addition, compensated siting programs
have failed to be successful in siting LULUs.'
However, market-oriented responses to environmental injustice also
include policies to foster economic empowerment in low-income and
minority communities. One theory finds that improvements in employ-
ment, residential and economic mobility, local infrastructure and public
services, and economic growth will either enhance the ability of poor and
minority communities to fight environmental injustices or decrease the
likelihood that their neighborhoods will be chosen for LULUs.' Rachel
Godsil and James Freeman have proposed a model of community-based
economic development to promote the overall health and sustainability
of low-income communities of color, including job creation, wise land
use patterns, community empowerment, and economic self-sufficiency.'
Another theory asserts that existing toxic and industrial sites will be
cleaned up and redeveloped into economically productive, clean uses
only if developers have economic incentives to do so.' This theory finds
its outlet in the current fascination among policy makers, the private
sector, lawyers, and scholars with "brownfields redevelopment. " "A
brownfield is best defined as abandoned or underutilized urban land
and/or infrastructure where expansion or redevelopment is complicated,
in part, because of known or potential contamination.'1 State brown-
495. Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 476, at 824-25.
496. Id. at 824; see also Eisen, supra note 477, at 997 (stating that negotiated compensation
statutes have been generally unsuccessful in attempting to facilitate the siting of hazardous waste
plants and facilities).
497. Rachel D. Godsil & James S. Freeman, Jobs, Trees and Autonomy: The Convergence of
the Environmental Justice Movement and Community Economic Development, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 25, 28 (1993-94); see Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1392; see also Bailey et al.,
supra note t2t, at 117 (concluding that the black population does not fight environmental injustices
because many rank issues of education, race relations and unemployment of higher priority than
issues of hazardous waste); Roger H. Bezdek, The Net Impact of Environmental Protection on Jobs
and the Economy, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICiES AND SOLUTIONS 86 (Bunyan
Bryant ed., 1995) (arguing that environmental protection has positive economic and job impacts but
in the absence of intentional efforts to capture these benefits for the poor and minorities, these eco-
nomic benefits will largely flow to higher income whites). See generally Gunn, supra note 13, at
1267-71 (discussing ideas for training and employment of low-income, minority community resi-
dents in environmental remediation).
498. Godsil & Freeman, supra note 497, at 28.
499. Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and Industrial Redevelopment: Econom-
ics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705, 752 (1994); see Johnson, supra
note 6, at 99 (stating that private and public institutions are reluctant to attempt redevelopment
because of the associated high costs).
500. Eisen, supra note 477, at 890-93.
501. Id. at 890 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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fields cleanup programs offer land owners "relaxed cleanup standards,
streanlined administrative procedures, and releases from future liability
to spur developers to clean up and reuse brownfield sites. " However,
Joel Eisen has shown that these programs often trade increased health
risks to low-income and minority communities with little local participa-
tion and only questionable actual job creation and urban revitalization.'
Il. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF INEQUITABLE DISTIBUTION OF LAND USE
REGULATORY PATrERNS
A. Land Use Regulatory Patterns: The Ignored Environmental Justice Issue
The five dominant conceptions of environmental justice--eviden-
tiary, power, legal, environmental, and economic-have insufficiently
considered land use planning and regulation. In addition to sparse atten-
tion to planning concepts and no attention to the strategic use of regula-
tory tools, very little systematic documentation of the unequal distribu-
tion of land use regulation on the basis of race and class exists.'
The use of zoning and other land use regulatory mechanisms--re-
quirements of large lots, minimum floor space, and significant setbacks;
low-density zoning; and restrictions on multi-family housing--to ex-
clude low-income people who cannot afford large single-family homes
on large lots (exclusionary zoning) has been well documented.' Exclu-
sionary zoning has had the effect of contributing to and perpetuating
residential segregation not only by class but also by race.s' In addition,
Yale Rabin has focused scholarly attention on expulsive zoning, the
practice of local governments rezoning neighborhoods of color to allow
incompatible and noxious land uses, thereby displacing ("expelling")
some residents and replacing them with new industrial and commercial
activities that threaten the health, safety, quality, and character of the
502. Id. at 886-87.
503. Id. at 886-88. But see Johnson, supra note 6 (finding that federal/state cooperation on
brownfields can serve as model for future federal/state environmental justice initiatives).
504. See discussion infra Parts IV and V.
505. But see, e.g., City of Austin Planning, Envtl. & Conservation Servs. Dep't, Plan. Div.,
East Austin Land Use/Zoning Report (last modified Mar. 6, 1997) <http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/
landuse/eajtexthtm> (releasing study showing that the largely-minority populated East Austin has a
significantly higher percentage of industrial zoning than other areas of city). The zoning report
complements an earlier study showing higher usage of hazartous substances in East Austin than in
other areas of Austin. Ralph K.M. Haurwitz et al., An Industrial Chokehold: Toxic Hazards Abound
in East Austin, and It's No Coincidence, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 20, 1997, at Al.
506. See PATICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLs §§ 3.01-.02 (E Damian
Kelly ed., 1998); KENNLEH H. YoUNG, ANDERSON'S AMEiCAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 8.01-.03 (4th
ed. 1996); see also Dubin, supra note 1, at 741 & n.8 (stating that racially-segregated residential
patterns remain as a result of discriminatory zoning and land use planning).
507. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 2.01[t, at 2-6; Dubin, supra note 1, at 740-41 (discussing
Yale Rabin's observation that residents who are not protected against expulsive zoning are often
victims of reduced safety and quality of their neighborhoods).
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neighborhood.'a Rabin documented his analysis of expulsive zoning with
twelve case studies of zoning changes in different cities nationwide that
had the effect of displacing minority residents." However, Rabin's study
did not attempt to quantify the distribution of zoning patterns in low-
income neighborhoods of color and compare those distributions with
zoning patterns of high-income white neighborhoods in the same cities.
The distributional studies that have emerged in the environmental justice
literature have focused on specific LULUs, not on land use regulatory
patterns.510 This article documents land use regulatory patterns--the per-
centages of area designated for different land uses-in thirty-one census
tracts in seven cities nationwide. Low-income, minority communities
have a greater share not only of LULUs, but also of industrial and com-
mercial zoning, than do high-income white communities.
B. Methodology
The study measures the percentages of area in census tracts that
local zoning ordinances have designated for each type of land use. It
contains data from thirty-one census tracts in seven cities: Anaheim,
California; Costa Mesa, California; Orange, California; Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania; San Antonio, Texas; Santa Ana, California; and Wichita, Kan-
sas.
1'
508. Rabin, supra note 1; see Dubin, supra note 1, at 742.
509. Rabin, supra note 1,at 108-18.
510. See, e.g., BULLARD, INVISIBLE HOUSTON, supra note 66, at 71-72 (addressing garbage
incinerators and landfills in Houston); GAO RpORT, supra note 5 (addressing major hazardous
waste landfills in Southeastern United States); ANN MAXWELL & DANIEL IMMERGLUCK,
LIQUORLINING: LIQUOR STORE CONCENTRATION AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN LOWER-
INCOME COOK COUNTY NEIGHBORHOODS (1997) (addressing liquor stores in Chicago); UNrrED
CHURCH OF CHRIST REPORT, supra note 3 (addressing commercial hazardous waste facilities and
uncontrolled toxic waste sites); Anderson et al., supra note 80, at 83 (addressing commercial haz-
ardous waste facilities and uncontrolled toxic waste sites); Baden & Coursey, supra note 7 (ad-
dressing Superfund, TSD, hazardous waste generating, and historical hazardous waste sites in Chi-
cago); Been & Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance, supra note 6, at 9 (addressing commercial hazardous
waste treatment storage and disposal facilities nationwide).
511. See appendix infra p. 140. Unless expressly noted, information from this study and ad-
dressed in the following text is presented in the appendix to this article. All data in this section
comes from the 1990 U.S. Census. Two census tracts analyzed fall outside the political jurisdiction
of the applicable named cities but are completely surrounded by the cities: Terrell Hills, which is a
separately incorporated city sunounded by the City of San Antonio, Texas, and is census tract
#1204; and Eastborough, which is a separately incorporated borough surrounded by the City of
Wichita, Kansas, and is census tract #74. For purposes of this study, these two "pocket" cities are
treated as part of their respective ambient cities. For all practical purposes, these "pocket" cities are
not suburban fringe cities, but instead are predominantiy white, upper-income neighborhoods within
the ambient city's geographic and psychological boundaries. Because these neighborhoods are
separately incorporated, their residents do not have to pay taxes to fund the ambient cities' urban
programs and are not controlled by the land use and other municipal decisions of the ambient cities'
governing bodies. However, these "pocket" city residents participate in the political, economic, and
civic life of the larger ambient city. For a discussion of local political boundaries and race, see Rich-
ard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1843 (1994).
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The cities were selected on the basis of several criteria:
1. Geographic diversity. Pittsburgh is in the Northeast; Wichita
is in the Midwest; San Antonio is in the South/Southwest; and Anaheim,
Costa Mesa, Orange, and Santa Ana are on the West Coast.
2. Population diversity!" San Antonio, with a population of
935,933, is the tenth largest city in the United States. However, it is part
of the thirtieth largest standard metropolitan statistical area, which has a
population of 1,302,099. Thus, most of the population in the San Antonio
metropolitan area is within the City of San Antonio itself. Pittsburgh, on
the other hand, is the fortieth largest city with a population of 369,879.
Yet, it is within the nineteenth largest metropolitan area, containing a
population of 2,242,798. A small percentage of the total Pittsburgh met-
ropolitan area population resides within the City of Pittsburgh. Wichita is
a medium-size city, ranking fifty-first in city population (304,011) and
seventy-fifth in metropolitan area population (485,270). The four re-
maining cities-Santa Ana (population of 293,742), Anaheim (popula-
tion of 266,406), Orange (population of 110,658), and Costa Mesa
(population of 96,357)-are part of the second largest metropolitan area
in the United States, covering more than 14.5 million people who live in
Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bemadino, and Ventura counties.
All four cities are in Orange County, which has a population of more
than 2.4 million people. Thus, they are medium to small cities in a large
metropolitan area.
3. Racial diversity. Two cities have very high percentages of
people of color. Santa Ana has 76.6% people of color, predominantly
Hispanic and Asian, and San Antonio has 63.6% people of color, pre-
dominantly Hispanic. Anaheim has 43.4% people of color, and Orange
has 31.9% people of color. Both of these cities have significant Hispanic
and Asian populations. Pittsburgh has 28.5% people of color, predomi-
nantly African American. Costa Mesa has 27.6% people of color, pre-
dominantly Hispanic. Wichita has 19.5% people of color, predominantly
African American.
4. Land use development diversity. Pittsburgh is an old city that
developed along natural features, particularly the convergence of three
rivers. Wichita is a traditional Midwestern grid-pattern city. San Antonio
has an old but partially redeveloped core, barrios, and new suburban and
outer-ring office development, but most of the greater metropolitan area
lies within the city boundaries. The four California cities are mostly
512. For rankings of cities by population, the populations of metropolitan areas, and rankings of
metropolitan areas by population, see WeiSER'S 11 NEW RIVERSIDE DESK REFERENCE 13-15, 77-
78(1992).
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twentieth-century edge cities,"'3 parts of the Orange County metropolitan
area which has no central core.
5. Spatial segregation by race and class. Each of the cities has
at least one census tract with a high (or in one case, a moderately high)
percentage of minorities and a high percentage of low-income persons,
and at least one census tract with a low percentage of minorities and a
low percentage of low-income persons, thus allowing for measurement
of whether low-income communities of color bear a higher percentage of
non-residential zoning designations than white, wealthy communities.
6. Study feasibility. The author had means of readily obtaining
the zoning maps and codes of each of these cities.
Census tracts were chosen by reviewing 1990 U.S. Census Bureau
census data on the racial composition, median household income, and
percentage of persons below the poverty level for all the census tracts of
each city."4 Census tracts were chosen for being either significantly
above or significantly below the racial and class composition of the city.
All high-income, low-minority census tracts selected for this study had
less than 50% of the respective city's percentages for people below pov-
erty and people of color, except Anaheim Tract #219.04. This tract had
22.10% people of color, which was 50.9% of Anaheim's percentage of
people of color (43.4%), but less than 32% of Anaheim's high-minority
census tracts (i.e., 874.02 and 874.03) that were studied. Thus, the per-
centage of people of color in tract 219.04 was significantly less than the
percentage in Anaheim's high-minority tracts.
In absolute, as opposed to relative, measures, all high-income, low-
minority tracts in all cities had less than 27% people of color, and eight
out of the twelve tracts had 14% or less. The high-income, low-minority
tracts had less than 8% people below poverty, and nine out of twelve
tracts had 4.5% or less.
All low-income, high-minority tracts were more than 150% of their
respective city's percentages of people below poverty and people of
color, except for two tracts in San Antonio and three tracts in Santa Ana.
These five exceptions had less than 150% of the respective city's per-
centages of people of color due to the high number of people of color in
those cities. Each of the five tracts had more than 85% people of color,
and three of the tracts had 92% or more.
In absolute measures, all low-income, high-minority tracts in all
cities had more than 45% people of color, and sixteen out of the nineteen
513. For a discussion of edge cites, see JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW
FRONTIER (1991); JON C. TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE EDGE
CITIES (1997).
514. Census tracts are the most appropriate unit of analysis for environmental justice distribu-
tional studies. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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tracts had more than 69%. All low-income, high-minority tracts had
more than 15% people below poverty, and thirteen out of nineteen tracts
had 33% or more.
After data on the racial composition, median household income, and
percentage of persons below the poverty level were gathered from the
1990 U.S. Census data for each census tract, the census tracts were iden-
tified on U.S. Census Bureau maps. Zoning maps for the areas corre-
sponding to the census tracts were obtained from local zoning authori-
ties, and census tract boundaries were correlated to the zoning maps. For
each census tract, the areas of zoned land on the map were measured
using fine hand measurement tools according to each land use designa-
tion (e.g., R-l, R-2, C-1, LI), and the percentage of the total area within
the entire census tract zoned for each separate land use designation was
calculated.
C. Data and Analysis
The census data and percentages of each census tract designated for
particular zoning are listed in the tables in the Appendix to this article.
However, data for aggregated zoning designations-single-family resi-
dential, multi-family residential, commercial, industrial, planned devel-
opment, and other-are provided in the tables in this section, following
the textual discussion of the data.
The data shows that low-income, high-minority neighborhoods in
the cities studied are subjects of more intensive zoning, on the whole,
than high-income, low-minority neighborhoods. This conclusion is sup-
ported by data from across the various types of cities studied, regardless
of the cites' geographic features, spatial development, population, politi-
cal characteristics, and the like. With respect to industrial zoning--the
most intensive land use-thirteen out of nineteen low-income, high-
minority census tracts had at least some industrial zoning, and in seven
of those census tracts, the city had zoned more than 20% of the tract for
industrial uses. In contrast, only one of the twelve high-income, low-
minority census tracts contained any industrial zoning at all, only 2.84%
of the tract.
More specifically, Santa Ana tract #744.03, an area of 4,862 people,
of whom 74.9% are Hispanic, is 90.54% zoned for industrial use. Nearly
70% of Orange tract #762.04, about 50% of both Pittsburgh tract #2808
and San Antonio tract #1105, and 36.59% of San Antonio tract #1307.85
are zoned for industrial use." Moreover, although the study did not in-
clude a quantified spatial distribution analysis of the industrial uses in
515. The population figures for these tracts are: Orange tract # 762.04: 3,413 people (66.7%
Hispanic); Pittsburgh tract #2808: 3,072 people (87.8% African American); San Antonio tract
#1105: 2,935 people (96.6% Hispanic); San Antonio tract #1307.85: 2,761 people (70.4% Hispanic
and 20.0% African American).
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comparison to the residential uses, a visual survey of the zoning maps
reveals that industrial use designations are close to residential use desig-
nations, often either across the street or in the same block.
The zoning of low-income neighborhoods of color for industrial
uses places highly intensive activities near local residents' homes, creat-
ing the very sort of incompatibility of uses that zoning is designed to
prevent." ' For example, among the "as of right" permitted uses in Pitts-
burgh tract #2808 are ammonia and chlorine manufacturing, automobile
wrecking, blast furnace or coke oven, chemical manufacturing, iron and
steel manufacturing and processing, airplane factory or hangar, brewery,
poultry slaughter, and machine shop, and among the conditional uses are
atomic reactors, garbage and dead animal reduction, rubbish incineration,
radio and television transmission and receiving towers, and storage of
explosives and inflammables. 7 The City of San Antonio allows acety-
lene gas manufacturing and storage, arsenals, blast furnaces, boiler
works, cement or paving material mixing plants, creameries with on-
premises livestock, forge plants, metal foundries, paper and pulp manu-
facturing, rock crushers, junk storage, tar roofing manufacturing, and
yeast plants, among others, in two of the census tracts studied."' Al-
though nearly two-thirds of Orange census tract #762.04 is zoned for
industrial manufacturing (M2), the City requires many of the most inten-
sive uses to obtain conditional use permits, thus at least theoretically
allowing some level of monitoring and control of the impacts. Neverthe-
less, some of the conditionally permitted uses in Orange's M2 district are
hazardous waste facilities, refuse transfer stations, blast furnaces and
coke ovens, mineral extraction and production, and various types of
chemical production.!' Santa Ana has zoned nearly 90% of census tract
#744.03, containing nearly 5,000 residents, for light industrial activity.
Although Santa Ana's light industrial zoning designation excludes haz-
ardous and solid waste facilities and some hazardous industrial activities
like acid manufacturing, gas and acetylene manufacturing, and metal
smelters, it does not exclude large-scale industrial facilities that can
overwhelm nearby residential uses, the use of toxic substances in light
industrial activities, unsightly storage facilities and warehouses, or a high
concentration of waste-producing facilities like automotive repair and
service sites.'
516. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926); Fifth Annual Re-
port of the Council on Environmental Quality 51-54 (1974), reprinted in ROBERT R. WRIGHT &
MORTON GITELMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 776 (5th ed. 1997).
517. PrITSBURGH, PA., ZONING CODE §§ 967.02, 967.05, 969.02, 969.05 (1996) (uses & use
exceptions for M3 and M4 districts).
518. SAN ANTONIO, TEx., UNIFIED DEV. CODE § 35-3606 (1997) (permitted uses in L district).
519. ORANGE, CAL., MUN. CODE § 17.20.030 (Nov. 1996) (permitted industrial uses).
520. SANTA ANA, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 41-472,41-489.5 (1997) (uses permitted and excluded
in MI district).
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Commercial uses are also located in greater concentrations in low-
income, high-minority neighborhoods than in high-income, low-minority
neighborhoods. In ten out of the nineteen low-income, high-minority
census tracts, at least 10% of the area is zoned for commercial use, and in
seven of those tracts, at least 20% of the area is zoned for commercial
use. In contrast, only two of the twelve high-income, low-minority cen-
sus tracts had at least 10% of the area zoned for commercial use, and
none had more than 20% commercial zoning.
Although the term "commercial" conjures up images of office
buildings and retail stores which may create parking and scale/shadow
impacts on neighboring residences but generally do not pose health haz-
ards, the cities studied allow in their various commercial districts uses
that are far more intensive than offices and stores. For example, nearly
50% of Wichita tract #41 is zoned Central Business District, in which
limited and general manufacturing, vehicle storage yards, warehousing,
welding and machine shops, and vehicle repair uses are allowed by right,
and solid waste incinerators, mining and quarrying, rock crushing, and
oil and gas drilling are conditional uses.!" In about 30% of San Antonio
tract #1307.85, permitted uses include electro-plating, brewery, chicken
hatcheries, poultry slaughter and storage, machine shop, and certain
kinds of manufacturing, such as ice cream, ice, brooms, mattresses, paper
boxes, candy, cigars, and refrigeration.5 Santa Ana's General Commer-
cial (C2) districts may contain automotive garages, blueprinting and
photo-engraving businesses, metal shops, automotive equipment whole-
salers, research laboratories, farm products wholesalers, and tire recap-
ping businesses, and the Central Business (C3) district may contain all of
these land uses except automotive garages.'s These "commercial" land
uses may involve storage and processing of hazardous or toxic materials,
generation of large amounts of waste, emission of fumes, odors, and air-
borne particulates, and imposition of large, unsightly structures on local
neighborhoods.
Zoning codes burden low-income communities of color with inten-
sive use designations. When one combines commercial and industrial
uses and rounds the combined figure to the whole percent, at least one-
quarter of the area in each of eleven census tracts-all of them low-
521. WICHITA & SEDGWICK COUNTY, KAN., UNIFIED ZONING CODE § m-B.16(b), (c) (1997)
(permitted and conditional uses in CBD district).
522. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., UNIFIED DEV. CODE § 35-3605 (1997) (permitted uses in I, J, and K
districts).
523. SANTA ANA, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 41-377, 4i-395 (as of right uses in C2 and C3 dis-
tricts). Nearly 20% of Santa Ana census tract #750.02 is zoned either C2 or C3.
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income, high-minority,'--is zoned for one of these two intensive uses,
even though nearby parcels are zoned for residential uses.
On the other hand, high-income, low-minority neighborhoods are
the beneficiaries of single-family residential zoning and open-space
zoning. Over 75% of the area in each of six high-income, low-income
tracts studied is zoned for single-family residences. If open space, a
country club, and a private university (with significant open space) are
included with single-family residential zoning, eleven of the twelve high-
income, low-minority tracts have more than 75% of their respective areas
zoned for these low-intensity land uses. The remaining tract, Costa Mesa
#638.02, has more than 75% of the tract zoned for low-intensity land
uses if the definition of low-intensity land uses includes not only single-
family residences but also a private school, a post office, a fire station,
and parks, all of which are highly compatible with single-family residen-
tial uses and rarely, if ever, considered LULUs. In other words, all of the
high-income, low-minority tracts have at least three-quarters of the total
land uses in each tract designated as non-intensive land uses.
In contrast, the only low-income, high-minority census tract with
more than 75% of the area zoned for single-family residential or open
space uses is Pittsburgh census tract #2609.98--one tract out of nineteen.
Although zoning for single-family residences or open space may pre-
clude affordable housing needed by low-income people, the contrast in
zoning patterns highlights the disparate impact of zoning designations on
low-income people of color.
524. These eleven tracts are nearly 60% of the low-income, high-minority tracts studied. No
high-income, low-minority tracts had such high percentages of area devoted to commercial and
industrial uses.
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LEGEND FOR TABLES AND GRAPHS
Symbol
* High-income, low-minority census tract
# Low-income, high-minority census tract
SFR Single-family residential (includes low-density residential)
MFR Multi-family residential (includes two-family residential, duplex residential,
manufactured housing, mobile home residential, and medium- and high-density
residential)
C Commercial (includes business and professional)
I Industrial
PD Planned Development
O Other (includes open space, park/recreation, country club, public use, government
center, and special [Pittsburgh])
TABLE 1: ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA, PERCENT OF CENSUS TRACTS BY
AGGREGATED ZONING DESIGNATIONS
Tract SFR MFR C I PD 0
219.04* 94.98 4.84 0.17 0 0 0
874.02 # 22.74 25.42 16.99 23.74 I1.12 0
874.03 # 57.9 12.50 22.59 334 3.63 0
TABLE 2: COSTA MESA, CALIFORNIA, PERCENT OF CENSUS TRACTS BY
AGGREGATED ZONING DESIGNATIONS
Tract S MFR C II IPD 10
638.02* 57.82 5.05 16.67 0 0 20.46
637 # 32.25 25.51 28.68 4.79 0 8.78
TABLE 3: ORANGE, CALIFORNIA, PERCENT OF CENSUS TRACTS BY AGGREGATED
ZONING DESIGNATIONS
Tract SFR R I C II I PD 10
219.12 25.89 0 0 2.84 49.83 21.44
762.04 # 0 8.08 20.46 68.84 0 2.61
TABLE 4: PrIBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA, PERCENT OF CENSUS TRACTS BY
AGGREGATED ZONING DESIGNATIONS
Tract SFR MFR C I PD 0
1401.98 * 42.57 7.02 0 0 2.96 47.44
1404 * 66.02 23.41 0.73 0 0 9.84
1106 * 6.82 22.28 0 0 0 70.90
509 # 0 57.74 0 1.94 0 40.33
510# 0 4.63 0 0 57.19 38.19
1016# 0 31.71 0 0 56.71 11.58
2609.98# 50.64 1.70 1.35 1.21 0 45.10
2808 # 5.94 13.88 0.74 50.11 12.28 17.05
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TABLE 5: SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, PERCENT OF CENSUS TRACTS BY AGGREGATED
ZONING DESIGNATIONS
Tract SFR MFR C I PD 0
1204* approx. 0 approx. 0 0 0
99.00 1.00
1914.02 * 95.22 1.98 2.81 0 0 0
1915.02 * 89.92 6.07 4.00 0 0 0
1105 # 9.79' 34.92 6.43 48.30 0 0.56
1305 # 38.39 48.22 11.72 1.64 0 0.04
1307.85 # 14.52 15.72 33.17 36.59 0 0
1702# 69.70 5.67 24.50 0 0 0.14
TABLE 6: SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA, PERCENT OF CENSUS TRACTS BY
AGGREGATED ZONING DESIGNATIONS
Tract SFR MFR C I PD 0
753.03 * 81.05 1.59 16.67 0 0 0.69
744.03 # 3.43 2.82 0.65 90.54 2.56 0
749.01 # 17.88 33.46 16.77 0 18.45 13.43
750.02 # 0 12.43 48.30 0 13.20 26.07
TABLE 7: WICHITA, KANSAS, PERCENT OF CENSUS TRACTS BY AGGREGATED
ZONING DESIGNATIONS
Tract SFR MFR C I PD 0
73.01 * 67.95 5.59 9.77 0 0 16.68
74* 100.00 0 0 0 0 0
8 # 0 94.36 5.65 0 0 0
41 # 0 6.77 70.68 22.55 0 0
78 # 68.03 19.59 5.85 6.52 0 0
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TABLE 8: INDUSTRIAL ZONING BY CENSUS TRACTS
City Census Tract Percent of per- Percent of low- Percent of tract
sons of color income persons zoned for in-
dustrial use
Anaheim 219.04 Low Low 0
874.02 High High 23.74
874.03 High High 3.34
Costa Mesa 638.02 Low Low 0
637 Medium High 4.79
Orange 219.12 Low Low 2.84
762.04 High High 68.84
Pittsburgh 1401.98 Low Medium- 0
1404 Low Low 0
1106 Low Low 0
509 High High 1.94
510 High High 0
1016 High High 0
2609.98 High High 1.21
2808 High High 50.11
San Antonio 1204 Low Low 0
1914.02 Low Low 0
1915.02 Low to Medium Low 0
1105 High High 48.30
1305 High High 1.64
1307.85 High High 36.59
1702 High High 0
Santa Ana 753.03 LOw Medium 0
744.03 High High 90.54
749.01 High High 0
750.02 High High 0
Wichita 73.01 Low Low 0
74 Low Low 0
8 High High 0
41 High High 22.55
78 High High 6.52
D. Caveats and the Call for Further Studies
The data presented here simply shows that land use regulatory pat-
terns are not evenly distributed in seven cities between high-income
white neighborhoods and low-income minority neighborhoods. A greater
percentage of low-income high-minority neighborhoods are zoned for
525. High median household income.
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commercial and industrial uses, which are more intensive than residen-
tial. Readers should take caution not to read more into the study than it
provides.
The study does not address whether race or income is more impor-
tant in the uneven distribution of land use regulation.' It does not at-
tempt to isolate the race and income variables, and statistically correlate
the results to either. Nor does it compare high-income white tracts with
high-income minority tracts, low-income white tracts with low-income
minority tracts, high-income minority tracts with low-income minority
tracts, or high-income white tracts with low-income white tracts. And it
certainly does not examine the land use patterns of middle-class tracts or
moderately mixed-race tracts.
The study does not attempt to correlate zoning patterns with the
presence of any particular LULUs or environmental hazards. It is possi-
ble that a census tract with significant industrial and commercial zoning
could have no hazardous waste sites, for example. It is also possible that
a census tract that is zoned primarily single-family residential could
contain a major LULU, like a solid waste dump. These scenarios would
probably be rare, and the neighborhoods with more intensive land uses
would likely have more LULUs or environmental hazards. ' However,
this study does not address that issue.
This study is not a longitudinal study.' It does not analyze when the
current zoning patterns emerged, if and how zoning patterns changed
over time, and how the racial and class composition of the census tracts
changed over time. In other words, we do not know if the cities engaged
in expulsive zoning by changing the zoning to permit intensive uses in
low-income, minority neighborhoods,' ' or if low-income, minority peo-
ple moved to industrial or mixed-use neighborhoods because of cheaper
housing costs, residential segregation, discrimination in private markets,
proximity to work, or similar reasons." °
The study does not attempt to identify causes of the inequitable dis-
tributions of land use regulation. The possibilities are far-ranging: inten-
tional discrimination by government decision makers, institutional dis-
crimination embedded in the land use regulatory system, market forces,
personal choices about priorities and values, lack of political power or
526. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
527. See Bullard, Residential Segregation, supra note 23 at 77; cf. Moore & Head, supra note
184, at 198. In addition, lack of zoning controls altogether may contribute to the presence of envi-
ronmental hazards. Robert D. Bullard blames Houston's lack of zoning for the presence of environ-
mental hazards in African American neighborhoods. See BULLAt , INVISIBLE HOUSTON, spra note
66, at 60-63; Robert D. Bullard, Endangered Environs: The Price of Unplanned Growth in Boom-
town Houston, CAL. SocioLoGisT, 1984, at 85; see also supra note 505 (East Austin, Texas, zoning
disparities mirror disparities in presence of hazardous substances).
528. See Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1384-85.
529. See Rabin, supra note 1,at 101-03.
530. See Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1385.
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resources, or most likely some complex and variable combination of
many or all of these. Land use patterns are built on dozens or even hun-
dreds of decisions--both public and private-made over a long period of
time as a result of the interaction of various political, social, and eco-
nomic forces. The failure to isolate one or more causes does not preclude
identification of a distributional problem or attempts by neighborhood
groups and environmental justice activists to change existing land use
patterns.
Finally, this study does not establish a national pattern. The number
of cities studied, seven, is simply too small to prove that zoning in the
United States is inequitable with respect to race and class. Furthermore,
it is meaningless to compare zoning in a census tract in one city with
zoning in a census tract in another city, because the zoning is a result of
decisions made by local land use regulatory authorities, which differ
from city to city. In fact, this study shows that San Antonio zoned census
tract #78 primarily single-family residential with a small amount of
multi-family residential and a significant amount of commercial zoning,
whereas Wichita zoned census tract #8 almost entirely multi-family resi-
dential with little commercial zoning, and Orange has a large amount of
industrial zoning in census tract #762.04. All of these census tracts are
low-income communities of color. Therefore, land use regulation does
not inevitably lead to high levels of commercial and industrial zoning in
low-income and minority neighborhoods. Instead, comparisons must be
between census tracts within each city, and a national trend would
emerge only if a significant number of cities have inequitable zoning
distributions. Perhaps most importantly, national trends are only margin-
ally relevant to addressing overly intensive zoning (or expulsive zoning)
of low-income communities of color. Instead, the existing patterns and
the neighbors' concerns and land use goals are inherently local (indeed,
specific to the neighborhood in question) and the regulatory authority is
local. Changes will occur locality by locality, neighborhood by neigh-
borhood, and not at a national level.
Study of the race and class distribution of land use regulatory pat-
terns is only in its infancy. Research should go in two somewhat diver-
gent directions simultaneously to fill the knowledge gap. One direction is
toward more comprehensive and more rigorous statistical studies of the
distribution of zoning in many different types of census tracts in many
different cities. These studies would validate the findings of this study
across a broader sample of cities than the seven selected for this study.
These studies could also establish which variables correlate most closely
to various distributional patterns. Some of the variables that should be
analyzed are race, median household income, percentage of tract resi-
dents below the poverty level, the degree of political participation among
census tract residents, geographic and natural characteristics of the tracts,
type of land use regulatory system, historical development patterns, size
[Vol. 76:1
19981 ENVIRONMENTAL JUS7ICE AND LAND USE REGULATION 89
of city, whether suburban development is within the city's political
boundaries or within separate political (and therefore zoning) jurisdic-
tions, the city-wide percentage of minorities and low-income people, and
the city-wide percentage of minority and low-income voters. A second
direction for empirical research on zoning distribution is toward more
detail-rich, longitudinal, qualitative case studies of land use histories of
specific neighborhoods. These studies would identify how zoning for
neighborhoods changed over time, how actual land uses and develop-
ment in the neighborhoods changed over time, and what factors and
forces influenced each."' The case study method accounts for variations
in land use decisions from locality to locality, and should include a syn-
thesis of generalizable theories and the empirical context of specific ex-
amples.'n
Nevertheless, this empirical study demonstrates that inequitable
land use regulatory patterns exist. The current conceptions of environ-
mental justice do not effectively address these patterns.
IV. LAND USE PLANNING & REGULATION: ANOTHER VISION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
A. Land Use Planning & Regulation
Land use planning and regulation offer an alternative, or perhaps
more accurately, an additional'" way of thinking about environmental
justice than the five conceptions described in Part I of this article. Public
planning and regulation of local land uses combine study, politics, and
legal mechanisms. However, planning and regulation are, by their nature,
531. Studies of two communities of color that have been zoned for industrial uses reveal very
different histories. East Austin, Texas, was planned in 1928 to be a "Negro district" and to contain
most of the city of Austin's industrial zoning, which was reflected in Austin's first zoning map in
1931. Local residents now seek rezoning to eliminate the industrial uses. See Scott S. Greenberger,
City's First Zoning Map Plotted Neighborhood of Minorities' Hazards, AUSTIN AM.-STATEsmAN,
July 20, 1997, at Al. However, the Logan neighborhood of Santa Ana, California, was settled and
developed as a primarily Mexican American residential neighborhood and was zoned for residential
use until 1929. When the Santa Fe Railroad was put through Santa Ana in the late 1920s, the neigh-
borhood was mostly rezoned to heavy industrial (M-2) but remained almost exclusively residential
until 1953. In 1953, the zoning code prohibited new residential development in the Logan neighbor-
hood which led to a mixing of industrial and commercial uses among the residential uses by the late
1970s. During the 1980s, zoning was determined parcel by parcel through a conditional use permit
process until local residents asked for elimination of the zoning uncertainty associated with parcel-
by-parcel decisions. Now, 59% of all landowners and 49% of all residential landowners prefer their
properties to be zoned industrial. CITY OF SANTA ANA, LOGAN NEIGHBORHOOD LAND USE &
ZONING REPORT 1-2,5-6 (1998).
532. See supra note 77.
533. No single conception of environmental justice and injustice is correct, and no single strat-
egy will be completely effective. See Tortes, supra note 11, at 847. Each different model is yet
"another stone in David's sling." Cf. Cole, supra note 4. Furthermore, Szasz argues that it is rarely
effective for environmental justice advocates to concentrate political activity in a single zone of
politics (e.g., Congress, federal administrative official, media). SzAsZ, supra note 7, at 164. Land
use regulation is a local, prospective zone of politics for environmental justice activity.
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primarily prospective, rather than remedial. Neighborhood residents that
engage in land use planning and develop proposed land use regulations
for their neighborhood proactively seek to prevent LULUs before the
siting process ever begins. Furthermore, they define not only what they
do not want in their neighborhood but also what they do want.
Planning is the process of identifying goals for the future, develop-
ing policies or plans for achieving these goals, and fashioning specific
mechanisms for implementing these plans.' It also contains phases of
pre-plan study and post-plan monitoring and feedback.' The American
Planning Association has defined planning as "a comprehensive, coordi-
nated and continuing process, the purpose of which is to help public and
private decision makers arrive at decisions which promote the common
good of society.' Some of the public interest goals served by planning,
at least theoretically, are health, safety, convenience, efficiency, natural
resource conservation, environmental quality, social equity, social
choice, amenity, and morals.'
Planning has historically meant many different things. At one time,
the emphasis was on physical planning of street layouts, building loca-
tions, the division of land for distribution, and overall city design. In
the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first five to seven decades
of the twentieth century, public planning or urban planning essentially
went in two directions. Comprehensive planning was concerned with
utopian visions of how cities in general, or specific cities, should look in
the long run.' More practical planning focused on specific problems that
dominated the public agenda of the times: health and safety issues like
public sanitation, tenement housing conditions, and sewage in the latter
half of the 19th century;' aesthetic considerations of the City Beautiful
movement at the turn of the century, such as parks, civic centers, streets,
and transportation;,'I the economic and social problems presented by
534. See THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING 10-11 (Frank S. So & Judith
Getzels eds., 2d ed. 1988).
535. Id.
536. American Plan. Ass'n, Policies and Commentary, PLANNING, July 1979, at 24B.
537. See F. STUART CHAPIN, JR. & EDWARD J. KAISER, URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 48 (3d
ed. 1979).
538. See YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.04, at 9-10; see also THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 20-26.
539. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND-UsE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 362 (1981).
540. See YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.04, at 10 (noting the reform movements centered on
tenement conditions); see also THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, spra note 534,
at 26-29 (describing the major cities' post-Civil War housing problems and related statutory re-
sponses).
541. See YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.05, at 10-11 (explaining the aesthetic focus in urban
planning from 1890-1910); see also THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note
534, at 30-32, 61-64 (describing the creation of a park system and the emerging emphasis on aes-
thetics in urban planning during the turn of the century).
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uncoordinated development and inadequate municipal services in the
face of urbanization in the early twentieth century;' and the problems of
poverty, slums, and housing shortages and conditions from the 1930s
through the 1960s.' Today, however, planning generally means devel-
opment of a short- or medium-range general plan for a city or region that
is both comprehensive and rational, yet accounts for the reality of poli-
tics, market economics, and limited information." The comprehensive
plan or general plan' is designed to provide for orderly, efficient, and
just local development and adequate services and infrastructure.' Far
from a static utopian vision, it is flexible and evolves.
This article focuses on land use planning, one of the elements of
comprehensive planning. Comprehensive plans contain many different
elements related to the general physical development of the city or re-
gion. For example, California requires that every general plan contain
seven elements: land use, circulation, housing, conservation, open space,
noise, and safety.w Any general plan that does not sufficiently address
each element is legally insufficient.' All of the elements, however, are
interrelated, and land use is at the core of the planning process.' Local
542. See YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.06, at 11-12 (describing the "City Practical" movement);
see also THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 32-38, 64-66 (dis-
cussing city planner's responses to the heavy urbanization of the early twentieth century including
zoning and planning enabling acts).
543. See YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.07, at 12-13 (discussing 1930s planning); see also THE
PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 38-46, 66-67 (discussing the
socioeconomic concerns of urban planning in the mid-twentieth century).
544. See ELLICKSON & TARLOCK, supra note 539, at 362-63 (recognizing the shift by the late-
1970s to responsive, short- and mid-range planning); YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.03, at 7 (defining
"planning"). But see THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 13, 60
(stating that comprehensive or general plans should he long range and "slightly utopian" but ac-
knowledging that static visions of a utopian future were not useful in describing how to reach those
goals). Despite the textbook view of planning as long range and utopian, many planners are practical
about the political, economic, and social environments in which they operate and adapt accordingly.
See Anthony James Catanese, Learning by Comparison: Lessons from Experience, in PERSONALITY,
POLITICS, AND PLANNING 179, 180-83 (Anthony James Catanese & W. Paul Farmer eds., 1978);
William Fulton, Visionaries, Deal Makers, lncrementalists: The Divided World of Urban Planning,
GOVERNING, June 1989, at 52.
545. Plans that are both general and comprehensive for a particular city or region, across the
many elements related to physical development-land use, transportation, environment and natural
resources, infrastructure, housing, historic preservation, and the like--have many different names:
general plans, comprehensive plans, master plans, official plans, urban plans, city plans, develop-
ment plans, growth management plans, policy plans, and many others. See THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 60 (discussing general development plans); Sabo v.
Township of Monroe, 232 N.W.2d 584, 594 n.14 (Mich. 1975) (characterizing the terminology used
to describe these documents). The term "comprehensive plan" is used in this article.
546. See Sabo, 232 N.W.2d at 594 & n.14; YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.03, at 6-8.
547. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302 (West 1987 & Supp. 1997).
548. See, e.g., Twain Harte Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Tuolumne, 188 Cal. Rptr. 233,
254-55 (Ct. App. 1982) (finding that county's general plan failed to meet land use element by not
sufficiently stating building intensity); Save El Tom Ass'n v. Days, 141 Cal. Rptr. 282, 287-88 (CL
App. 1977) (finding that city's zoning plan failed to contain all elements of open space requirement).
549. THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 13,60,72.
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public authorities implement their comprehensive plans primarily
through land use controls, particularly subdivision regulations and zon-
ing.' Land use planning is also a central feature of district planning,
which is the process of developing goals, policies, and specific plans for
distinct neighborhoods or districts within a city or urban area and relating
those specific plans to the larger (city, urban, or regional) comprehensive
plan."' Furthermore, the primary concerns of grassroots advocates about
the presence of LULUs in low-income neighborhoods and neighbor-
hoods of color are land use concerns that require attention to local land
use plans."
This article also focuses on land use regulation. Land use planning
and land use regulation are analytically distinct, yet closely related parts
of the land use control process in the United States: the plan articulates
the general principles and policies that will guide local development and
regulations, particularly zoning ordinances (or a zoning code that organ-
izes the ordinances), and gives effect to those principles through detailed
legal controls over private and public land use activity.' The relationship
between planning and regulation varies considerably from locality to
locality. On one hand, zoning implements planning, ' and most state
zoning enabling statutes require that local zoning be in accordance with a
comprehensive plan.m ' On the other hand, many plans are not reflected in
zoning regulations and therefore are difficult to enforce,.' and many
550. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 27-28 (Or. 1973). See generally THE
PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 198-284 (describing subdivision
regulation and zoning); YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.12, at 18 (explaining the rationale behind, and
the necessity of implementing plans through legal controls).
551. See THE PRACTICE OF LocAL GOVERNMENt PLANNING, supra note 534, at 95-116 (de-
scribing the practice of district planning).
552. See generally Been, LULUs, supra note 6 (examining locally undesirable land uses in
minority neighborhoods). However, members of minority and low-income communities may also
have concern about lack of input into or disparate treatment by local plans for transportation, hous-
ing, use and protection of natural resources, neighborhood infrastructure, municipal services, avail-
ability of open space, and the like. See generally GOMEZ & WONG, supra note 23 (water); CHARLES
M. HAAR & DANIEL WILuAM FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS (1986) (municipal serv-
ices); THE ECOLOGICAL CITY, supra note 462 (valuable urban ecosystems in central cities); JUST
TRANSPORTATION: DISMANTING RACE AND CLASS BARRIERS TO MOBILITY (Robert D. Bulilard &
Glen S. Johnson eds., 1997) (transportation); MAXWELL & IMMERGWCK, supra note 510 (liquor
store concentration); Kenneth W. Bond, Toward Equal Delivery of Municipal Services in the Central
Cities, 4 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 263, 265-67, 286 (1976) (municipal services and infrastructure);
Emily Gunon, Toxic Soil Has Plans for Tiny Park on Hold, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Sept. 28,
1997, at DI (open space and parks, and transportation).
553. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 27; YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.12, at 18-19.
554. YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.13, at 19.
555. Id. § 5.03, at 360; see Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68
HARV. L. REv. 1154, 1154-56 (1955) (discussing te interelationship between state enabling acts
and the comprehensive plan); see also CAL. GOvT. CODE ANN. § 65300 (West 1987).
556. See ELLICKSON & TAJLocX, supra note 539, at 362-63; YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.12,
at 18.
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zoning regulations are adopted with very little real planning.' Nonethe-
less, land use planning and land use regulation are intertwined in an im-
perfect, yet persistent symbiotic relationship.
Land use regulations are legal mechanisms, often enacted by local
government, " that restrict the use of privately owned land in the interest
of the public health, safety, morals, and welfare.?' Thus, land use regula-
tion is an exercise of the state's delegated police power. Land use regu-
lation has existed in the United States since the colonial period, when it
was used to ensure orderly development of cities and to promote eco-
nomic growth.' ° Land use regulation also, from its early history, pre-
vented incompatible, noxious uses from interfering with the private en-
joyment of property, private property values, and public health and
safety." In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court of the anti-regulatory Lochner
era used common law nuisance doctrine to uphold the constitutionality of
an early zoning ordinance in the landmark case, Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co.' The Court analogized regulatory prohibitions of non-
residential uses in residential neighborhoods and building structures that
did not conform to height limits, construction standards, and setbacks to
nuisance law restraints on valuable uses in inappropriate locations and
circumstances.'n Furthermore, land use regulation embodies social val-
ues, ranging from promotion of residential enclaves "where family val-
ues, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make
the area a sanctuary for people,"" to the similar but more sinister at-
tempts to exclude people who are different, particularly those who are
people of color, low-income people, non-traditional families, the relig-
ious faithful, the mentally disabled, the homeless, prison parolees, and
the like.' Land use regulation also serves to protect the environment and
557. See YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.13, at 19.
558. But see FRED BOssELMAN ET AL., FEDERAL LAND USE REGULATION (1977) (depicting the
increasing federalization of land use controls); Arnold, supra note 465, at 2-3 (noting the centraliza-
tion of land use regulatory powers by state and federal governments).
559. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.32, at 53 (3d ed. 1993).
560. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doc-
trine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1257-80 (1996) (discussing the colonial governments' many rea-
sons for extensively regulating land use).
561. MANDELKER, supra note 559, § 2.05, at 22.
562. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
563. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387-90.
564. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,9(1974).
565. Several casebooks describe exclusionary zoning and cite numerous articles documenting
the practice. See, e.g., DAVID L CALIJES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 431-34 (2d
ed. 1994); ROHAN, supra note 506, § 2.01[IJ, at 2-3 to -6; § 3.04, at 3-171; § 3.05, at 3-221 to -320
(household membership, age, educational uses, housing for students, religious uses, and social wel-
fare facilities, among others); Dubin, supra note 1, at 741 & n.8 (referencing scholarship on exclu-
sionary zoning and racial segregation).
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conserve or allocate scarce natural resources,' and to define the evolving
boundaries of private property rights.5'
The primary methods of land use regulation are zoning ordinances,
subdivision regulations, building and design codes, and official maps.' "
Subdivision regulations apply to any division of land into parcels, lots, or
other smaller units, and allow localities to control the location and design
of streets, drainage and sewers, utilities, parks, common areas, and other
infrastructure. They also give localities leverage to require subdivision
developers to pay fees or donate land or facilities for this infrastructure.'
Building and design codes govern the construction, materials, design, ar-
chitecture, signs, and other physical features of buildings&" ' Local govem-
ments adopt official maps to indicate the publicly planned locations of
streets, parks, public buildings, fire and police stations, and other commu-
nity facilities. Zoning, however, is the core of land use regulation. 2 Zon-
ing divides a locality into geographic districts (zones) and imposes differ-
ent land use controls on each district 3 These controls dictate allowable
uses of land and structures, building bulks, lot size and shape, placement of
buildings on lots, and density and intensity of land uses and structures.7'
The traditional categories of land uses are residential, commercial, indus-
trial, and agricultural. Modem zoning schemes, however, are quite com-
plex with many subcategories of uses, for example: overlay zones, incen-
tive zoning, parking and sign regulations, performance and environmental
566. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007-08 (1992) (holding
that the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act prohibited development of oceanfront property
to protect fragile ecosystem); Goddard v. Board of Appeals, 433 N.E.2d 98, 99 (Mass. App. CL
1982) (upholding ordinance requiring landowner to obtain special permit to develop in wetlands
area); D & R Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Greene County, 630 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Mo. CL App. 1982)
(approving of lot size requirements to prevent pollution of water reservoirs); Albano v. Mayor and
Township Comm., 476 A.2d 852, 857 (NJ. Super. C. App. Div. 1984) ("Land use regulations
should take into account ecological and environmental concerns."). See generally ELuCKSON &
TARLoCK, supra note 539, LINDA MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE (1990);
A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its Niche?, 60 U. CFt. L.
REV. 555, 574-83 (1993) (discussing environmental protection zoning); John M. Winters, Environ-
mentally Sensitive Land Use Regulation in California, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 693 (1973) (focusing
on the environmental impact of certain California land use regulations).
167. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1033 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding that expectations about
pnyate property rights and government regulation evolve as conditions change, including the fragil-
ity of ecosystems); Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Privae Property, 58 WASH. L.
REV. 481,481-82 (1983) (positing that as land use regulation has become more restrictive, property
owner's rights are being redefined and adversely affected).
568. See ELCKSON & TARLoCK, supra note 539, at 36; YOuNG, supra note 506, § 1.12, at
18-19.
569. THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 198-200.
570. Id. at 200.
571. See id. at 268.
572. Id. at 251.
573. Id.
574. ELtuCKsoN & TARLOCK, supra note 539, at 36; THE PRACrTCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
PLANNING, supra note 534, at 251.
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standards, negotiated zoning techniques like planned-unit developments,
transferable development rights, and many others. '
The planning and opposition models of environmental justice share
some characteristics. Both are largely concerned with questions of fair-
ness (however defined) and goals of achieving safe and healthy commu-
nities. Both involve empirical, political, legal, environmental, and eco-
nomic factors. Both attempt to prevent environmental hazards and LU-
LUs in low-income and minority neighborhoods, albeit in different ways.
And both are struggles for grassroots participation in policymaking and
in political, economic, and legal decisions that affect these neighbor-
hoods.
The models also differ in some important ways. In the opposition
model, grassroots activists react to existing LULUs or proposed sitings.
In many cases, they may seek remedies for past or ongoing harms or
government and corporate decisions that pose the risk of harm. Thus, the
opposition model is largely reactive, retrospective, and remedial, al-
though perhaps necessarily so. In the planning model, local residents
develop land use plans and regulations that either address broader prob-
lems than a single LULU or reflect goals for future land use patterns in
the neighborhood. To some extent, these plans and regulations capture an
element of the community's self-identity-a high-density community of
affordable housing; an historic neighborhood of single-family residences
and small retail businesses; a neighborhood of single- and multi-family
housing with many small parks and playgrounds and few through-streets;
an area in which industrial activities remain on the east side of the river.
These plans and regulations also are in place to govern future land use
decisions, including proposals for LULU sitings. In these ways, the plan-
ning model is proactive, prospective, and visionary.
Opponents of existing or proposed LULUs often are political out-
siders, entering the decision making process after relationships have been
established between the facility owner or operator and government offi-
cials. Theirs is the struggle of people without power who are taking on
and fighting established exercises of power. Some environmental justice
activists reject governmental decision making, economic markets, and
the legal system as inherently subordinating and victimizing the poor and
minorities. In many ways, low-income people and people of color who
seek to influence land use planning and regulation start out similarly by
struggling against the powerful. Their goal, however, is to exercise
power within the existing land use regulatory system. They want to par-
ticipate in the process, empowered by their definition of land use goals
and hopefully successful implementation of these goals through zoning
and other regulations. They want to participate at the land use negotiating
575. See EJicXSoN & TARLocK. supra note 539, at 56-57, 61; THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL
GovERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 25 1.
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table in matters that concern them, along with government officials, de-
velopers, property owners, environmentalists, and other interested people
and groups. They want to serve on advisory boards, zoning commissions
and boards of appeal, city councils, and other decision making bodies.
Finally, the opposition model identifies and seeks to exclude harm-
ful activities and LULUs. The planning model identifies and seeks to
allow (i.e., include) desirable land uses. The contrasts between these two
models are summarized below:
Characteristics of Two Models of Environmental Justice









B. Strategic Advantages, Efficacy, and the Public Good
Land use planning and regulation offer several advantages for
achieving environmental justice goals. First, an owner or operator of a
prospective LULU would have much more difficulty obtaining approval
for siting the LULU in a minority or low-income neighborhood, if the
comprehensive plan and zoning ordinances prohibited the LULU in that
neighborhood than if they allowed the LULU, either by right or condi-
tionally. Assume that a waste company wants to locate a hazardous waste
incinerator in a low-income, Hispanic neighborhood. If the city zoning
code prohibits hazardous waste incinerators in every zone except 1-3, and
the zoning map does not designate any land in the target neighborhood as
1-3, the waste company will need a zoning amendment, as well as use-
specific environmental permits. If the city's comprehensive plan pro-
vides for non-industrial uses only in the neighborhood or explicitly states
that waste facilities are not appropriate for that neighborhood, the waste
company also will need an amendment to the comprehensive plan. The
waste company nonetheless might have enough political and economic
power to obtain all the needed approvals, but it will face several obsta-
cles. The zoning code text and map and the comprehensive plan will
create a presumption that the hazardous waste incinerator is not appro-
priate for the neighborhood. This presumption will take on a certain legal
and political reality. The waste company will have to expend more po-
litical capital to overcome the presumption. The neighbors will have
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more opportunities to defeat the incinerator. Not only might the federal
or state environmental agencies deny the permits, but the local land use
authority, perhaps more attentive to local neighborhood concerns, might
deny the land use approvals. Furthermore, the neighbors will have more
government approvals to challenge in litigation. If each approval is nec-
essary to the siting of the project and a court were to hold any approval
to be invalid, the project would fail. The neighbors can bring land use
claims, as well as civil rights and environmental law claims, to challenge
any objectionable land use approvals. For example, they can argue that
rezoning to allow the incinerator is inconsistent with the comprehensive
plan, irrationally allows a use that is incompatible with surrounding uses,
constitutes spot zoning, and violates procedural requirements. When
neighborhoods engage in land use planning and regulation, they create
the rules with which prospective LULUs must comply, rather than
merely reacting to specific LULU siting proposals that have already sur-
faced and obtained a certain amount of legitimacy before opposition can
arise. These pre-established rules can make LULUs less likely to receive
approval and challenges to any such approvals more likely to be success-
ful.
Second, land use planning and regulation create greater certainty
about what land uses will or will not be allowed in a neighborhood.
When local land use regulations allow LULUs, either by right or condi-
tionally, neighborhood residents face uncertainty about whether or not
their neighborhood will be the object of a LULU siting proposal (or a
proposal to site another LULU in their neighborhood if they already have
one or more). Once a proposal has been made, neighborhood residents
face the further uncertainty regarding whether or not they will be suc-
cessful in defeating the proposal. Similarly, the owner or operator faces
uncertainty about whether local residents will attempt to defeat the proj-
ect as inappropriate for the neighborhood even though the local land use
regulations permit it and the owner or operator has invested significant
amounts in that specific site proposal. Both sides have significant eco-
nomic costs (inefficiency), psychological costs (anxiety), and relational
costs (suspicion and animosity) resulting from uncertainty about the pro-
priety of the LULU in the neighborhood. However, if local residents
have been involved in land use planning and development of regulations
for their neighborhood and have carefully identified what uses are appro-
priate for differing areas of their neighborhood, the level of certainty
increases substantially. Proponents of LULUs may nonetheless seek
amendments to or relief from applicable land use prohibitions, and
neighborhood residents may nonetheless oppose LULUs permitted by the
regulations. But in most circumstances, the content of the land use plans
and regulations, when developed with meaningful neighborhood partici-
pation, provide generally reliable information on which both sides can
make decisions. This information fosters efficiency, comfort, and trust.
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Third, land use planning and regulation improve the community's
capacity to achieve its goals. Typically, members of neighborhoods have
community goals that extend far beyond excluding a particular LULU
from the neighborhood. They often have goals about parks and other
recreational uses, open space, traffic patterns and safety, availability of
grocery stores or medical facilities, maintenance of property and cleanup
of nuisances, public infrastructure such as streets, sidewalks, and drain-
age, public areas or commons, social or cultural centers, historic preser-
vation, community identity, economic development, public transporta-
tion, and many other matters. Land use plans contain these goals, and
land use regulations facilitate efforts to reach the goals by defining the
permissible land uses in the neighborhood. '
In many ways, land use planning is like preventive medicine. Eating
well, exercising regularly, developing a healthy emotional outlook, and
avoiding harmful activities do not guarantee that you will never be sick,
nor do they mean that you should not react to the initial signs of illness
or existing health problems. Nevertheless, these proactive strategies cer-
tainly reduce your chance of illness and make life healthier and more
enjoyable. Similarly, land use planning and regulation will not always
preclude the siting of LULUs or the need to oppose proposals or existing
sites. However, communities that develop a healthy vision of their
neighborhoods and enact that vision in land use regulations will more
likely prevent LULUs and other environmental harms than if they had
simply waited to react. The empirical evidence presented in Part In
shows a wide difference in zoning patterns between low-income com-
munities of color and high-income white communities.' Whether caused
by intentional discrimination, institutional inequities, market forces, or
some other factor(s), these disparities indicate that low-income people of
color have very little effective input into the land use planning and regu-
latory process. They also suggest that environmental justice advocates
may want to consider additional strategies that focus on community-
based planning initiatives and zoning proposals.
C. Empirical Evidence of Land Use Planning in the Environmental
Justice Movement
The land use planning model of environmental justice is increas-
ingly developing within the environmental justice community as low-
income neighborhoods of color seek to define and protect their commu-
nities through land use regulation. This section presents five brief case
576. THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GovERNMEwr PLANNING, supra note 534, at 61, 73. Although
some local neighborhoods overwhelmingly may seek residential zoning, others might lack consensus
or may embrace industrial zoning as consistent with their vision of the neighborhood. See supra note
531 (comparing East Austin in Austin, Texas, with the Logan neighborhood in Santa Ana, Califor-
nia). Empowerment to define and seek land use goals is the objective.
577. See supra Pat II.C-D.
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studies of grassroots environmental justice land use strategies. These
examples cover a range of goals and tactics, as well as locations: (1) re-
zoning to limit industrial and commercial uses in East Austin neighbor-
hoods of Austin, Texas; (2) rewriting Denver, Colorado's industrial
zoning code by a North Denver community group; (3) the St. Paul, Min-
nesota, West Side Citizens Organization's seeking and obtaining passage
of a city-wide ordinance banning metal shredders; (4) the adoption of a
comprehensive land use and development code by the Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation in Washington; and (5) involvement of
grassroots groups from San Antonio, Texas barrios in the formulation of
overlay zoning to protect the Edwards Underground Aquifer.
1. East Austin Rezoning
One approach seeks change to existing zoning either through re-
zoning of individual parcels or application of various "flexible zoning
techniques" to an entire neighborhood. The East Austin area of Austin,
Texas, is a good example.
The residents of East Austin are primarily African American and
Hispanic.' Land uses are industrial, commercial, and residential, inter-
spersed among each other.'8' The area was planned in 1928 as a "Negro
district" that would host most of Austin's industrial uses next to housing
for African Americans."' The City's first zoning map in 1931 reflected
this plan. In addition, Austin had cumulative zoning in East Austin until
the mid-1980s, allowing residences to be built on property designated for
residential uses (i.e., allowing the less intensive land uses in zones where
more intensive uses were allowed). ' Thus, Austin engaged not in "ex-
pulsive zoning"--the assault on minority and low-income neighborhoods
by zoning that allows intensive uses ---but in "repulsive zoning"-the
intentional and simultaneous placement of people of color and intensive,
even harmful land uses next to, or among, one another.'
Because local zoning allowed industrial uses on many parcels in
East Austin, few to no obstacles existed to land uses such as a power
plant, at least two trash recycling plants, a gasoline tank farm, and in-
578. See infra notes 626-60 and accompanying text.
579. Scott S. Greenberger, A Legacy of Zoning Bias: East Austinites Seek to Reform Land Use
Rules of 1931, AUSTIN AM.-STATEsmAN, July 21, 1997, at At.
580. Despite the presence of industrial uses, the neighborhood retains "a distinctive residential
character," and "a remarkably rich social fabric thrives." Haurwitz et al., supra note 505, at Al.
581. Greenberger, supra note 579.
582. Id.
583. Rabin, supra note l,at 101.
584. The inspiration for the label "repulsive zoning" comes from a comment by Becky Helton,
a librarian with the Austin History Center, which houses the 1928 city plan for Austin that was the
genesis for East Austin's zoning injustices. See Greenberger, supra note 531, at Al ("It's repulsive."
(quoting Becky Helton)).
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dustrial facilities that use and emit hazardous and toxic substances.'
Responding to complaints by neighborhood residents about specific land
uses and the overall pattern of industrial zoning, the City of Austin con-
ducted a study in 1997 showing that the area had a significantly higher
percentage of industrial zoning than other areas of the city.' The zoning
report complemented an earlier study showing higher usage of hazardous
substances in East Austin than in other areas of the city.'
Neighborhood residents demanded reform of the area's zoning, and
the City Council responded with two types of reform. The first is the
designation of a large area of East Austin as the East Austin Overlay
Combining District.' Fourteen enumerated land uses and any land use
for which a hazardous materials permit is required by the Austin Fire
Department are defined as conditional uses if they are within the East
Austin Overlay Combining District.s The ordinance does not change the
underlying zoning designation of any parcel. However, new industrial or
commercial uses or changes to existing industrial or commercial uses in
East Austin, if falling within the list of conditional uses, would require a
permit from the Planning Commission under zoning procedures designed
to give local residents an opportunity to study and object to the proposed
uses.s These procedures include notification of property owners and
registered neighborhood associations living within 300 feet of a proposed
site plan, and a public hearing at which concerned neighborhood resi-
dents could speak."' The ordinance also contains a requirement that city
staff report annually to the City Council about both the impact of the
ordinance on the local neighborhood-addressing such things as the
number of conditional use permits approved and denied, the change in
the number of residential units constructed in the area, and other factors
related to quality of life and the environment-and the impact of the or-
dinance on the property interests of industrial and commercial landown-
ers--the change in the total appraised value of all affected development
585. Greenberger, supra note 579 (discussing how industry, specifically a recycling plant,
negatively affects the residents of east Austin); Haurwitz et al., supra note 505, at Al (claiming that
minority communities live among more toxic waste sites and other environmental hazards than other
neighborhoods); Eunice Moscoso & Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, PODER's Woes Bigger Than Springs,
Birds, AUSTIN AM.-STATESmAN, July 21, 1997, at A4 (listing old tank farm site and fuel storage
terminals as areas where more toxic chemical materials exist than anywhere else in the city).
586. See supra note 505 (discussing a City of Austin planning study).
587. Haurwitz et al., supra note 505, at Al.
588. AUSTIN, TEX., ORDINANCE 970717-F, § 13-2-190 (1997).
589. Id. § 13-2-191(A)-(C). The fourteen enumerated land uses are agricultural sales and
services (except nurseries), basic industry, construction sales and services, general warehousing and
distribution, kennels, light manufacturing, limited warehousing and distribution, recycling centers,
resource extraction, vehicle storage, building maintenance services, laundry services (except where
the proposed use is 5,000 square feet or less), equipment sales, and equipment repair services.
590. Id. § 13-2-191(B).
591. Id. § 13-2-191(D); see also CTY OF AUSTIN, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERs: EAST AUSTIN
OVERLAY DIsmTlr (1997) (fact sheet on file with author).
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and other factors related to economic development and employment op-
portunities."
In addition to the neighborhood-wide designation of certain uses as
conditional uses, the City Council rezoned individual parcels from in-
dustrial to either commercial or residential uses. For example, the City
Council rezoned the site of the BFI recycling plant-which posed prob-
lems of blowing trash, rats, noise, traffic, and a five-alarm fire--from
limited industrial to limited office. Similarly, the Council rezoned the site
of the Balcones recycling plant, of which neighbors complained about
aesthetics, noise, and traffic, from limited industrial to residential."' The
rezoning does not automatically shut down the existing uses of these
properties, but prevents expansion of their uses or any new industrial
uses unless the new owner resumes the exact same land use activity
within ninety days. Furthermore, the City Council rezoned a number of
residential lots to residential designation eliminating the option of con-
version to industrial or commercial use."' Local residents, although criti-
cal of the lack of support from traditional environmental groups, contend
that their primary concern is not with whether their industrial and com-
mercial neighbors are polluters but instead lies with the amount of in-
dustrial land use in their residential neighborhood."
2. Revision of Denver Industrial Zoning Code
In contrast to the East Austin activists, environmental justice advo-
cates and leaders of low-income and minority neighborhoods in Denver,
Colorado, took a different approach to the saturation of neighborhoods
positioned near industrial uses.' They sought to rewrite the city's indus-
trial zoning code, and the changes they achieved affected the entire city.
In October 1987, a coalition of grassroots groups, mixed-race but
composed primarily of Hispanic residents of three neighborhoods
(Elyria, Globeville, and Fwansea), formed an organization called
"Neighbors for a Toxic Free Community." The group identified the ar-
chaic content of the industrial zoning code as one reason for the exis-
tence of so many LULUs in their neighborhoods. The coalition, armed
with hard data on the saturation of LULUs in low-income minority
neighborhoods, successfully obtained support from the local housing
authority, schools, and political leaders, including a state senator. In 1989
592. AUSTIN, TEx., ORDINANCE 970717-P, Part 2 (July 1, 1998).
593. Greenberger, supra note 579; see VanScoy, supra note 135.
594. Greenberger, supra note 579.
595. See VanScoy, supra note 135 (contending that traditional zoning which alternated between
industrial and residential prompted the residents' protests); see also Haurwitz et al., supra note 505,
at Al ("East Austin residents do not want to evict all industry; that would be illegal, if not impossi-
ble. Rather, they want a more balanced land-use policy and a greater voice in decisions.").
596. Except where noted separately, all information concerning this case study is from two
telephone interviews with Lorraine Granado of the Colorado People's Environmental and Economic
Network (COPEEN) (July 21 and 22, 1997).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
and 1990, the activists and city officials developed several amendments
to the industrial zoning code, which the City Council approved unani-
mously. These amendments include requirements that buffers separate
industrial uses from residences, that local residents be notified about and
have an opportunity to comment on applications for industrial uses or
hazardous materials storage, and that the Zoning Administrator have the
authority to deny a permit based solely on the area's undue saturation
with uses that manufacture, use, or store hazardous materials. In addition,
an environmental review committee was established to review proposed
land uses that involve hazardous materials and can withhold a permit if it
agrees unanimously to do so.
Despite limited enforcement, these amendments made a difference
in one case. The Denver Board of Adjustment for Zoning Appeals re-
versed the Zoning Administrator's grant of a conditional use permit for
Laidlaw Environmental Services to operate a solid waste transfer station
in an 1-2 zone.' A neighborhood group, Park Hill for Safe Neighbor-
hoods, with the help of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and the Land
and Water Fund, opposed the permit. The groups argued for the denial of
the permit because of an undue concentration of neighborhood uses
having hazardous substances, not merely releasing hazardous wastes.
The Board of Adjustment agreed with their arguments,' and a Colorado
District Court affirmed the Board's decision.'" The court deferred to the
Board's interpretation of the industrial zoning code's undue concentra-
tion provision as reasonable, within its authority, and supported by the
evidence."
3. St. Paul Ban on Metal Shredders
When the political and economic climate make it difficult for grass-
roots environmental justice groups to seek comprehensive rezoning of
neighborhood parcels (East Austin rezoning), neighborhood-wide zoning
text amendments (East Austin overlay zoning), or city-wide zoning text
amendments (Denver revised industrial zoning code), groups may in-
stead focus on one particularly troublesome land use. In the face of a
proposed metal shredder to be located in the mixed-race, low-income
West Side of St. Paul, Minnesota, local residents formed Neighbors Or-
ganized to Stop the Hazards of All Metal Shredders! (NO SHAMS!). The
group proposed amendments to the city's zoning code text and compre-
hensive plan to prohibit large metal shredders anywhere in the city and to
allow small metal shredders only at recycling processing centers. The
597. In t Bd. of Adjustment for Zoning Appeals of the City & County of Denver, Findings of
Fact & Conclusions as to Law, No. 72-95 (Sept. 19, 1995).
598. Id. at 1-2.
599. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., Inc. v. Board of Adjustments, No. 95-CV-4631 (Colo. Dist. CL, July
2, 1996).
600. Id. at 2-3.
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City Council adopted the amendments on September 24, 1997.' The
group felt that the political climate of concern for business development
and activity would not support a complete rezoning of neighborhoods
affected by industrial development along the river, as well as gentrifica-
tion of those areas.e However, the group also completed an environ-
mental inventory of the neighborhood to be used in making its case for
environmental justice, and will continue to address various environ-
mental and land use issues facing West Side residents. '
4. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation Land Use and
Development Code
One issue receiving little attention in the literature on environmental
justice or land use regulation is how low-income and minority communi-
ties that lack zoning altogether address the lack of control over LULUs.'
The problem arises in rural areas and on Indian reservations.s
Some of the low-income and minority areas that have lacked land
use codes and plans are establishing these plans. For example, the Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Reservation adopted a comprehensive
Land Use and Development Code in January 1991.' The Code estab-
lishes nine zoning districts, each with permitted uses, conditional uses,
prohibited uses, density provisions (including setbacks), and off-street
parking requirements. ' It provides governing authorities-such as the
Land Use Review Board, Planning Director, Land Use Administrator,
and Colville Business Council-standards and procedures for special use
and conditional use permits, major and minor subdivisions, nonconfor-
mities, appeals, variances, code interpretations, hearings, and enforce-
ment. Comprehensive land use codes like the Colville Tribe's code
allow a community to identify the land uses it desires, prohibit those it
does not desire, and define appropriate land uses before proposals for
intensive uses ever arise. The Tribe has used its land use code to prohibit
601. Development of the Anti-Shredder Movement, NO SHAMS! NEWSltrER (Neighbors
Organized to Stop the Hazards of All Metal Shredding! (NO SHAMS!), Saint Paul, MN), May 3,
1997, at 1; Recommendations: Metal Shredder Zoning & Compreh. Plan Amends, REPoRTBRIEF
(City of St. Paul Dep't. of Planning & Econ. Dev., Div. of Planning ) (1997).
602. Telephone interview with Lee Olson, NO SHAMS! (Aug. 9,1997).
603. id.; Letter from Sherilyn Young, NO SHAMS!, to Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold (Aug. 10,
1997) (on file with author).
604. But see Larson, supra note 118, at 182 (discussing the lack of zoning and land use plan-
ning in Texas-Mexico border colonias). This statement assumes that there am areas that lack land
use controls of any sort, not only public controls like zoning, but also private controls like covenants
and effective mechanisms for enforcing nuisance laws.
605. See Larson, supra note 118, at 182, 197-99; Environment: A Survey of Twentieth-Century
Issues, AM. INDIAN Q., June 1, 1995, at 423; Ralph Frammolino, Lawmakers and Indians Wage War
over Dump, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 1990, at B 1.
606. CONFEDERATE TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION, LAND USE & DEV. CODE (Jan.
1991).
607. Id. ch. 50.3.
608. Id. ch. 50.4-50.9.
103,
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development that would interfere with tribal subsistence hunting and
fishing, but has encountered disputes concerning its jurisdiction over
land owned by people who are not Tribe members and over its jurisdic-
tion to zone when the surrounding counties have no zoning.a
Tribal efforts increasingly focus on land use regulation to protect
the environment and promote economic development. One study in par-
ticular highlights the variety of different regulatory schemes used by
tribes." A proposed model tribal environmental review code also con-
tains provisions for land use planning and regulation.""
5. Edwards Underground Aquifer Overlay Zone
Finally, leaders of low-income and minority neighborhoods may
become involved in land use regulation and planning for areas of the city
other than their own neighborhoods and contribute their vision of the
overall community's public interest. In particular, leaders of Citizens
Organized for Public Service (COPS), and its sister organization, Metro
Alliance, representing the low-income, Hispanic South and West sides of
San Antonio, formed a coalition with environmentalists and neighbor-
hood groups from the high-income, non-minority North side to achieve
the passage of zoning protections for the Edwards Underground Aquifer
Recharge Zone."2 The Edwards Underground Aquifer is the ecologically
sensitive source of drinking water for the San Antonio metropolitan area.
The Recharge Zone is an area that allows water to seep from the surface
into the underground aquifer. Contamination from run-off on the surface
in the recharge zone threatened the quality of water in the aquifer.
On January 12, 1995, the San Antonio City Council approved new
provisions to the Zoning Code that established an overlay zone restrict-
ing two types of development through per se prohibitions, conditional
use permit requirements, and density limits: (1) general land develop-
ment resulting in impervious cover (primarily buildings and paving)
609. See John Craig, Non-Indian Launches Suit over Authority of Tribe, SPOKESMAN-REv.
(Spokane, Wash.), Mar. 17, 1998, at BI; John Craig, Ferry Considers Suing Tribe over Zoning,
Dispute Centers on Jurisdiction over Property Owned by Non-Indians, SPOKSMAN-REv. (Spokane,
Wash.), Dec. 20, 1997, at B3; John Craig, Governments Try to Settle Differences with Indians,
Colville Tribes' Moratorium on Development Sparks Dispute, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.),
Mar. 7, 1997, at B5; John Craig, Couples Sue County, Tribes over Land-Use Regulations,
SPOKESMAN-REv. (Spokane, Wash.), Apr. 21, 1994, at B3.
610. Sitkowski, supra note 1, at 259-69.
611. A Model Tribal Environmental Review Code (obtained from <http://www.undnodak.edul
telp/modelcode.hml> on June 27, 1997, but subsequently removed) (on file with author).
612. See Tom Bower, Aquifer Rules Approved, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEwS, Jan. 13, 1995, at
IA; Rick Casey, The Political Import ofAqwifer Ordinance, SAN ANTONIO ExPR-NEws, Jan. 15,
1995, at 2A; Rick Casey, "Ms. Cuss," "Mr. Cool" Forge Safe Water Pact, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, Nov. 6, 1994, at 2A; Interview with Danielle Milam & Gene Dawson, Co-Chairs, San Anto-
nio Water Quality Task Force (Mar. 28, 1996); Interview with Ruben Solis & Chavel Lopez, South-
west Workers Union (Mar. 26, 1996). Unless specifically noted, all information concerning this case
study came from these three articles and two interviews.
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which contributes to run-off of chemicals and constrains the natural wa-
ter filtering process of the recharge zone's soil; and (2) land uses in-
volving hazardous or toxic substances or other potential pollutants that
could contaminate the aquifer!" The zoning amendments resulted from a
compromise between development interests and environmental interests.
COPS, Metro Alliance, and other groups from low-income neighbor-
hoods supported the amendments, even though these regulations would
effectively prevent San Antonio's wealthy, non-minority Northwest side
from bearing its share of industrial and some commercial uses. The new
overlay zone would also tend to make the area even more exclusive by
limiting housing development and requiring large lots. The grassroots
social justice activists apparently believed that their constituents were
unlikely to afford Northwest homes or have the political power to shift
industrial uses to the Northwest, regardless of the overlay zone's addi-
tional restrictions. They instead were interested in keeping the San Anto-
nio drinking water supply clean and plentiful, as well as forming an on-
going, but loose working relationship with environmentalists to address
the environmental conditions of South Side, West Side, and East Side
neighborhoods.
Even though the COPS/Metro Alliance leaders joined the policy
negotiations late, they sought and obtained several important provisions.
These provisions included deadlines for the agreement, the assistance of
an outside environmental attorney to plan around potential legal con-
straints, and public input and review of development-restriction waivers
that could be granted by the San Antonio Water System. With their own
social justice and public participation goals, leaders of low-income His-
panic neighborhoods became significant players in San Antonio envi-
ronmental and land use policy. Perhaps the best indicator of the long-
term impact of this strategy was a series of neighborhood planning
meetings to address the environmental conditions and land use goals
surrounding watersheds in four low-income minority neighborhoods.""4
Grassroots groups are engaging in prospective, proactive policy devel-
opment in San Antonio, as well as in Austin, Denver, St. Paul, and the
Colville Reservation. Each community pursues a different strategy and a
different configuration of goals, but all use land use planning and regu-
latory tools.
V. LAND USE REGULATORY MECHANISMS
The empirical evidence of low-income and minority communities'
activism to change local land use policies reflects some of the range of
local regulatory tools that are available for achieving environmental jus-
tice goals. Comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances and amendments to
613. San Antonio, Tex., Ordinance No. 81491 (Jan. 12, 1995).
614. Patrick Driscoll, Ideas Floated on Water and San Antonio's Future, SAN ANTONIO
ExPREss-NEwS, Mar. 10, 1996, at Al.
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zoning ordinances, flexible zoning techniques, and exactions are legal
mechanisms which can be used to implement communities' planning.
Land use regulation not only concerns ethical choices made individually
and socially,6" but it is also an evolving area of law, adaptable to new
social problems and shifting social, economic, and political forces.!' To
date, environmental justice scholarship has devoted little attention to
exploring specific land use regulatory tools.
A. Comprehensive Plan
The first land use regulatory mechanism is the comprehensive plan.
Zoning regulations that implement low-income and minority neighbor-
hoods' goals may be legally ineffective if they are not preceded by
amendments to the city's comprehensive plan to reflect those goals. The
zoning enabling legislation of most states requires that all zoning regula-
tions be in accordance with a comprehensive plan."' Although most
courts do not require that a formal written plan precede zoning ordi-
nances,618 many state statutes require local governments to adopt written
comprehensive plans and prohibit zoning regulations inconsistent with
those plans."' More importantly, many municipalities have adopted some
form of comprehensive plan.' To the extent that new zoning regulations
reflecting low-income and minority neighborhoods' goals are inconsis-
tent with the written comprehensive plan, a court might invalidate them
as not in accordance with a comprehensive plan.' Moreover, courts are
615. See TIMOTHY BEATLEY, EThIcAL LAND USE: PRwNpPLns OF PouCY AND PLANNING 4-5
(1994).
616. See WRIGHT & GrrELMAN, supra note 516, at 1-14.
617. YOUNG, supra note 506, § 5.03, at 360.
618. See e.g., Theobald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 644 P.2d 942, 949 (Colo. 1982); Furtney
v. Simsbury Zoning Comm'n, 271 A.2d 319, 325 (Conn. 1970); Dawson Enters., Inc. v. Blaine
County, 567 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Idaho 1977); Iowa Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe County, 494 N.W.2d
664, 669 (Iowa 1993); Nottingham Village, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 292 A.2d 680, 687 (Md.
1972); State ex reL. Chiavola v. Village of Oakwood, 886 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Mo. CL App. 1994);
Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 131 A.2d 1, 7 (NJ. 1957); Allred v. City of Raleigh, 173
S.E.2d 533,536 (N.C. CL App. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 178 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. 1971); Udell v.
Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901 (N.Y. 1968); Tulsa Rock Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 531 P.2d
351, 357 (Okla. CL App. 1974); Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 200 A.2d 408, 413 (Pa. 1964);
Hadley v. Harold Realty Co., 198 A.2d 149, 152 (R.L 1964); West Hill Citizens v. King County
Council, 627 P.2d l002, 1005 (Wash. CL App. 1981); Bell v. City of Elkhom, 364 N.W.2d 144, 148
(Wis. 1985). But see Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 28 (Or. 1973) (requiring
proof that a change conforms to the comprehensive plan).
619. ARJZ. REV. STAT. § 9-462.01F (1995); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West 1997); FLA.
STAT. § 163.3194 (1990); IND. CODE. § 36-7-4-201 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. § 100.213 (Michie
1993); ME. RFV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4961-A(l)(A) (West 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-114.03
(1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62 (West 1991); OR. REv. STAT. § 197.010(3) (1989).
620. For a discussion of the increasing importance of both mandatory planning and written
plans, see CALUES, FT AL., supra note 565, at 372-73.
621. See, e.g., Parks v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 425 A.2d 100, 103 (Conn. 1979); Green v.
County Council, 508 A.2d 882, 891 (DeL Ch. 1986); Moore v. Maloney, 321 S.E.2d 335, 338 (Ga.
1984); La Bonta v. City of Waterville, 528 A.2d 1262, 1265 (Me. 1987); Udell, 235 N.E.2d at 905.
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more likely to uphold spot zoning-the rezoning of a small parcel of land
for a use classification that differs from surrounding parcels-if the re-
zoning is consistent with a comprehensive plan.'
Comprehensive plans generally contain elements of land use, trans-
portation, and community facilities, and may contain elements of com-
munity design, open space, noise, housing, recreation, and environmental
factors. Low-income and minority communities wanting to redefine
land use, transportation, or recreation and open space patterns in their
neighborhoods should seek to amend their cities' comprehensive plans.
Failure to do so could subject more specific zoning amendments to legal
challenge as inconsistent with the land use or other patterns contained in
the comprehensive plan. These communities may be able to take advan-
tage of state statutory rights to participate in local planning and provi-
sions that allow frequent amendment of plans.'
B. Amendments to Zoning
Despite the importance of comprehensive planning as a policy goal
and a legal requirement, the crux of land use regulation for environ-
mental justice will be the amendment of existing zoning codes. Most
low-income and minority communities that suffer or risk exposure to
environmental harms exist in areas with zoning classifications that cur-
rently permit intensive uses.6' Because people of color and the poor live
near and among a higher proportion of industrial and commercial uses
than do white, high-income people,6' an appropriate land use regulatory
response for cities would be to change the permitted uses in those areas
to correspond more closely to the residents' desired neighborhood envi-
ronment, as well as their health and safety needs.
Cities make two types of amendments to zoning regulations: zoning
text amendments and zoning map amendments. Text amendments
change the text of the zoning code;6' zoning map amendments change
However, where courts find comprehensive plans in zoning regulations they may find that the
amendment itself results in a plan that achieves the required planning goals. See, e.g., 1000 Friends
of Oregon v. Board of County Comm'rs, 575 P.2d 651, 656-57 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that
compliance achieved where government demonstrates that the amendment results in a plan which
conforms with planning goals).
622. See, e.g., Holmgren v. City of Lincoln, 256 N.W.2d 686, 691 (Neb. 1977); Watson v.
Town Council, 805 P.2d 641, 645 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); Cleaver, 200 A.2d at 415.
623. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 32A.04[l][b][ii], 32A-41.
624. E.g., ARmZ. REv. STAT. § 9-461.05(E) (seeking maximum public participation); CAL.
GoVT. CODE § 65351 (allowing opportunities for public involvement); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
100.193 (consulting with public and giving notice); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-22.2-9(c)(2) (1991) (giv-
ing public notice and soliciting comments); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-303 (1995) (holding public
hearing and giving reasonable notice).
625. See ROHAN, supra note 506, § 32A.04[i 1][b][vii], at 32A-47.
626. See supra Part III.C.
627. Id.
628. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 39.01[t], at 39-3.
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the zoning district designations of particular parcels or areas of the city'
An additional mode of amendment is a comprehensive revision of both
the text and the map, covering a large part of the city or regulatory juris-
diction.'O
Text amendments change what uses, heights, densities, and the like
are permitted in particular districts, but do not change which property is
in what district. 3' For example, a city council or county commission
might amend the zoning code expressly to prohibit ready-mix concrete
plants in 1-2 (heavy industrial) districts,' or to change quarrying and
extractive-type activities from "of right" uses in agricultural districts to
conditional uses.e In each of these cases, the designations of districts on
the map did not change, but what was allowed in those districts changed
through amendments to the permitted, conditional, and excluded uses
that applied to all parcels bearing those designations. In addition, text
amendments might have jurisdiction-wide (i.e., multi-district) applica-
bility, as in the case of removing recycling operations from permitted
uses in solid waste floating zones,' or classifying all airports, both
commercial and non-commercial, as conditional uses in any district."
Residents of low-income neighborhoods and neighborhoods of color
might use zoning text amendments to remove intensive uses from use
districts in which those intensive uses are inappropriate in their view,
without ever changing the district designation of any particular parcel.
For example, a neighborhood with a checkerboard pattern of commercial
uses might seek an amendment to the zoning code to prohibit electro-
plating, solid waste incinerators, and machine shops in commercial
zones.'" No parcel would lose its commercial use designation, but the
range of permissible uses for commercial parcels would shrink. Simi-
larly, the neighborhood might ask the city to change a permitted "of
right" use, such as metal foundries in industrial districts, to a conditional
use, so that anyone seeking the use would have to obtain a conditional




631. See, e.g., Marcus Assoc. v. Town of Huntington, 382 N.E.2d 1323, 1323 (N.Y. 1978)
(upholding the validity of a text amendment to use restrictions applicable to certain districts which
limited the number of occupants and uses of a building or premises); Town of Sandgate v. Coleha-
mer, 589 A.2d 1205, 1207, 1213 (VL 1990) (holding that a text amendment which prohibited storage
of inoperable cars after a certain period was valid).
632. See Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. City of Gaithersburg, 291 A.2d 672, 673-74 (Md.
1972).
633. See County Comm'rs. v. Aundel Corp., 571 A.2d 1270, 1272 (Md. 1990), vacated, Amn-
del Corp. v. County Comm'rs, 594 A.2d 95 (Md. 1991).
634. See Free State Recycling Sys. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 885 F. Supp. 798,802-05 (D.
Md. 1994).
635. See Von Lusch v. Board of County Comm'rs, 330 A.2d 738,741 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
636. See supra notes 517-20.
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Zoning text amendments have some legal advantages over zoning
map amendments. Because text amendments are generally applicable and
thus often deemed "comprehensive" in nature, they receive greater defer-
ence as legislative acts and are presumed valid.' Even after a landowner
receives a special exception that permits it to use its property for an in-
tensive land use like a concrete batching plant in a heavy industrial zone,
a city may prevent the use by amending the zoning code to prohibit the
use altogether in heavy industrial zones. The landowner has no vested
right in the continuation of any existing zoning.' Text amendments do
not address whether particular uses are appropriate on particular parcels
singled out for attention; but instead, text amendments are generally ap-
plicable determinations that certain uses are always incompatible with
the other uses in a zoning classification, or always need the oversight that
accompanies conditional use permits. Thus, they avoid the potential
problems associated with "spot zoning" and "downzoning" that result
from particularized treatment of individual parcels or small groups of
parcels.'s Local governing boards, however, must follow required proce-
dures and give affected parties proper notice and opportunity to be heard
when adopting text amendments.' In addition, changes to generally ap-
plicable zoning designations may arouse the opposition of many different
affected landowners city-wide, thus making them difficult to achieve
politically. Furthermore, a text amendment may be too blunt a tool for
excising intensive uses that are interspersed throughout low-income and
minority neighborhoods. For example, a solid waste incinerator might be
appropriate for most, perhaps even nearly all, heavy industrial zoning
designations in a city. A text amendment to make it an impermissible use
in industrial zones would not directly address the underlying environ-
mental justice problem of industrial zoning in a residential area of color.
Zoning map amendments change the zoning district designation for
a particular parcel, tract of land, or set of parcels."' Although rezoning
has been used to allow intensive uses in neighborhoods of color and low-
income communities,"2 grassroots environmental justice activists might
637. See Von Lurch, 330 A.2d at 742; Layne v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment., 460 A.2d 1088,
1089 (Pa. 1983) (deferring to zoning classifications in local zoning code unless "it is obvious that the
classification has no substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals or general welfare"
(emphasis added)).
638. Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. City of Gaithersburg, 291 A.2d 672,675-77 (Md. 1972).
639. See infra notes 651-63 and accompanying text.
640. Free State Recycling Sys. Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 885 F. Supp. 798, 806-08
(D. Md. 1994).
641. See, e.g., Orange Lake Ass'n v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214, 1217 (2d Cir. 1994) (rezoning
several parcels totaling 150 acres from R-3 to R-2, thus changing density); Bartram v. Zoning
Comm'n, 68 A.2d 308, 309-10 (Conn. 1949) (rezoning single lot from residential to business);
Pierson Trapp Co. v. Peak, 340 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960) (rezoning 30-acre tract from
residential to commercial); Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 733 P.2d 182, 186-88
(Wash. 1987) (rezoning single parcel of nearly 27 acres from light industrial to agricultural).
642. Lake Lucerne Civic Ass'n v. Dolphin Stadium Corp., 801 F. Supp. 684, 688 (S.D. Fla.
1992) (rezoning land in predominantly African American neighborhood to commercial use for a
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seek zoning map amendments to change more intensive use designations
in their neighborhoods to less intensive use designations, a technique
known as "downzoning.'" For example, a low-income minority neigh-
borhood might contain several parcels zoned for heavy industrial use in
close proximity to residences, schools, churches, health care facilities,
and the like. Residents might seek to rezone some or all of these parcels
for less intensive,-yet economically viable, commercial uses.
Even though downzoning may change the land use designations in
low-income and minority communities to reduce threats to the residents'
health, safety, quality of life, and sense of community, owners of down-
zoned parcels are likely to challenge the rezoning. A majority of courts
will deem a rezoning a legislative act and give it a presumption of valid-
ity." Thus, the landowner will have to prove that the zoning amendment
was "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and [has] no substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety or general welfare.' However,
Oregon, ' Idahor and Kansas" have treated rezoning as an administra-
tive or quasi-adjudicative act, thus subject to greater judicial scrutiny. In
addition, Maryland,"' Connecticut, ' Mississippi,"' Virginia," and New
stadium and extensive commercial development); R.LS.E. Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1148
(E.D. Va. 1991) (rezoning tract in predominantly African American area from agricultural to indus-
trial to allow regional landfill).
643. See e.g., McCuskey v. Canyon County, 851 P.2d 953, 955 (Idaho 1993) (downzoning
single parcel from heavy industrial to rural residential); Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n, 550
So. 2d 316, 317 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (downzoning land from heavy industrial to light industrial to
prevent expansion of solid waste landfill), overruled by Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n, 561
So. 2d 482 (La. 1990); City of Virginia Beach v. Virginia Land Inv. Ass'n, 389 S.B.2d 312, 312 (Va.
1990) (downzoning 403 acres from planned unit development to agricultural); Scabrooke Partners v.
City of Chesapeake, 393 S.E.2d 191, 192-93. (Va. 1990) (downzoning 19 acres from multi-family
residential to single-family residential); Valley View Indus. Park, 733 P.2d at 186-88 (downzoning
single parcel of nearly 27 acres from light industrial to agricultural).
644. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 39.01[2), at 39-4; see, e.g., Amel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa
Mesa, 620 P.2d 565, 567 (Cal. 1980). But see, e.g., infra notes 664-65 and accompanying text.
645. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 39.01 [21, at 39-4.
646. See, e.g., Neuberger v. City of Portland, 603 P.2d 771, 777 (Or. 1979) (rezoning by city
counsel was quasi-judicial function subject to review by court of appeals); Fasano v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Or. 1973) (rejecting the position that judicial review of a
rezoning was limited to a determination of whether it was arbitrary and capricious and futher noting
that courts should not "rigidly" view zoning decisions as legislative acts to be accorded a presump-
tion of validity).
647. See, e.g., Cooper v. Board of County Comm'rs., 614 P.2d 947, 950-51 (Idaho 1980)
(holding that the board's determination on rezoning was a quasi-judicial act).
648. See, e.g., Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130, 135 (Kan. 1978) (holding that a
change of zoning which focused on a specific tract of land, rather than the entire city, was more
quasi-judicial than legislative).
649. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.05[a] (1997); see, e.g., Wakefield v. Kraft, 96 A.2d 27, 30
(Md. 1953) (building in reliance on original zoning was not sufficient to prevail on claim where a
mistake in original zoning ordinance or change in the neighborhood's character was enough to
render rezoning proper).
650. See, e.g., Kimball v. Court of Common Council, 167 A.2d 706,708 (Conn. 1961) (chang-
ing zones is improper unless new conditions or substantial changes have occurred in the area).
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Mexicoe have required that governmental bodies support rezonings with
evidence of either a substantial change in the character of the neighbor-
hood where the rezoning occurred or a mistake in the existing zoning.
The "change or mistake" rule is particularly problematic for low-income
and minority neighborhoods, as it creates strong inertia for existing zon-
ing patterns, which are inequitably distributed and often harmful to low-
income people and people of color. Environmental justice advocates who
seek land use changes are seeking to change local conditions by first
changing zoning patterns. They often will not be able to support down-
zoning with changed conditions towards less intensive uses in the area
because the area is likely to have deteriorated as a result of the existing
zoning allowing more intensive uses. Instead, they will have to argue
that the initial zoning was a mistake by showing the local land use
authority relied on invalid, or perhaps discriminatory, assumptions about
the compatibility of industrial and commercial uses with nearby residen-
tial activities.'
Even in the majority of states where rezoning is legally presumed
valid, courts as a matter of practice scrutinize downzoning carefully!' A
landowner may contend that the rezoning is impermissible spot zoning,
or more precisely spot zoning in the reverse.e" Spot zoning involves
zoning a small area of land differently than surrounding land, while spot
zoning in the reverse entails zoning a parcel more restrictively than the
surrounding parcels.a Spot zoning in the reverse, which is more relevant
to the environmental justice goal of downzoning intensive uses in mixed
use areas, is often struck down as arbitrary and capricious, an unjust dis-
crimination against the downzoned parcel while surrounding parcels are
not subjected to the same treatment.'" Environmental justice advocates
651. See, e.g., City of Biloxi v. Hilbert, 597 So. 2d 1276, 1280 (Miss. 1992) (holding that clear
and convincing evidence must be given that either a mistake in the original zoning or a substantial
change in the character of the neighborhood renders the rezoning justified).
652. See, e.g., Seabrooke Partners v. City of Chesapeake, 393 S.E.2d 191, 193 (Va. 1990)
(holding that rezoning will be sustained on the production of evidence demonstrating sufficient
change in the circumstances of a parcel's neighborhood).
653. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Albuquerque, 648 P.2d 777, 779 (N.M. 1982) (holding that
downzoning must be based on a showing of a mistake in the original zoning or change in the neigh-
borhood).
654. See Bullard, Residential Segregation, supra note 21, at 80-81; Rabin, supra note 1, at
111-12.
655. See Boyce v. Sembly, 334 A.2d 137, 142 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1975).
656. See, e.g., Grimpel Assocs. v. Cohalan, 361 N.E.2d 1022, 1024-25 (N.Y. 1977) (holding
that rezoning resulted in unconstitutional exercise of police power after considering evidence of
traffic conditions and reduction in value to determine the suitability for the uses prescribed in the
zoning ordinances).
657. See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., "Spot Zoning"-A Spot That Could Be Removed from the
Law, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONEMhP. L. 117, 117-19 (1995).
658. Id.
659. See, e.g., Viso v. State, 92 Cal. Rptr. 580, 584-85 (CL App. 1979); City of Miami v.
Schutte, 262 So. 2d 14, 17 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1972).
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must also take care to ensure that downzoning accords with, and does not
facially conflict with, the comprehensive plan.'
Furthermore, owners of downzoned property who suffer economic
loss to accommodate neighborhood residents' opposition to their uses of
their property may claim that the local land use authority unreasonably
exercised its police power and took private property without just com-
pensation. For example, a New York village rezoning of two parcels
from business to residential, resulting in at least a sixty percent loss of
value, was not only in violation of a comprehensive plan but also unjusti-
fiably discriminatory."' The court also noted that the downzoning oc-
curred in the face of a specific proposal for a bowling alley and a super-
market or discount house that received neighborhood opposition rather
than as the result of pre-proposal comprehensive planning."2 Similarly,
downzoning a parcel from commercial to residential use was unconstitu-
tional when it resulted in a 92% diminution in the parcel's value and
nearby residences could be protected from the impacts of the business
use of the land by an existing buffer area.!' However, when local resi-
dents and the land use planning authority can present sufficient evidence
that downzoning is necessary to protect local residential neighborhoods,
courts will likely uphold the downzoning.6"
People of color and poor people are in something of a Catch-22. On
one hand, zoning designations often reflect existing uses,' which in the
case of low-income and minority neighborhoods are often a set of mixed,
intrusive, intensive, and even expulsive uses. Environmental justice ad-
vocates want to change these zoning patterns. However, environmental
injustice often exists in older neighborhoods, and as Ellickson and Tar-
lock observe, "[allthough all use designations are potentially amendable,
those in established neighborhoods are the least likely to be open for
negotiation." Amendments to the zoning code and zoning map are
means of redefining acceptable land uses, at least for the future, but they
660. See supra notes 617-21 and accompanying text.
661. Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897,905 (N.Y. 1968).
662. Id. at 903-04.
663. Grimpel Assocs. v. Cohalan, 361 N.E.2d 1022, 1024 (N.Y. 1977); see also Condor Corp.
V. City of St. Paul, 912 F.2d 215, 223 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that neighborhood opposition was not
a sufficient basis for restricting intensive uses and that the city must establish evidence of incom-
patibility of uses); D'Addario v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 593 A.2d 511, 517 (Conn. 1991)
(holding that downzoning two parcels from commercial to residential was a taking of private prop-
erty for public use without just compensation when the downzoning reduced the value of both par-
cels by about 90% each).
664. Moviematic Indus. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 349 So. 2d 667,669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (noting the validity of downzoning from heavy industrial to single-family residential to protect
ecological systems and residential, historic, and aesthetic character of neighborhoods); McGowan v.
Cohalan, 361 N.E.2d 1025,1027 (N.Y. 1977) (upholding a downzoning from industrial to residential
as necessary to create buffer between residential and industrial uses).
665. E jCKSON & TARLOCK, supra note 539, at 59.
666. Id.
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will be judged by their compatibility with surrounding uses and the char-
acter of the neighborhood,' which often reflect the very uses that grass-
roots groups are trying to change. Objectionable uses may be deemed
compatible with nearby uses that are similarly intensive. In addition,
landowners accustomed to the intensive characterization of their parcels
and the neighborhood are likely to resist change.
Low-income and minority neighborhood groups will be most suc-
cessful in achieving valid rezoning of neighboring properties from more
intensive to less intensive uses if they follow four guiding principles: (1)
seek rezoning before controversial specific land use proposals arise; (2)
carefully document the incompatibility of existing high-intensity use
designations and their impact or potential impact on the health and safety
of local residents, as well as community character, (3) seek rezoning for
all neighboring parcels with similar use designations and similar impacts
(do not leave a landowner the argument that only his or her property has
been downzoned while neighboring parcels remain zoned for more inten-
sive uses); and (4) do not downzone so greatly that the landowner suffers
a substantial diminution in the property's value (leave the owner some
economically viable use-for example, downzone from an industrial use
to a commercial use, instead of all the way to a single-family residential
use).
Perhaps the most successful strategy of all includes a comprehen-
sive set of amendments to the zoning text, the zoning map, and the com-
prehensive plan. These combined text and map amendments often create
new zoning designations and apply them to existing parcels, and they
often receive judicial approval because of their comprehensive nature."'
For example, if a group of neighborhood residents were concerned that
interspersed light industrial zoning might permit manufacturing activity
with the presence and use of toxic chemicals, the emission of noise and
dust, and the like, but did not object to warehouse uses (permitted uses in
light industrial zones), the group would have four options. First, they
could seek a zoning text amendment to delete manufacturing as a per-
mitted use in light industrial zones. This change, however, would seem to
run contrary to the definition of light industrial activity as including at
least some manufacturing and would likely develop opposition from
manufacturers in other parts of the city whose property is zoned light
industrial. Second, they could seek a zoning map amendment to down-
zone their area's light industrial property to commercial or residential.
This would prevent manufacturing in the area, but it would also ineffi-
ciently and perhaps unjustly prevent owners of the downzoned parcel
from using their land for warehouses even though the residents have no
objection to warehouses. Third, they could seek both a map and text
amendment that would downzone the land to commercial but place
667. See La Salle Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 125 N.E.2d 609,613 (11. 1955).
668. See, e.g., Jafay v. Board of County Comm'rs, 848 P.2d 892,898 (Colo. 1993).
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warehouses among the permitted uses for commercial zones. However,
warehouses might not be compatible with all other commercial uses, and
residents and landowners in other parts of the city where there is com-
mercial zoning might object to warehouses in their areas. Fourth, they
could seek both a text amendment that creates a new "warehouse" zoning
designation and a map amendment that rezones the light industrial prop-
erties to warehouse uses. The creation of new districts accommodates the
particular land use compatibility needs of particular neighborhoods, such
as low-income and minority communities that historically have suffered
expulsive zoning and harmful land uses. It has the capacity to reflect
changing social norms about what uses are deemed compatible and in-
compatible with other uses. It also increases the "supply" of zoning des-
ignations, perhaps avoiding inefficient and burdensome restrictions on
land that result from attempts to avoid some uses in a particular classifi-
cation's large number of permissible uses (which accompany a small set
of use classifications). This method, however, risks proliferation of par-
ticularized use designations and piecemeal zoning. Overly specialized
zoning designations could limit both the local community and the private
landowner in options for the property's use if the conceived use is no
longer viable or desired or the property is to be sold. Nonetheless, com-
munities may need to experiment with new zoning classifications in an
attempt to achieve environmental justice.!
C. Flexible Zoning Techniques
1. Conditional Uses
Beyond traditional zoning, localities and neighborhood groups who
become involved in land use planning and regulation have a variety of
more flexible techniques available to them. Perhaps the most commonly
used mechanism is the conditional use or special exception.!" Zoning
classifications contain uses that are permitted by right (without having to
obtain any specialized permit) and uses that are completely prohibited.
However, most zoning classifications also contain uses that are permitted
in the zone only if the landowner obtains a permit and meets the stan-
dards or conditions listed in the zoning code for those uses.7' These uses
are often compatible with other uses in the zone but are not necessarily
compatible in every location or under every circumstance or without
certain limitations and conditions.' The terms "special permits," "spe-
669. "Incremental planning that adapts to change in an ad hoc manner is a fact of life." ROHAN,
supra note 506, § 32A.04[l1[b][viij, at 32A-47.
670. ELLICKSON & TARLOCK, supra note 539, at 61.
671. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 44.01[1], at 44-2.
672. Id.; see also Tullo v. Township of Millbum, 149 A.2d 620, 624-25 (NJ. Super. CL App.
Div. 1959) (holding there was sufficient evidence that the statute and ordinance had been met to
justify a special exception for the construction of an outdoor pool at private club).
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cial exceptions," and "conditional uses" are legally the same and are used
interchangeably to refer to the same device. '
Conditional uses are not a means of excluding potentially harmful
activities from areas zoned for them because the zoning code lists them
as permissible if they meet certain conditions, thus presuming general
compatibility. Instead, conditional uses are a means of imposing certain
restrictions on uses that could become nuisances or unduly burdensome
on the surrounding area if left unchecked. ' They also allow for greater
public scrutiny of some land use proposals." Residents of low-income
and minority neighborhoods cannot count on keeping out conditional
uses just because the landowner has to obtain a permit. First, to even
have a chance at preventing an unwanted conditional use, the local resi-
dents must watch vigilantly for conditional use permit applications that
affect their neighborhoods and become actively and effectively involved
in opposing the applications that would have adverse impacts on their
community.6! 6 Second, the local land use regulatory authority might grant
the permit despite neighborhood opposition. For example, the environ-
mental justice cases of East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Association v.
Macon Bibb Planning & Zoning Commission6" (concerning a landfill in
Macon, Georgia) and Security Environmental Systems, Inc. v. South
Coast Air Quality Management Districf' (concerning a hazardous waste
incinerator capable of burning more than 450 chemicals at a rate of two
tons per hour) involved local grants of conditional use permits. Third, a
landowner whose conditional use permit application has been denied is
likely to obtain judicial reversal if he or she can show compliance with
all the conditions in the zoning code.!"
Environmental justice groups, however, may be able to exercise
more scrutiny over industrial and commercial uses that are not likely
(politically or legally) to be prohibited altogether if the landowner is re-
quired to obtain a conditional use permit. In addition, they can seek to
influence the conditions under which a permit may be granted, so as to
reduce the negative impacts of the conditional use. Therefore, an envi-
ronmental justice strategy might involve rewriting conditional use stan-
dards to require more buffers, more limits on pollution and nuisance-like
activities, a smaller scale, and the like. Furthermore, one standard might
require denial of the permit if there is an over-concentration of similar
673. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 44.0 1 [ I ], at 44-3.
674. Id. § 44.01[4], at 44-11.
675. Id.
676. See MAXWEU. & IMMERGLUCK, supra note 510, at 13.
677. 888 F.2d 1573 (11 th Cir.), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 896 F.2d
1264 (l th Cir. 1989).
678. 229Cal.App.3dSupp. 110(1991).
679. See, e.g., Zylka v. City of Crystal, 167 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Minn. 1969); Bankoff v. Board of
Adjustment, 875 P.2d 1138, 1142-43 (Okla. 1994).
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uses in a low-income or minority neighborhood. Finally, requiring con-
ditional use permits for new industrial or commercial activity in a low-
income or minority neighborhood that is disproportionately zoned for
these uses might be an effective way of controlling further intrusion until
comprehensive rezoning can occur."'
2. Overlay Zones and Special Districts
Overlay zones are another way of imposing additional requirements
on existing Euclidean zoning: "An outgrowth of Euclidean zoning,
overlay zones in effect circumscribe an environmental area that is al-
ready subject to Euclidean regulation, and impose additional require-
ments thereon.'" The additional requirements are laid over the existing
zoning, subjecting the land in the overlay district to the underlying tradi-
tional zoning requirements and the special requirements associated with
the overlay district. Overlay zones have been used for a wide range of
purposes, including prohibitions or limits on development where natural
conditions such as seismic hazards, hillside slopes, or flood hazards
make it unsuitable, where there are aesthetic or historic features to be
preserved, where sensitive and valuable environmental areas exist that
could be harmed by excessive development, and where certain activities
in the area, like airplane flight patterns, make constraints on other activi-
ties necessary for safety or health.'
Overlay zones could be used to impose a variety of specific re-
quirements on industrial and commercial land activities that occur in
neighborhoods or areas inhabited by low-income people and people of
color and that threaten the residents' health or the area's character and
integrity. For example, environmental justice groups could seek overlays
of "interface zones," which limit land uses and require certain mitigation
and buffer measures to create buffers where higher intensity zoning bor-
ders upon lighter intensity zoning. ' They could also seek neighborhood
conservation districts, designed to protect older neighborhoods from the
harmful or expulsive effects of mixed zoning, and then impose on all
neighborhood conservation districts certain land use limits designed to
680. The Denver Board of Adjustment reversed a grant of a conditional use permit for a solid
waste transfer facility in an industrial (1-2) zone in a low-income neighborhood of color, in part
because "[tihe area in which the station is to be located has an undue concentration of uses which
manufacture, use, or store materials which create environmental hazards." Board of Adjustment for
Zoning Appeals of the City and County of Denver, Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, Case
No. 72-95, at 2.a.i (Sept. 19, 1995).
681. The East Austin Overlay District is an excellent example of this strategy. See Austin,
Texas Ordinance No. 970717-F (July 1, 1997); CITY OF AUSTIN, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: EAST
AUSTIN OVERLAY DiSTRICr, supra note 591.
682. Robert J. Blackwell, Comment, Overlay Zoning, Performance Standards, and Environ-
mental Protection After Nollan, 16 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 615,616 (1989).
683. Id. at 632-34; see CALujES E AL., supra note 565, at 61-62.
684. Blackwell, supra note 682, at 619 n. 135.
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prevent those impacts.' For example, the City of Waco, Texas, enacted
an ordinance prohibiting the sale of automobiles on certain commercial
property in neighborhood conservation districts, thus protecting these
sensitive older areas from an arguably disruptive land use."' Finally, en-
vironmental justice advocates might follow the lead of residents of East
Austin and the Austin, Texas planning staff and city council in develop-
ing an overlay zone for a low-income neighborhood of color that suf-
fered a disproportionate amount of industrial and commercial uses and
zoning designations.' The East Austin overlay zone requires conditional
use permits for any new industrial or commercial activity in the district.'
The specific additional requirements imposed on the overlay zone will
vary from locality to locality, depending on the concerns identified by
local residents. The concept of the overlay zone, however, allows impo-
sition of these additional requirements only where they will help to pro-
tect and promote the health of the neighborhoods and the residents, not in
other parts of the city where overlay zones might have no or little impact
on residential areas. This narrow geographic tailoring of additional land
use regulations reinforces legal arguments that the regulations are de-
signed to protect only those neighborhoods at risk of deterioration or
environmental hazards without unnecessarily burdening land use in other
areas. It also decreases the number of landowners citywide who might be
affected and therefore might be opponents.
3. Performance Zoning
Performance zoning is a deceptively attractive option for residents
of mixed use neighborhoods wanting to protect against environmental
harms, but it contains the same limits inherent in federal and state envi-
ronmental regulations. Performance zoning does not regulate land uses,
but instead regulates the impacts of activities that occur on land.& ' A per-
formance zoning ordinance establishes certain performance standards for
possible negative impacts on neighboring property, such as dust, smoke,
noise, odor, vibration, toxic pollutants, runoff, glare, heat, and other nui-
sances (negative externalities).a ° It prohibits any land use with impacts
685. "[A) neighborhood conservation district is an overlay district 'intended to encourage the
continued vitality of older residential areas of the city, to promote the development of a variety of
new housing of contemporary standards in existing neighborhoods, and to maintain a desirable
residential environment and scale."' Bell v. City of Waco, 835 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex. CL App.
1992) (quoting WACO, TEX., CODE § 4.2303(a) (1987)).
686. Id. at 213.
687. See supra Part W.C.1.
688. See supra note 505; see also East Austin Due Rezoning, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
July 1, 1997, at AIS (discussing proposed changes to zoning policies in East Austin); Haurwitz et
al., supra note 505, at Al (describing the effects of the proposed changes to remedy the incompati-
bility of zoning and actual use of East Austin).
689. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 40.01[71, at 40-6.
690. Id.
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that exceed levels predetermined to be tolerable."' Two ways of classi-
fying performance standards exist. One is to distinguish between stan-
dards related to development density, design, and preservation of natural
resources-often associated with areas of new development-and stan-
dards related to the nuisance-like impacts of industrial activity, such as
air, water, and soil pollution; noise; vibration; and odors---often in estab-
lished industrial areas.' Another classification distinguishes between
what are known as "primitive" standards, which have only general defi-
nitions stemming from common law nuisance concepts (e.g., prohibitions
on emission of "any offensive odor, dust, noxious gas, noise, vibration,
smoke, heat or glare beyond the boundaries of the lot'") and "precision"
standards, which are developed from scientific data and reflected in
quantifiable measurements (e.g., limits on permissible decibel levels in
designated octave bands per second or designated center frequency-
cycles per second). Nevertheless, all types of performance zoning ordi-
nances supplement, as opposed to replace, traditional, use-based Euclid-
ean zoning. And courts have largely upheld the validity of performance
zoning standards both as reasonable means of protecting the public from
nuisances and as sufficiently measurable according to a "reasonable per-
son" nuisance standard.'
Performance zoning is essentially local environmental law. Except
for the performance standards that prohibit all emissions, ' the standards
permit some level of impact. The permissible level, then, is based either
on what is generally defined as "objectionable," which is vague and dif-
ficult to enforce, or on scientific calculations of risk. In either event, the
standards require legal or scientific expertise, regulatory oversight, and
control of pollution through risk assessment, rather than pollution pre-
vention-all characteristics of environmental law criticized by environ-
mental justice activists and scholars, and distrusted by low-income peo-
ple and minorities' If low-income and minority communities must en-
dure industrial and intensive commercial uses, performance standards
offer a locally available tool for prohibiting those activities from pollut-
ing and disrupting the neighborhood. Performance standards, however,
691. LANE KENDIG, PERFORMANCE ZONING (1980); ROHAN, SuPra note 506, § 40.01[l][c], at
40-6; CALLIES E AL., supra note 565, at 63; Frederick W. Acker, Note, Performance Zoning, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363,364 (1991); Blackwell, supra note 682, at 616.
692. See generally KENDIG, supra note 691 (addressing performance zoning).
693. State v. Zack, 674 P.2d 329, 331 (Ariz. 1983) (quoting city ordinance).
694. Blackwell, supra note 682, at 638-39.
695. Id. at 616, 637. But see Acker, supra note 691, at 364 (urging performance zoning as a
superior alternative to Euclidean zoning).
696. Zack, 674 P.2d at 332; Dube v. City of Chicago, 131 N.E.2d 9, 16 (i1. 1955); DeCoals,
Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 284 S.E.2d 856,859 (W. Va. 1981).
697. E.g., DeCoals, 284 S.E.2d at 858 (stating that the text of the ordinance indicated that "mno
dust of any kind produced by the industrial operations shall be permitted to escape beyond the limits
of the property being used.").
698. See supra notes 111-12,119-24.
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do not address the problem of disproportionate industrial and commercial
zoning in low-income and minority neighborhoods. Nor are they as cer-
tain to keep pollution out, given slippages in enforcement and the poten-
tial for either careless or inadvertent emissions from heavy industrial
activities, as prohibitions on industrial uses in these neighborhoods are.
Thus, at best, performance standards might be a fallback negotiating po-
sition for communities that, because of private property rights, economic
and political forces, or other practical limits, cannot completely undo the
legacy of intensive zoning.
4. Buffer Zones
Buffer zones, like performance zoning, both help and hurt low-
income people and people of color. Buffer zones are use designations
that create a buffer or transition between a less intensive use, such as
single-family residential, and a nearby more intensive use, such as com-
mercial or industrial.' The buffer zone exists between the two areas to
minimize the impact of the more intensive use on the less intensive, more
sensitive use.'
The most frequent type of buffer between single-family residential
areas and industrial or commercial areas is medium- or high-density resi-
dential uses.J' In fact, in the famous case of Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,' in which the Supreme
Court upheld the Village's refusal to rezone land for low-income housing
in an all-white Chicago suburb, the Village's avowed purpose for its
multi-family zoning designation was to serve as a buffer between single-
family homes and commercial activities.' Buffer zones are perhaps one
of the major reasons why low-income and minority neighborhoods have
so much industrial and commercial zoning: the multi-family housing,
where many low-income and minority people live, is purposefully placed
near the industrial and commercial uses to create a buffer that protects
high-income, white, single-family neighborhoods. Zoning practices place
large numbers of poor and minority people near intensive uses because
traditional zoning and planning theory values most the single-family
residence, instead of the integrity and quality of all residential areas.'
However, low-income and minority neighborhoods need buffers to
protect them from intensive industrial and commercial activity. Buffer
zones can also include physical screening, landscaping, significant set-
699. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 40.0 117], at 40-38.
700. Id.
701. Id.
702. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
703. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 556.
704. The practice of buffer zoning "presents the anomalous situation of putting more people
next to commercial uses rather than fewer, [but] it is consistent with traditional theory which places
the single-family use at the apex of the zoning pyramid. The courts have generally sustained the
practice." RotHAN, supra note 506, § 40.01[7), at 40-38.
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backs, open space, and even low-intensity commercial uses like offices,
shops, churches, and medical care facilities.' Environmental justice ad-
vocates can use the concept of buffer zoning but redefine it to protect
low-income and minority residences. Although neighborhood groups
might want to avoid buffering against industrial activities with open
space uses that have recreational value and could attract children and
others to play close to heavy industry, they could seek non-residential
buffer zones to separate themselves from potentially harmful or disrup-
tive uses. This would be most successful in situations in which industrial
or commercial zoning borders low-income or minority neighborhoods,
instead of being interspersed throughout them.
5. Floating Zones
Floating zones are flexible zoning techniques that require particular
scrutiny and monitoring by environmental justice groups to ensure that
low-income communities and neighborhoods of color are not assigned
harmful or burdensome floating uses. A floating zone is a land use dis-
trict created in the zoning code text but not yet designated on the zoning
map.' The zoning authority identifies a need for a particular type of use
but may not be able to identify where in the locality that use should be
placed or zoned. Rather than be limited by the rigidity of traditional
Euclidean zoning, the authority creates a district without any specific
location(s) on the map, but with a set of standards for determining ap-
propriate locations. The zone "floats" until a landowner seeks to have it
applied to his or her property via a rezoning of the property. Thus, there
is a bifurcation of the creation of the zone and the application of the zone
to any specific area. It gives the local authority flexibility in responding
to local land use needs. By and large, courts have upheld floating
zones.'
0
Floating zones pose an uncertain threat to local residents and land-
owners, who do not know whether a neighboring property will be chosen
for a floating zone use."' If it is chosen for this designation, they may
face (in some cases, literally!) an unexpected new use. Furthermore,
floating zones appear to be used most often for either industrial uses or
705. Id.
706. For discussions of floating zones and how they work, see CALLIES Eu AL., supra note 565,
at 69; WRIGtrr & GITELMAN, supra note 516, at 855; Comment, Zoning-The Floating Zone: A
Potential Instrument of Versatile Zoning, 16 CATH. U. L. REV. 85 (1966).
707. See, e.g., Lurie v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n., 278 A.2d 799, 811 (Conn. 1971);
McQuail v. Shell Oil Co., 183 A.2d 572, 580 (Del. 1962); Beall v. Montgomery County Council,
212 A.2d 751,762 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1965); Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731,733
(N.Y. 1951). But see Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 164 A.2d 7, 12 (Pa. 1960) (invalidating use
of floating zone as antithetical to concept of zoning).
708. Herbert Goldman, Comment, Zoning Change: Flexibility vs. Stability, 26 MD. L. REv. 48,
51-52(1966).
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high-density residential uses.0  For example, in McQuail v. Shell Oil
Co.,"' New Castle County, Delaware, applied an industrial floating zone
to an undeveloped parcel previously zoned residential, so that Shell Oil
Co. could build a refinery. Residents of low-income and minority neigh-
borhoods may find that property zoned for non-intensive uses, for exam-
ple residential, may be rezoned for industrial uses through the application
of a floating zone at the request of the landowner. In fact, parcels in these
neighborhoods might be particularly attractive to industrial companies
wanting to take advantage of floating zones for their activities: the land
may be cheaper;, local residents might not have the political power, in-
formation, or resources to oppose the rezoning; there would likely be
other nearby industrial uses or industrially zoned property; and there
might be proximity to transportation facilities like railroads, interstate
freeways, waterways, and airports. In addition, the decision about
whether or not to apply a floating zone to a particular parcel or tract will
be made on the basis of criteria already established at the creation of the
use initially. Therefore, grassroots environmental groups should pay par-
ticular attention to the existence of unmapped floating zones in local
zoning codes and any possible requests to apply those zones in their
neighborhoods. They will need to be politically active in opposing any
unwanted floating zones, both in the text (the existence of the unmapped
district altogether) and on the map (the application of the zone to land in
their neighborhoods). Opposition to particular applications of floating
zones will be most successful when based on the articulated criteria, as
well as political activity.
D. Exactions
A possibly not-so-obvious tool that could be part of a land use plan-
ning model of environmental justice is the local government imposition
of exactions (i.e., conditions) on approvals of industrial and commercial
development near residential areas. Exactions require the developer to
provide the public either real property (land, facilities, or both) or mone-
tary fees as a condition for permission to use land in ways subject to
government regulation."' These dedications and fees provide the public
facilities necessitated by new development, including schools, parks,
open space, roads, sidewalks, public utilities, fire and police stations,
709. See McQuail, 183 A.2d at 574 (heavy industrial floating zone); Beall, 212 A.2d at 751
(multi-family high-rise residential floating zone); Costello v. Sieling, 161 A.2d 824 (Md. 1960)
(tourist accommodation floating zones); Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 133 A.2d 83, 84-85 (Md.
1957) (restricted manufacturing floating zone); Rodgers, 96 N.E.2d at 732 (multi-family residential
floating zone); Eves, 164 A.2d at 8 (limited industrial floating zone); see also CALLIES, Er AL, supra
note 565, at 69 (using light industrial and multi-family housing uses for hypothetical about floating
zones).
710. 183 A-2d 572,574 (1962).
711. Vicki Been, "Exit" As a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitu-
tional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 478-79 (1991).
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low-income housing, mass transit, day care services, and job training
programs. 1
There are five basic types of commonly imposed exactions: (1) on-
site dedications, which consist of land and facilities within the devel-
oper's subdivision that the developer dedicates to the public; (2) off-site
dedications, which consist of land and facilities outside the subdivision,
yet dedicated by the developer, (3) fees-in-lieu-of-dedication, which are
money contributions for the public provision of facilities that the devel-
oper otherwise would be required to dedicate; (4) impact fees, which
capture from the private developer the public's costs of local capital-
infrastructure and public-services needs caused by the development's
impacts; and (5) linkages, which are facilities and/or fees provided by
central-city commercial and industrial developers for the services neces-
sitated by their specific development activities."' Cities and counties use
exactions extensively, determining the amount demanded "either ac-
cording to a nondiscretionary, predetermined schedule, or through case-
by-case negotiations."" They usually impose exactions during the subdi-
vision map approval process, because new subdivisions are significant
sources of population growth that create the demand for additional public
facilities and services.: However, other zoning approvals, such as re-
zoning or conditional use permits, may trigger the expectation of exac-
tions.
16
Exactions potentially benefit low-income and minority neighbor-
hood residents in two ways. First, if a city or county requires a developer
of a new residential subdivision to provide or pay for streets, parks,
schools, public utilities infrastructure, and the like, the costs are borne
ultimately by the residents (the new homeowner) of the subdivision, not
the general tax base. Therefore, residents of existing low-income or mi-
nority neighborhoods are not contributing taxes to infrastructure fre-
quently enjoyed by upper-income whites in new suburban subdivisions.
Furthermore, local tax revenues are not diverted from services and fa-
cilities that support inner city neighborhoods.
Second, government agencies can use exactions to mitigate the en-
vironmental impacts of new or expanding development in low-income
712. See CALuES Lr AL., supra note 565, at 182; ROHAN, supra note 506, § 9.01, at 9-4 to -5;
Been, supra note 711, at 480.
713. Been, supra note 711, at 479-81. Been also includes "set-asides or inclusionary zoning
programs"; she notes, however, that these programs are not universally regarded as exactions, but
could be considered substantive zoning requirements. Id. at 481 & n.41.
714. Id. at 481 & nn.42 & 43.
715. EuiCKSON & TARLocK, supra note 539, at 738; RoHAN, supra note 506, § 9.01, at 9-4;
cf. Been, supra note 711, at 481 ("The practice of imposing exactions is fairly widespread, although
exactions are most common in communities of growth areas.").
716. EWuCKSON & TARLoCK, supra note 539, at 738; David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in
an Age oflHeightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. ReV. 1243, 1251 (1997).
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and minority areas. Already, various federal, state, and local environ-
mental regulatory programs require developers to dedicate land or pay
fees to mitigate the environmental impacts of development in ecologi-
cally sensitive areas."' A comprehensive environmental justice land use
program, though, might include environmental impact fees and dedica-
tions for inner-city industrial and commercial development. The exac-
tions would be based on the various environmental and social impacts of
intensive uses and LULUs on the surrounding neighborhood(s), not just
the publicly funded local infrastructure, and would be earmarked for
ameliorating amenities in the affected neighborhood(s). For example, an
unsightly industrial facility might have to dedicate land for parks and
open space, or to pay fees for these features. Similarly, an operator of a
proposed waste facility might be required to contribute to a fund to be
used for monitoring pollution levels and resident health status, as well as
future cleanups of contamination related to the facility. An exactions
program would be most attractive to environmental justice advocates
when either, (1) the local residents would not oppose the proposed land
use if its adverse impacts were mitigated, or (2) complete prohibition of
the proposed land use is politically or legally infeasible. The program,
though, could apply only to new development or new activities, such as
changes in existing uses, requiring development permits. In addition, it
could not be used "to remedy existing infrastructure deficiencies, or to
provide for operation and maintenance of facilities.""'
Finally, the exactions program must be tailored to the impacts of the
proposed developments. To survive a challenge under the Takings
Clause of the U.S. Constitution,"" an exaction must bear an "essential
nexus" to the legitimate government interest that forms the basis for
regulating the development.' It must also be roughly proportional in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development'" This two-
part test applies to all land or facility dedication requirements and those
impact fees imposed on an individualized, or ad hoc, basis.tm Lingering
uncertainty exists over whether the Nollan "essential nexus" and Dolan
"rough proportionality" requirements apply to legislatively-adopted,
717. See COLLABORATIVE PLANNING FOR WETLANDS AND WILDLIFE: ISSUES AND EXAMPLES
(Douglas R. Porter & David A. Salvesen eds., 1995); Thomas W. Ledman, Note, Local Government
Environmental Mitigation Fees: Development Exactions, the Next Generation, 45 FLA. L. REV. 835,
836 (1993).
718. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 9.01, at 9-5.
719. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
720. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
721. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374i 391 (1994).
722. Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 438-39 (Cal. 1996). But see Sintra, Inc. v. City of
Seattle, 829 P.2d 765, 773 n.7 (Wash. 1992) (distinguishing Nollan as applicable only to physical
exactions, not fees); Frank Michelman, The Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1600,
1608-09 (1988) (arguing that Nollan is concerned primarily with permanent physical occupation of
land).
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formula-driven impact fees.' The Nollan and Dolan standards appear to
meet or exceed separate state constitutional tests requiring either a "rea-
sonable relationship" or "rational nexus" between the exaction and the
state interest in regulating the impacts of the development.' A few state
courts, however, require exactions to be tailored to impacts that are "spe-
cifically and uniquely attributable" to the proposed development, which
is a higher standard than those found in Nollan and Dolan.' In any
event, neighborhood groups urging local land use agencies to impose
exactions on industrial and commercial development and LULUs should
do studies on the impacts of these developments or otherwise attempt to
specify, preferably in quantitative terms, the development's direct and
indirect impacts on the neighborhood. These studies would support ar-
guments that the conditions are properly tailored to the government in-
terest in regulating adverse impacts of development. In addition, neigh-
borhood groups would need to avoid using exactions to remedy existing
or past development impacts.
E. Limits to Land Use Regulations As Environmental Justice Tools
1. Judicial Protections of Private Property Rights
The land use regulatory model of environmental justice, while
promising for many low-income communities of color, contains inherent
limits. Among these limits are legal constraints on land use regulation
that are largely designed to protect the private property rights of land-
owners. Courts, increasingly protective of private property rights and
skeptical of local political processes, have eroded the well-established
judicial presumption that zoning decisions are valid' by imposing
greater scrutiny on decisions about land use regulation tm Even if the ero-
723. Compare Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 438-39 ("A court must determine whether the factual find-
ings made by the permitting body support the condition as one that is more or less proportional, in
both nature and scope, to the public impact"), with Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumberg, 661
N.E.2d 380, 390 (111. App. Ct. 1995) (in making a legislative determination, "the city demonstrated a
rough proportionality between the requirements and objectives" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
724. See Dana, supra note 716, at 1252-53; see, e.g., Ayres v. City Council, 207 P.2d 1,8 (CaL
1949); Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863,866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
725. See Dana, supra note 716, at 1252-53; see, e.g., Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of
Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799,802-03 1M 1961).
726. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 35.04(lXc), at 37-38 ("It is well-settled in the law that a zoning
ordinance, like other legislative acts, is entitled to a strong presumption of validity unless it is arbi-
trary or unreasonable on its face."); Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Taziock, Shifting the Presump-
tion of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 1-3 & n.l (1992) (showing that often
the presumption is extended to zoning bodies' administrative functions, as well as legislative func-
tions).
727. See Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 726, at 50 (supporting the proposition that zoning
ordinances will be presumed to be constitutional); Michael Allan Wolf, Fruits of the "Impenetrable
Jungle": Navigating the Boundary Between Land-Use Planning and Environmental Law, 50 WASt.
U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 5, 6-9 (1996) (addressing the current judicial extension of the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause, U.S. CONST. amend V).
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sion of the presumption itself is more perceived than real, the courts are
playing a greater role in reviewing land use controls. T'
There are four primary areas of constraints relevant to achievement
of low-income and minority neighborhoods' land use goals: (1) the rea-
sonableness of the zoning decisions; (2) the impact on the property
owner's economically beneficial use of the property; (3) a developer's
expectations that zoning laws will not change once he or she has relied
on initial approvals and begun the development; and (4) rights to con-
tinue a previously permissible land use once it has been prohibited. '
First, the constitutional doctrine of substantive due process requires that
zoning bear a real and substantial relationship to the public health, safety,
morals, or welfare-the traditional police power justifications for regu-
lation.' The courts will strike down land use controls or decisions that
are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable."' As discussed above, substan-
tive due process claims often arise in situations of downzoning; the
owner of the downzoned property will argue that the downzoning is ar-
bitrary and capricious in its application to his or her property.' The most
important factors to courts in determining the validity of downzoning are
728. Jerold S. Kayden, Judges As Planners: Limited or General Partners?, in ZONING AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 1, at 223, 223. Nonetheless, potential land use conflicts still over-
whelmingly tend to be negotiated, rather than litigated. However, the nature, and perhaps outcomes,
of these negotiations may reflect perceptions about whether the courts will favor regulators or prop-
erty owners or interested neighbors or groups if agreement cannot be reached and the litigation
option is exercised. See, e.g., Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 218, at 950-51.
729. See generally Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 591-92 (1962) (explaining
the Court's interpretation of "reasonableness" regarding these elements).
730. See Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 593 ("A prohibition simply upon the use of property for pur-
poses that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the
public benefit'); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (declaring that
before an ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, such provisions must be shown to be clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare); F.H. Uelner Precision Tools & Dies, Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 190 N.W.2d 465,
469 (Iowa 197 1) ("In principle, zoning of land for the public good is a proper exercise of the police
power even though it works some onerous consequences on landowners."). Land use controls that do
not substantially advance legitimate state interests may also be regulatory takings. See Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987) (reiterating that a restriction may consti-
tote a taking if not reasonably necessary to effectuate a substantial government purpose); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (stating that "an application of a general zoning law to a
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance state interests").
731. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (declaring that before an ordinance can be declared unconstitu-
tional, such provisions must be shown to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable); Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928) (stating that the determination of public officers should not
be set aside unless the action is an arbitrary or irrational exercise of power); Marks v. City of Chesa-
peake, 883 F.2d 308, 311-12 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing that the dispositive question is
whether a local government's land use decision is arbitrary and capricious, and thus a deprivation of
property without due process); Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 118 A.2d 824, 829, 831 (NJ.
1955) (deviating from the rles of the constitutional and statutory zoning process in an arbitrary
fashion is prohibited).
732. See supra notes 644-64 and accompanying text.
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the reasons for the zoning change;TM whether it appears to be designed to
stop a specific land use proposal, instead of resulting from pre-proposal
comprehensive planning;' whether surrounding parcels are treated
similarly;' 5 and the degree to which the downzoning decreases the prop-
erty's value and interferes with reasonable expectations about the use of
the property. TM
Second, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment' limits the
government's regulation of land use. The U.S. Supreme Court has devel-
oped several different tests depending on the governmental action re-
specting private property. The Nollan "essential nexus" and Dolan
"rough proportionality" tests for the imposition of exactions are dis-
cussed above."' Physical occupation of private property would rarely be
relevant to the land use regulation model of environmental justice, and
will not be discussed here!"' However, Supreme Court jurisprudence on
regulatory takings is highly relevant. If a land use regulation denies a
property owner all of the economically viable use of his or her property,
a taking occurs and compensation is due, unless the property owner's
rights never included the right to the regulated activity, such as a public
nuisance:' If the landowner suffers a diminution in value less than one
hundred percent of the economically viable use of his or her property,
733. See Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs., 349 So. 2d 667, 669 (Fla.
Dist. CL App. 1977) (allowing zoning regulations that preserve ecological systems, residential or
historical character of a neighborhood, or aesthetic appeal of a community); McGowan v. Cohalan,
361 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (N.Y. 1977) (establishing the need for an adequate separation between areas
of residential and industrial use).
734. See Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188 (recognizing that the unconstitutional zoning of the locus in
question was not indispensable to the general plan); Katobimar, 118 A.2d at 829 (insisting that all
property in like circumstances be treated alike).
735. See Viso v. California, 92 Cal. Rptr. 580,584-85 (CL App. 1979) (defining spot zoning);
Miami v. Schutte, 262 So. 2d 14,16-17 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1972) (recognizing the insensibility of
allowing spot zoning in reverse by permitting apartment houses on land surrounding a parcel but
denying apartments on that parcel).
736. See supra note 663 and accompanying text; see also Nectow, 277 U.S. at 187 (providing
an example of loss of a sales contract due to changed expectations regarding the use of the property).
737. U.S. CONST. amend. V ('IN]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
738. See supra notes 719-25 and accompanying text.
739. See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421-23
(1982) (addressing permanent physical occupation as a per se taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979) (addressing governmental occupation of navigable waters in a private
marina as a physical invasion short of permanent and a taking); Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d
1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that a permanent physical occupation of private property by the
government constitutes a taking).
740. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1004 (1992) (holding that a
regulation which denies a private property owner of all economically viable use of the property is a
per se taking unless the use was never part of the owner's rights under background principles of state
property law).
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courts will apply an ad hoc balancing test "that considers the economic
effects of the regulation and the government's purpose.''
Courts uphold zoning regulations that greatly restrict the use of pri-
vate property far more than they declare such regulations to be takings.
Many of the cases in which government agencies must compensate land-
owners involve total bans on development.:' Some takings cases, how-
ever, involve downzoning that both limits the use and diminishes the
value of the property. Where the property still has some significant value
for the rezoned use, courts will find no taking, even with a substantial
diminution in value" Where the rezoned use is deemed economically
unfeasible because the property is inappropriate for that use, though, a
taking occurs. Often, an important factor will be whether surrounding
more intensive uses, such as industrial or commercial uses or major roads
or freeways, make a less intensive zoning designation, like a single-
family residential, unreasonable, therefore rendering the property rela-
tively useless. ' Therefore, as low-income and minority neighborhood
residents seek zoning changes in their communities, they should (1)
avoid using designations for private property that completely prevent
development, such as open space designations;'" (2) seek compatible
uses for contiguous parcels so that a single piece of land does not be-
come a low-intensity island or peninsula in the midst of a sea of high-
741. Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 860 (Cal. 1997) (identifying
ten non-exclusive, ad hoc factors that courts have found relevant in evaluating non-categorical (i.e.,
non-Lucas) regulatory takings claims); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (identifying three factors: (1) "The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant"; (2) "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations"; and (3) "the character of the governmental action').
742. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 727, at n.366.
743. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (1997) (leaving
no productive or financially feasible use of the land constitutes a taking); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1004
(showing that a denial of all economically feasible use of the land requires compensation without the
usual inquiry as to the public interest being advanced); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28
F.3d 1171, 1180-81 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (maintaining that all economic use must be destroyed before
there is a taking).
744. See Elias v. Town of Brookhaven, 783 F. Supp. 758,761-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (downzon-
ing from commercial to residential); HFH Ltd. v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 237, 242 (Cal. 1975)
(downzoning that reduced value of property by 80%); Turner v. City of Atlanta, 357 S.E.2d 802,
802-03 (Ga. 1987) (downzoning from commercial to office use, resulting in 67% reduction in prop-
erty value); Marshall v. Town of Topsfield, 433 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (Mass. App. CL 1982) (down-
zoning from retail to residential or community facilities); Ketchel v. Bainbridge Township, 607
N.E.2d 22, 26-27 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (restricting density that reduced value of property).
745. See Canlon Oil Co. v. City of Phoenix, 593 P.2d 656, 658-59 (Ariz. 1979) (recognizing
that merely decreasing property value does not constitute a taking); Grimpel Assocs. v. Cohalan, 361
N.E.2d 1022, 1023-24 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that depriving owner of all reasonable use of the land is
necessary for a taking); Central Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper Pike, 409 N.E.2d 258, 276-77 (Ohio
CL App. 1980) (recognizing that zoning of a property for an impossible use is unconstitutional).
746. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (holding that the government cannot enact new legislation
that deprives an owner of all economically viable use of a property without compensation for that
property).
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intensity uses; ' (3) explicitly connect any zoning changes to traditional
state nuisance law to the extent possible;' and (4) identify economically
viable permissible uses for property subject to new zoning schemes: ' In
fact, the land use model of environmental justice envisions local com-
munities identifying productive, yet healthy, safe, and compatible uses
for land, not merely prohibiting unwanted land uses.
Third, the doctrine of vested rights and equitable estoppel may pre-
vent local governments from stopping a development proposal once the
developer obtains some approvals and relies on them in proceeding with
the project-' The issue might arise, for example, when a grassroots
group learns of a proposed chemical recycling plant in the neighborhood
and influences the city either to rezone the property in question from
light industrial use (which permits "recycling facilities") to commercial
use or to amend the zoning code text to prohibit chemical recycling
plants in light industrial districts. If the developer has already received
some city approvals (e.g., a site plan approval, a conditional use permit,
or a building permit), at what point does he or she have a vested right in
the zoning that existed at the time he or she obtained the initial approv-
als?
The area of vested rights and equitable estoppel has been termed
"hopelessly muddled."' The doctrine of vested rights, grounded in con-
stitutional protections of private property rights against government in-
terference, and the doctrine of equitable estoppel, or perhaps more pre-
cisely equitable zoning estoppel, grounded in equitable protections
against unfair exercises of government zoning power, are distinct from
each other only in theory. In practice, the concepts are treated inter-
changeably' In addition, the rles governing when a landowner has
vested rights to proceed with development (or when a government regu-
lator is estopped from preventing the development) vary considerably
from state to state in ways that defy precise categorization:" Conceptu-
ally, states can be divided into early vesting jurisdictions, which give the
developer early certainty that zoning controls will not change in the
midst of the multi-permit approval process, and late vesting jurisdictions,
which require the developer to have obtained one of the later permits
given just before the final building phase takes place, such as a building
747. See supra notes 663-64 and accompanying text.
748. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1004 (restricting use according to state's property and nuisance laws
does not require just compensation).
749. See Elias, 783 F. Supp. at 761-62 (holding that leaving a property with a viable economic
use does not constitute a taking, even when the use is different from that allowed under prior zoning).
750. Robert M. Rhodes & Cathy M. Sellers, Vested Rights: Establishing Predictability in a
Changing Regulatory System, 20 STETSON L. REV. 475,478 (1991).
751. Grayson P. Hanes & J. Randall Minchew, On Vested Rights to Land Use and Develop-
ment, 46 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 373,377,383 (1989).
752. Id. at 382-83; Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 750, at 476.
753. Hanes & Minchew, supra note 751, at 379-80.
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permit.' However, cases vary so much, not only from state to state, but
even within states, that the conceptual distinctions do not closely match
actual case outcomes in any predictable way.:-
A developer claiming vested rights or equitable zoning estoppel
must establish three elements: (1) an official government act or omission
that would suggest approval of the project; (2) good faith reliance on the
government action; and (3) substantial change in position or incurrence
of extensive obligations and expenses toward developing the property.7'
Depending on the jurisdiction and the facts of the case, some of the fol-
lowing government approvals might result in vested rights: approval of a
site plan or planned unit development (PUD) when accompanied by a
rezoning (e.g., to reflect the approved PUD use); approval of a plat or
subdivision site plan; a conditional use (or special use) permit; a prelimi-
nary permit like a rough grading, clearing, paving, foundation, or public
improvement permit; informal assurances and representations by local
government officials; and arguably, conditional zoning by which the
developer commits to certain conditions in exchange for a specific zon-
ing designation.:" If the developer, in good faith, relies on the requisite
approvals by expending substantial amounts of money or making signifi-
cant physical changes to the land, any subsequent zoning changes that
are inconsistent with the earlier approvals will be invalid.' ' Therefore,
environmental justice advocates seeking zoning changes in their neigh-
borhood might not be able to stop developments and land uses for which
the developer has already received some initial approval(s). Grassroots
groups will need to monitor closely the approvals that local officials are
considering before such approvals are made and the developer obtains
vested rights. Neighborhood groups can avoid many of the problems
with vested rights, though, by formally putting a developer on notice that
they intend to seek a zoning change or other land use controls to prevent
the development, and by giving the notice before the developer spends
substantial sums on the project post-approval.
Fourth, the doctrine of nonconforming uses prevents a local gov-
ernment, when it makes a zoning change, from demanding the immediate
discontinuance of a use that was lawful at the time of the zoning change,
unless the use is a public nuisance.' The government, however, may
754. id. at 379-80 & n.19.
755. Id. at 379-80 & n. 8.
756. Id at 388, 398, 400; Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 750, at 478.
757. See Hanes & Minchew, supra note 751, at 388-98; Rhodes & Seller, supra note 750, at
482-84.
758. Hanes & Minchew, supra note 751, at 398-400; Rhodes & Seller, supra note 750, at 478-
82, 486-89.
759. See Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 272 P.2d 4, 7 (Cal. 1954)
(approving revocation of a prior permit when the use was deemed to be detrimental to public health
and safety or a nuisance); Dugas v. Town of Conway, 480 A.2d 71, 76 (N.H. 1984) (invalidating
new zoning regulations that extinguished existing nonconforming uses as unconstitutional depriva-
ton of vested property rights); Oswalt v. County of Ramsey, 371 N.W.2d 241,246 (Minn. CL App.
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require that the nonconforming use cease after a reasonable "amortiza-
tion" period. This is designed to balance the public interest in landowner
conformance with the zoning laws against private property rights, par-
ticularly in the opportunity to obtain a reasonable return on the land-
owner's investment. However, an owner of a nonconforming use can
generally be prohibited from changing, extending, enlarging, or structur-
ally altering the use, and will lose the right to the nonconformity if he or
she abandons or discontinues the use or upon total destruction of the
structures.:' Therefore, environmental justice land use strategies might
not effectively force changes in current actual land use patterns, but in-
stead would do so over time, as nonconforming uses cease to exist or are
required to terminate at the end of an amortization period.
2. State Preemption of Local NIMBYism
Another set of legal limits to land use regulation as an environ-
mental justice tool is state preemption of local land use regulations and
decisions that attempt to keep out LULUs. These laws are a response to
the NIMBY ("Not In My Backyard") phenomenon, in which local resi-
dents mount powerful and effective campaigns to prevent the location of
LULUs near them.' Environmental justice advocates have argued that
NIMBYism by white and upper-income communities has contributed to
the siting of noxious uses in less politically and economically powerful
neighborhoods inhabited by low-income people and minorities. How-
ever, just at the time when low-income and minority communities are
trying to prevent LULUs and environmental hazards in their neighbor-
hoods, state preemption laws designed to combat NIMBYism may hurt
these environmental justice efforts.
1985) (maintaining that existing nonconforming uses must be either permitted to remain or elimi-
nated by the use of eminent domain); Bachman v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 494 A.2d 1102, 1105 (Pa.
1985) (vesting property rights in lawful nonconforming uses unless they are a nuisance, abandoned,
or extinguished by eminent domain).
760. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 1950) (giving power
to a municipality to extinguish an existing use by ordinance); City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d
34, 44-45 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1954) (insisting that a nonconforming use be relocated or extin-
guished within five years); Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 152 N.E.2d 42, 45 (N.Y. 1958) (requiring
the termination of nonconforming uses over a given period of time).
761. RoHAN, supra note 506, § 41.03(l), at 41-59.
762. See Michael Dear, Understanding and Overcoming the NIMBY Syndrome, 58 APA J. 288
(1992); Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBr' Is a National Environmental Problem, 35 S.D. L REV. 198,
198 (1990); Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. 14. 495, 495 (1994);
Michael Heiman, From "Not in My Backyard" to "Not in Anyone's Backyard!": Grassroots Chal-
lenge to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 56 APA J. 359 (1990). For a view that the NIMBY
movement represents a valuable perspective on the public interest and that LULUs have unintemal-
ized social costs, see Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive
Justice, 15 B.C. ENVTn. APP. L REV. 437 (1988).
763. BuLARD, DuMPNG IN DIXmE, supra note 7, at 46, 108; Gauna, supra note 6, at 32-33.
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There are two basic types of LULUs subject to preemption in order
to overcome local opposition to their siting. The first is hazardous waste
management facilities, of which there are three approaches" One ap-
proach, "super review," occurs when the private developer of a hazard-
ous waste facility chooses a potential site and applies for a permit from a
state agency. The agency then reviews the environmental impacts and
presents all applications that meet state environmental criteria to a spe-
cial siting board that gathers public input, but is primarily designed to
neutralize public opposition and fear. A second approach is "site desig-
nation," in which the state agency-not the private developer-formu-
lates a list of possible sites that are candidates for hazardous waste facili-
ties. In addition to the "super review" or "site designation" approaches,
some states expressly prohibit localities from using land use require-
ments to burden the operation of hazardous waste facilities. This third
approach, followed only in California and Florida, is known as "local
control." Under this last approach, state law does not preempt local
regulation of hazardous waste facility siting, and localities are free to
enact strict land use regulations to keep out all hazardous waste sites.
The other type of LULU siting that is protected from local opposition by
state statutory or judicial exemption is the siting of certain residential
facilities, such as group homes for the mentally disabled '  halfway
houses," and low-income housing.' State preemption laws of both types
create some very real political and legal difficulties for grassroots envi-
ronmental justice groups.
Even though state laws might override zoning controls that prevent
hazardous waste facilities or other LULUs in low-income or minority
neighborhoods, there are several important reasons to seek these zoning
controls nonetheless. Zoning that does not permit a specified LULU
(e.g., a hazardous waste facility) suggests to state regulators that the use
764. The three major approaches are uniformly summarized in several law review articles, and
the discussion here is a synthesis of these summaries. See Hasler, supra note 257, at 456-57; Mank,
supra note 6, at 348-51; Audrey Wright, Unequal Protection Under the Environmental Laws: Re-
viewing the Evidence on Environmental Racism and the Inequities of Environmental Legislation, 39
WAYNE L. REv. 1725, 1731-35 (1993); Godsil, supra note 6, at 402-07. For an example of federal
preemption of a local attempt to ban PCB disposal in a predominantly African American area, see
Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276,289-90 (D. N.C. 1981).
765. See City of Clebume v. Clebure Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (holding the
denial of conditional use permit for mentally disabled to be a violation of Equal Protection Clause
founded on "irrational prejudice"); see, e.g., Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 5116 (Deering 1982) (designating a group home of six or fewer mentally disabled adults as resi-
dential use for zoning purposes).
766. E.g., Nicholson v. Connecticut Half-way House, 218 A.2d 383, 384-86 (Conn. 1966)
(finding a halfway house for prison parolees a residential use).
767. See MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. Ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (1973) (authorizing the state to preempt
local exclusionary zoning); see also Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel (Mount Laurel ID, 456 A.2d 390, 410 (NJ. 1983) (holding that a county's zoning laws could
not absolutely ban mobile homes); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel (Mount Laurel 1), 336 A.2d 713, 713 (NJ. 1975) (holding that zoning laws must allow for
low and moderate income housing).
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is incompatible with surrounding land uses--a type of presumption in
effect-whereas if the property is zoned to allow the LULU, the state
regulators are more likely to believe that it is compatible with the neigh-
boring land uses. If the local zoning allows the LULU, there may never
be close scrutiny of its siting by any level of government agency, while
an attempt by the locality to exclude it could put pressure on state regu-
lators to find reasons to deny state permits. The zoning might also dis-
courage potential developers or operators of LULUs from attempting to
site the LULUs in that area. They might perceive that the neighborhood
is politically active and opposed to such LULUs, which could lead to a
costly and time-consuming approval process. They also might want to
avoid a legal dispute to enforce the preemption.
Furthermore, the very process of developing land use plans and
regulations that reflect neighborhood goals and obtaining their enactment
by local officials will tend to promote a more politically active and aware
grassroots group. The group can mobilize more quickly and effectively
to oppose a LULU proposal, even if decided at the state level, than if the
community forms a group for the first time upon learning of the specific
proposal. In addition, there are many LULUs that local residents might
want to exclude and many beneficial land uses that they might want to
include, beyond the few land uses that are the subject of state control. In
other words, there are many LULUs that are not subject to state preemp-
tion and can be effectively precluded by local zoning. Even if a land use
plan will not effectively protect against every LULU, it should address
some of the inequities in the distribution of land use patterns, such as the
high concentration of industrial and commercial uses in many low-
income communities of color. Therefore, despite the obstacles presented
by state preemption laws, local land use regulation can be an effective
environmental justice tool.
3. Politics
The final limits to land use regulation as an environmental justice
strategy are political and economic. How successful, as a practical mat-
ter, will grassroots neighborhood groups be in changing land use patterns
in low-income communities and communities of color? There is reason
for a mix of sober realism and thoughtful optimism.
At the most practical level, residents of some, or perhaps many,
low-income and minority neighborhoods will encounter apathy, antipa-
thy, or paternalistic co-optation by local planning staff and elected offi-
cials. Local government is likely to regard changes to existing industrial
or commercial zoning as politically or fiscally inconvenient, especially
when these uses cannot be relocated to higher-income, lower-minority
areas without political conflict. Indeed, many local governments engage
in "fiscal zoning," favoring industrial and commercial uses because these
uses generate tax revenues without creating expensive demands for local
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services in the way that single-family residences do, particularly through
public school costs:" However, single-family residential neighborhoods,
particularly if occupied by upper income people, are desirable for rea-
sons other than a pure analysis of marginal costs and revenues would
indicate. But cities and counties might offset the costs of these neighbor-
hoods by reducing expenditures on older neighborhoods where industrial
and commercial uses have intruded: generally low-income and minority
neighborhoods. ' Therefore, fiscal zoning practices can have a double
negative effect on low-income communities of color:. (1) the attraction of
industrial and commercial uses to those areas, and (2) pressures on local
governments to decrease public spending on physical infrastructure,
schools, and other public services in those areas.
In addition, owners of industrially or commercially zoned property
will often oppose downzoning of those parcels, the imposition of addi-
tional controls via overlay districts or performance zoning, and demands
of exactions. These landowners are likely to have financial and political
capital to spend in seeking to defeat an environmental justice land use
plan. The local community may not be united in its goals, and disagree-
ment within the area could undermine strategies to allow only safe and
healthy land uses compatible with local residences. In other words, some
or all of a low-income minority neighborhood might embrace one or
more LULUs or other intensive land uses, and this fact may be a political
reality for opponents.' Furthermore, development of a land use regula-
tory plan for a low-income neighborhood of color is likely to involve
financial costs and volunteer effort, as well as sustained political activity
in the form of organization, publicity, education, study, lobbying, elec-
toral campaigning and voting, and perhaps even protest. Finally, the na-
ture of the land use planning and regulatory model requires continual
involvement in, and monitoring of, implementation. Developers, land-
owners, and LULU operators may seek conditional use permits, vari-
ances, and rezonings, among other changes or exceptions to whatever
regulations the local residents have helped to shape. Failure of grassroots
environmental justice groups to participate effectively in these subse-
quent government decisions could undo all that the initial land use strat-
egy had achieved.
These practical concerns raise questions about the extent to which
land use controls are inherently flawed. Some scholars imply that the
combination of zoning's exclusionary nature and society's racism leads
768. ELICKSON & TARLOCK, supra note 539, at 738-39.
769. Id. at 740.
770. See, e.g., Kevin Gover & Jana L Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism: One
Tribe's Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country, 63 U.
COLO. L. REV. 933, 936-42 (1992) (discussing a California Indian tribe's acceptance of the devel-
opment of a solid waste facility on their land); Jeff Kass, Homes and Shops at Odds, LA. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 1997, at B3 (noting that some residents support business development in their communities
to increase property values).
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to segregation of races, exclusion of people of color from desirable areas,
and placement of unwanted land uses in neighborhoods of color (i.e.,
expulsive zoning)."' Other scholars argue that zoning promotes balkani-
zation by socioeconomic class and geography, resulting in suburban
sprawl and protection of the economic interests of the development
community (i.e., business interests, land developers, financial institu-
tions, and the like) and/or suburban homeowners.'m Zoning can also be
seen as a tool of parochial local interests that want to keep socially nec-
essary land uses (LULUs) out of their communities, in other words, a
tool of NIMBYism--the worst of localism and pluralism, an impediment
to the larger public good.' According to some, land use controls inap-
propriately interfere with, or even supplant, the efficient workings of
private markets and privately developed norms and agreements about
land use." Others would argue that land use regulations are a means for
government capture of public benefits or power at the expense of private
property or liberty."
These critiques, in turn, raise questions about how local land use
decisions are made. In other words, will low-income and minority neigh-
borhoods have a fair and effective opportunity to influence the land use
policies that affect them? The difficulty in answering this question stems
from the lack of a single, coherent, comprehensive theory of local poli-
cymaking. 6
If land use decisions are controlled primarily by local elites, who
serve the private economic interests of either the development and busi-
ness community or upper- and middle-income homeowners in areas
zoned primarily single-family residential (i.e., suburban and suburban-
like communities)," low-income and minority people will likely remain
771. Dubin, supra note 1, at 741-44; Rabin, supra note 1, at 101.
772. MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTz: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES 151-219
(1992); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I--The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1990); Jerry Frg, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047,
1047-48 (1996).
773. Orlando E. Delogu, The Dilemma of Local Land Use Control: Power Without Responsi-
bility, 33 MAINE L. REV. 15, 16-20 (1981); Delogu, supra note 762, at 198.
774. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines As
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHL. L. REV. 681,682-87 (1973); Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land
Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 30-31 (1981).
775. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 263-73 (1985); ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, PLANNING FOR
SERFDOM: LEGAL ECONOMIC DISCOURSE AND DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT 140 (1991); BERNARD
H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITuTION, THE COURTS, AND LAND-USE
REGULATION 179-201 (1997).
776. For a discussion of three different theories of environmental policy making and their
failure to encompass an environmental justice theory of political participation in environmental
decisions, see Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Para-
digm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVrL L.J. 3 (1998) (discussing regulatory expertise, pluralism, and civic
republican models).
777. See JOE R. FEAGIN & ROBERT PARKER, BUILDING AMERICAN CITIES: THE URBAN REAL
ESTATE GAME 2 (1990); DENNIS R. JUDD, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN CITIES: PRIVATE POWER
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"outsiders" with very little real influence over land use decisions.
These decisions will continue to protect high-income, low-minority
neighborhoods from non-residential uses, while catering to industrial
and commercial interests by placing those activities in the "subordi-
nated" low-income and minority neighborhoods. Similarly, if local land
use decisions typically reflect persistent societal racism tm minority
neighborhoods will continue to suffer a higher proportion of LULUs
and intensive zoning patterns. According to this theory, local officials
intentionally or subconsciously select these communities for greater
burdens or tolerate private and institutional forces that exacerbate ine-
qualities.
If the primary model of land use decision making is interest group
pluralismtm grassroots groups from low-income and minority commu-
nities will fare much better than if only elite interests have captured the
decision making process. Grassroots success will depend on their abil-
ity to organize, identify goals and strategies, exert pressure, persist in
participating in land use decisions, and bargain effectively with other
interest groups and government officials to obtain political benefits.
There are, however, two normative sides to interest group pluralism.
One view celebrates the diversity of interests represented in a blatantly
political process of "demanding, wrangling, and influencing," and as-
serts that the roar of many groups seeking policies which benefit their
members' interests reflects overall citizen preferences and prevents any
single group from obtaining too much power.' The other view is
aghast at the "capture" of public policy making and policy implement-
ing bodies by well-organized special interest groups." It observes the
vast differences in power and effectiveness among groups and the ten-
dency for policy outcomes that serve private interests to the detriment
of the collective good, whether that collective good is defined in terms
of equity or efficiency or both.' Although low-income and minority
neighborhood groups seeking their visions of good land use policy will
certainly add to the range of interests represented, they could find
themselves outmatched in political and economic power by well-
organized industrial and commercial interests. Furthermore, to the ex-
tent that they buy into pluralism as a dominant model, they may lose
their "moral voice": their claims that changes in zoning patterns in their
AND PUBLIC POUCY 1-9 (1984); Davis, supra note 772, at 151-219; Joe R. Feagin, Arenas of Con-
flict: Zoning and Land Use Reform in Critical Political-Economic Perspective, in ZONING AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 1, at 73, 84.
778. Dubin, supra note 1, at 741-44; Rabin, supra note 1, at 101; see also Ford, supra note
511,at 1843.
779. See, e.g., EDMUND M. BuRKE, A PARTICIPATORY APPROACH TO URBAN PLANNING 29-
32, 41 (1979) (contending that zoning furthers a social hierarchy); Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note
726, at 36 (reconstructing the role of democratic pluralism in land use litigation).
780. BuRKE, supra note 779, at 27.
781. See Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 726, at 36.
782. id. at 37.
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neighborhoods reflect just policy (i.e., are the "right" result), instead of
merely the preferences of yet another group.
Civic republican theory suggests that local policymaking is or
should be a deliberative public discourse about the common good and a
participatory process of developing civic virtue.' Alternatively, local
land use policies could be seen as the result of a negotiation "game,"
either between the developer and government officials, or among a
range of interested parties, including the developer, the property
owner(s) and possessor(s) (if different from the developer), neighbors
of various types, environmental groups, various government agencies
perhaps with competing or coextensive jurisdiction, and even scientific
and legal professionals.' M
One possible reason for competing theories about land use politics
and decision making is that each explains some portion of a complex and
variable reality. The process of land use regulation inevitably involves
some type(s) of negotiation. But the identity and number of participants,
their relative bargaining strength, their actual influence, whether the ne-
gotiation focuses more on positions or interests or principles, the role of
external factors, the economic efficiency of the process (transaction
costs) and outcomes (Pareto optimality), the fairness of the process (pro-
cedural justice) and outcomes (distributive justice), the impact on civic
virtue, and other factors will likely vary widely from locality to locality
and from decision to decision. Thus, it seems doubtful that the land use
regulatory process inherently or inevitably excludes low-income and
minority communities from effective participation.
Despite the critiques of land use regulation, the land use model of
environmental justice remains a useful approach to addressing envi-
ronmental injustice and the goals of low-income and minority commu-
nities. First, land use controls---even if they could be characterized as
flawed-are here to stay. Zoning and similar regulatory controls over
land use are widely used in the United States, and there is little evi-
dence that local governments pay much attention to academic criticisms
of the institution of land use regulation.' M As this article demonstrates,
however, low-income neighborhoods of color by and large do not enjoy
783. See STEPHEN L. ELKIN, CITY AND REGIME IN THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 150-51 (1987);
Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493, 1503-05 (1988); Joseph P. Viterritti,
Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity Under Constitutional Feder-
alism, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 113, 124 (1996). For general discussions of civic republican the-
ory, see BRUCE A. WILLIAMS & ALBERT R. MATHENY, DEMOCRACY, DIALOGUE, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: THE CONTESTED LANGUAGES OF SOCIAL REGULATION (1995);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1969).
784. See Dana, supra note 716, at 1288, 1294; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the
Critics, 10 J. LAND USE& ENVrL. L. 45,81 (1994).
785. Karkkainen, supra note 784, at 46; Andrew J. Cappel, Note, A Walk Along Willows: Pat-
terns of Land Use Coordination in Pre-Zoning New Haven (1870-1926), 101 YALE LJ. 617, 618
(1991).
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the same zoning protections and benefits that high-income, non-
minority neighborhoods enjoy. Unless courts correct these inequities,'
which seems highly unlikely,' the primary means of change will be
political activity in attempting to influence land use decisions and zon-
ing patterns.
Second, land use regulation serves several important functions,
including protection of neighbors against harmful or noxious activities
on nearby land; comprehensive, area-wide, coordinated planning of land
uses and development patterns; protection of private property values
from the impact of neighboring uses; prevention of development from
placing greater burdens on public funds for infrastructure and services
than the development generates in tax revenues; and protection of col-
lective rights and interests in the character of the neighborhood.7' In
addition, political pressures and the options of voice (participation) or
exit (relocating to another jurisdiction) are effective constraints on the
potential for abuse in the arena of land use regulation.' Involvement of
low-income and minority neighborhood residents in developing and
implementing land use policies enhances these various goals or values
of the land use regulatory system.
Third, if, as Luke Cole has argued, environmental justice is an issue
of power,'m the poor and people of color should seek power wherever it
is exercised, including in the land use decisions that shape both the
quality of their neighborhoods and their exposure to harmful or un-
wanted activities and pollutants. Furthermore, they can exercise power
more effectively with respect to land use decisions than with respect to
environmental permitting decisions, because land use decisions are
made at the local level to which grassroots groups have greater access"M
and are less scientifically and legally technical than environmental deci-
sions. Layperson input tends to shape local land use regulation more
than national environmental regulation.
Most importantly, not only does land use planning and regulation
theoretically embrace neighborhood-based citizen participation,m but
786. See Dubin, supra note 1, at 782-800 (urging judicial protection of zoning in minority
communities).
787. See discussion supra notes 278-338 and accompanying text (discussing civil rights re-
sponses to environmental injustice).
788. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS
APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 19 (1985); Karkkainen, supra note 784, at 47-50;
Larson, supra note 118, at 235; Cappel, supra note 785, at 618-19.
789. WILLIAM A. FIsCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 289 (1995).
790. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 642.
791. See Arnold, supra note 465, at 35-36; Barton IL Thompson, Jr., The Search for Regula-
tory Alternatives, 15 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. viii, at x-xi (1996) (arguing that the environmental justice
movement, like the private property rights movement, is about devolution of power from national
and state levels to local community levels).
792. See EDMUND M. BURKE, A PARTICIPATORY APPROACH TO URBAN PLANNING 13 (1979);
MICHAEL FAGENCIE, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING 1-13 (1977); NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY
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empirical evidence shows that citizen participation can make a differ-
ence,' including in the arena of land use regulation and environmental
justice. Early examples of environmental justice groups seeking local
land use policies suggest that low-income and minority neighborhood
residents can effectively organize, exercise power, make their voices
heard, and influence policies about zoning and land use issues that affect
them.' Despite political and legal limitations, environmental justice
groups actively seek and obtain changes to zoning laws to reflect the
goals of neighborhood residents and a more equitable distribution of
land use patterns.
VI. CONCLUSION
Low-income communities and communities of color experience not
only a higher proportion of environmental hazards and LULUs, but also
a higher proportion of zoning for intensive land uses, such as industrial
uses. With a growing grassroots environmental justice movement, these
communities-like the fictional Milagro, New Mexico--are looking for
miracles (milagros).
However, there are not easy answers or quick fixes to environ-
mental injustice. It is a complex problem with empirical, political, le-
gal, environmental, and economic dimensions. One model of environ-
mental justice features opposition to existing or proposed LULUs and
environmental hazards in low-income and minority communities.
Another model, presented in this article, calls for these communities to
become involved in land use planning and regulation. Through com-
prehensive planning, rezoning of inner-city neighborhoods, use of
flexible zoning techniques and exactions, and political involvement in
the shaping and negotiating of local land use policies, residents of low-
income neighborhoods and neighborhoods of color can proactively de-
fine their visions for healthy communities. They also can seek to prevent
would-be polluters and operators of LULUs and other intensive land
uses from selecting sites in their communities initially. In the event that
they still have to oppose siting proposals or seek changes to existing
facilities, they have a stronger case that public policy supports their po-
sition. Local residents also may choose to allow or encourage develop-
ment that meets their economic, social, and environmental goals. Land
AND PLANNING 3-5 (Phillip L. Clay & Robert M. Hollister eds., 1983); Karkkainen, supra note 784,
at 83; Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 726, at 1.
793'. See M. MARGARET CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED STATES 152-57
(1985); Michael Barrette, City of Anaheim: Avon-Dakota-Eton Neighborhood Association,
PLANNING, March 1994, at 16; Mary Lou Gallagher, Gila River Indian Community Public Partici-
pation Program, PLANNING, March 1993, at 12; Michelle Gregory, Champaign Neighborhood
Wellness Action Plan, PLANNING, March 1994, at 14; Scott Martelle, Don't Tread on Us: Commu-
niy Activists Show How Democracy Works Between Votes, LA. TIMES, May 25, 1997, at B 1.
794. See supra notes 137-63 and accompanying text.
795. See supra note 2.
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use planning and regulation foster choice, self-determination, and self-
definition for local neighborhoods, not paternalism that insists that there
is a single correct environmental justice goal.'
The land use planning and regulation model of environmental jus-
tice is not the miraculous cure for environmental injustice, nor is it a
replacement for the opposition model. It is an additional approach that
has faith in low-income people and people of color who want to build
healthy, safe, moral communities. It envisions that the milagros are al-
ready at work in the local neighborhoods and the people who live there.
796. Compare Metzger, supra note 148 (advocating a paternalistic approach to environmental
justice), with Gover & Walker, supra note 770 (discussing a California Indian Tribe's deliberations
about and ultimate acceptance of the development of a solid waste facility on their land).
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APPENDIX:m
Crry: ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACT # 219.04
Percent persons below, poverty 2.4
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 83,296
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 77.9
Hispanic: white & other 5.0
Black (including Hispanic) 2.1
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 14.7
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.3
Other nn-Hispanic 0
Percent arca in tract by zoning designation
CL-HS, Limited Hillside Commercial 0.10
CO, Office & Professional Commercial 0.07
RM-2400, Multiple-Family Residential 0.81
RM-3000, Multiple-Family Residential 4.03
RS-500, Single-Family Residential 0.87
RS-7200, Single-Family Residential 6.15
RS-HS-l00I0, Single-Family Hillside Residential 44.94
RS-HS-22000, Single-Family Hillside Residential 5.21
RS-HS-43000, Single-Family Hillside Residential 37.81
Crry: ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACr# 874.02
Percent persons below poverty 20.05
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 28,097
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 24.4
Hispanic: white & other 70.3
Black (including Hispanic) 1.6
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 3.2
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.4
Other non-Hispanic 0.1
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
CO. Office & Professional Commercial 0.89
CH, Heavy Commercial 0.11
CL, Limited Commercial 15.99
ML, Limited Industrial 23.74
RM-1200, Multiple-Family Residential 17.03
RM-2400, Multiple-Family Residential 7.87
RM-3000, Multiple-Family Residential 0.52
RS-7200, Single-Family Residential 19.99
RS-A-43000, Single-Family Residential 2.75
SP 92-2, Specific Plan-Resort 11.12
797. The information contained in this Appendix was compiled by Craig Anthony (Tony)
Arnold utilizing data from the 1990 census and zoning maps. See supra Part II.B (describing meth-
odology for the study).
19981 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND LAND USE REGULATION 141
CrrY ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACT # 874.03
Percent persons below poverty 19.9
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 29,010
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 30.5
Hispanic: white & other 64.7
Black (including Hispanic) 2.8
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 2.1
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
CO, Office & Professional Commercial 1.75
CL, Limited Commercial 20.84
ML, Limited Industrial 3.34
RM-1200, Multiple-Family Residential 12.50
RS-7200, Single-Family Residential 34.39
RS-A-43000, Single-Family Residential 23.55
SP 92-2, Specific Plan-Resort 3.63
Cr'r: COSTA MESA, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACT # 638.02
Percent persons below poverty 4.3
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 64,298
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 88.3
Hispanic: white & other 5.7
Black (including Hispanic) 0
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 5.8
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.2
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
GC, General Commercial 16.67
HDR, High Density Residential 5.05
LDR, Low Density Residential 57.82
PU, Public Use 20.46
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CrY: COSTA MESA, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACT# 637
Percent persons below poverty 15.6
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 29,422
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 54.9
Hispanic: white & other 38.6
Black (including Hispanic) 0.9
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 5.2
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.2
Other non-Hispanic 0.2
Percent area in tram by zoning designation
CC, Commercial Center 8.46
GC, General Commercial 2.32
HDR, High Density Residential 3225
LDR, Low Density Residential 15.11
LI, Limited Industry 4.79
MDR, Medium Density Residential 10.40
PU, Public Use 8.78
UCC, Urban Center Commercial 17.90
CITY: ORANGE, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACT# 219.12
Percent persons below poverty 3.7
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 89,727
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 86.0
Hispanic: white & other 6.0
Black (including Hispanic) 1.0
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 6.8
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.2
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
A-1, Agricultural 1.50
MI, tight Industrial 2.84
P-1, Public Institution 0.55
PC. Planned Community 49.83
RI-10, Single-Family Residential 0.75
RI-20, Single-Family Residential 1.57
RI-40, Single-Family Residential 11.87
RI-6 Single-Family Residential 0.53
RI-8, Single-Family Residential 11.17
RO, Recreation Open Space 11.33
SO, Sand & Gravel Extraction 8.06
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CrrY: ORANoE, CAmIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACr # 762.04
Percent persons below poverty 19.4
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 25,313
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanc 23.5
Hispanic: white & other 66.7
Black (including Hispani) 2.0
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 6.9
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispani) 0.8
Other non-Hispanic 0.2
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
Cl. Limited Business 0.33
CZ General Business 0.21
CR, Commercial Recreation 19.89
MI, Light Industrial 3.98
M-2, Industrial Manufacturing 64.86
MH, Mobile Home Residential 2.41
OP, Office Professional 0.03
P-L Public Institution 2.45
RO, Recreation Open Space 0.16
R2-6. Duplex Residential 0.72
R-3, Multiple-Farily Residential 4.95
CITY: PITrSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENSUS TRACT# 1401.98
Percent persons below poverty 7.3
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 82.553
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 86.9
Hispanic: white & other 1.6
Black (including Hispanic) 2.8
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 8.7
American Indian, Eskimo, Almt (including Hispanic) 0
Other. non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
Ri, One-Family Residential 26.39
R -A, One-Family Residence 26.18
R2, Two-Family Residence 4.59
R3, Multiple-Family Residence 1.33
RS, Multiple-Family Residence 1.10
RP, Residential Planned Unit Development 2.96
I-C, Institutional-Civic 33.68
S, Special 13.76
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CITY: PITrSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENsuS TRACT # 1404
Percent persons below poverty 3.3
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 75,269
Percent persona by race
White: non-Hispanic 95.4
Hispanic: white & other 0.7
Black (including Hispanic) 1.9
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 2.0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other. non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
C I, Neighborhood Retail 0.73
RI, One-Family Residence 30.70
R I -A, One-Family Residence 35.32
R2, Two-Family Residence 23.41
S, Special 9.84
CITY: PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENSUS TRAcT# 1106
Percent persons below poverty 4.5
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 41,439
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 86.4
Hispanic: white & other 0.7
Black (including Hispanic) 11.2
Asian & Pacific Ilander (including Hispanic) 1.5
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other. non-Hispanic 0.3
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
RI, One-Family Residence &82
R2, Two-Family Residence 15.24
R3, Multiple-Family Residence 5.03
R4, Multiple-Family Residence 2.01
S, Special 70.90
CITY: PrlTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENSUS TRACT # 509
Percent persons below poverty 64.1
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 6,039
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 2.4
Hispanic: white & other 0
Black (including Hispanic) 96.2
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0
American Indian. Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 1.1
Other. non-Hispanic 0.3
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
M2, Limited Industil 1.94
R4, Multiple-Family Residence 57.74
S, Special 40.33
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CITY: PrITSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENSUS TRACT# 510
Percent persons below poverty 73.2
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 5,770
Percemt persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 0.6
Hispanic: white & other 0
Black (including Hispanic) 98.9
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0.5
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
1-C, Institutional-Civic 25.35
R2, Two-Family Residence 2.02
R4, Multiple-Family Residence 1.47
RS, Multiple-Family Residence 1.14
RP, Residential Planned Unit Development 57.19
S, Special 12.84
CITY: PrFSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENSUS TRACT# 1016
Percent persons below poverty 55.4
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 7,732
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 7.6
Hispanic: white & other 0
Black (including Hispanic) 91.9
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0
American Idian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.5
Other. non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
R2, Two-Family Residence 22.61
R3, Multiple-Family Residence 9.10
RP, Residential Planned Unit Development 56.71
S, Special 11.58
CrT: PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENSUS TRACT# 2609.98
Percent persons below poverty 76.4
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 5,811
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 2.8
Hispanic: white & other 0.2
Black (including Hispanic) 96.3
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.7
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
A 1, Commercial-Residential Associated 1.35
MI, Limited Industrial 1.21
RI, One-Family Residence 50.64
R2, Two-Family Residence 1.70
S, Special 45.10
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1
CITY: PITr SBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENSUS TRACT # 2808
Perent persons below poverty 77.0
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 5,736
Percent persons by rae
White. non-Hispanc 10.5
ispnc white & other 0
Black (including Hispanic) 87.8
Asian & Pacific Ilander (including Hispanic) 0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 1.7
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent ares in tract by zoning designation_
C1, Neighbothood Retail 0.74
CP, Commercial Planned Unit Development 2.85
N3, Light Industrial 31.91
M4, Heavy Industrial 18.20
RI, One-Family Residence 5.94
R2, Two-Family Residence 0.31
R3, Multiple-Family Residence 13.57
RP, Residential Planned Unit Development 9.43
S, Special 17.05
CrTY: SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS; CENSUS TRACT# 1204
Percent persona below poverty 6.5
Median househoid incoie (1989 U.S. $) 62,705
Percent persons by race
White: on-Hpaic 90.5
Hispanic: white & other 8.2
Black (including Hispanic) 0.1
Asian & Pacific blander (including Hispanic) 0.7
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other non-xHpanic 0.5
Percent area in tact by zoning designation
Single-Family Residence 99.00
Commercial !.00
CITY: SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS; CENSUS TRACT# 1914.02
Percent persons below poverty 3.4
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 85,099
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 83.3
Hispanic- white & other 12.4
Black (including Hispanic) 1.3
Asian & Pacific Isander (including Hispanic) 3.0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in ac by zoning designation
B-2, Business 2.14
B-3, Business 0.66
R-l, Single.Family Resilence 95.22
R-3, Multiple-Family Residence 1.98
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Crry: SAN ANMTNIO, TaXAS; CENSUS TRAcr# 1915.02
Percent persons below poverty 4.3
Median household income (1989 U.S. S) 63,657
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 79.6
Hispanic: white & other 16.9
Black (including Hispanic) 2.4
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0.9
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.2
Other non-Hispanic 0




R-1, Single Family Residence 85.96
R-3, Multiple Family Residence 6.07
R-7, Small Lot Home 4.23
CITy: SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS; CENSUS TRACr# 1105
Percent ersons below poverty 81.8
Median household income (3989 U.S. $) 4,999
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 1.8
Hispanic: white & other 96.6
Black (including Hispanic) 0.3
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.3
Other am-Hispanic 1.1




I-1, Light Industry 14.40
K, Commercial 1.98
L, Firt Manufacturing 30.16
M, Second Manufacturing 3.74
R-3, Multiple Family Residence 34.92
R-7, Small Lot Home 9.79
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CITY: SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS; CENSUS TRACT# 1305
Percent persons below poverty 52.0
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 9,731
Percent persona by race
White:. non-Hispanic 6.4
Hispanic: white & other 23.6
Black (including Hispanic) 69.6
Asian & Pacific Ilander (including Hispanic) 0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.4
Other non-Hispanic 0




B-2 NA, Non-Alcohol Sales 1.35
B-3, Business 0.12
B-3 R, Restrictive Business 1.81
C, Apartment 2.16
F, Local Retail 2.68
HISTORIC 0.04
1-t, Ught Industry 1.64
J, Commercial 2.62
Ai, Commercial 0.66
R-2, Two Family Residence 28.68
R-3, Multiple Family Residence 13.17
R-3 CC, Multiple Family Ridence 4.21
CITY: SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS; CENSUS TRACT# 1307.85
Percent persona below poverty 64.3
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 9,169
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 8.0
Hispanic: white & other 70.4
Black (including Hispanic) 20.0
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 1.6
Other: non-Hispanic 0





F, Local Retail 0.44
G, Local Retail 0.62
J, Commercial 30.65
JJ, Commercial 0.50
L Frst Manufacturing 36.59
0-1, Office 0.46
R-1, Single Family Residence 13.48
R-2, Two Family Residence 0.06
R-2A, Three & Four Family Residence 0.30
R-5, Single Family Residence 0.88
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Cr-y: SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS; CENsus TRACT# 1702
Percent persons below poverty 54.4
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 8,999
Percent persons by race
White non-Hispanic 2.6
Hispanic: white & other 96.8
Black (including Hispanic) 0.2
Asian & Pacif Isander (including Hispanic) 0.2
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.1
Other non-Hispanic 0




B-2 NA, Non-Alcohol Sals 0.04
B-3, Business 2.40
B-3 NA, Non-Alcohol Sales 1.75
B-3 R, Restrictive Business 1.05
F, Local Retail 7.22
G, Local Retail 1.56




R-1, Single Family Residence 0.35
R-3, Multiple Family Residence 5.67
R-5, Single Family Residence 9.80
R-7, Small Lot Home 38.05
CrrY: SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TIRACr # 753.03
Percent persons below poverty 7.7
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 54,346
Percent persons by race
White. non-Hispanic 73.3
Hispanic: white & other 20.6
Black (including Hispanic) 1.6
Asian & Pacific Ilander (including Hispanic) 3.1
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.8
Other non-Hispanic 0.7
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
Cl, Community Commercial 4.90
CS, Arterial Commercial 2.78
0, Open Space Land 0.69
P, Professional 8.99
RI, Sigle-Family Residence 81.05
R3, Multiple-Family Residence 1.59
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CrrY: SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACT# 744.03
Percent persons below poverty 28.1
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 24,408
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 13.6
Hispanic:. white & other 74.9
Black (including Hispanic) 3.9
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 7.6
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
C2, Generl Commercial 0.20
C4, Planned Shopping Center 0.45
MI, Ught Industrial 88.28
M2, Heavy Industrial 2.26
RI, Single-Family Residence 3.43
R3, Mukiple-Family Residence 2.07
R4, Suburban Aparment 0.75
SD-16, Specific Development 1.54
SD-56, Specific Development 1.02
CmTY: SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACT# 749.01
Percent persons below poverty 27.5
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 24,931
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 4.0
Hispanic: white & other 91.6
Black (including Hispanic) 0.7
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 2.0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.9
Other non-Hispanic 0.7
Percent area in amt by zoning designation
Cl, Community Commercial 4.83
C2, General Commercial 1.72
0, Open Space Land 13.43
P, Professional 10.22
RI, Single-Family Residence 17.88
R2, Two-Family Residence 25.99
R3, Multiple-Family Residence 7.47
SD-18, Specific Development 0.77
SD-40, Specific Development 13.09
SD-55, Specific Development 1.60
SP-l, Specific Plan 2.99
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CrrY: SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TAcr# 750.02
Percent persons below poverty 33.6
Median household income (1989US$) 15,508
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 12.4
Hispanic: white & other 80.4
Black (including Hispanic) 3.4
Asian & Pacific blander (including Hispanic) 3.2
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.3
Other non-Hispanic 0.2
Percnt area in tra by zoning designation
C2, General Commercial 13.36
C3, Central Business 15.92
C5, Arterial Commercial 3.19
GC, Government Center 16.96
0, Open Space Land 9.11
P, Professional 15.83
R2, Two-Family Residence 6.22
R3, Multiple-Family Residence 6.21
SD, Specific Development 8.78
SD-40, Specific Development 4.42
CITY: WICHITA, KANSAS; CENSUS TRACT# 73.01
Percent persons below poverty 2.6
Medin household income (1989 U.S. $) 64,495
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 95.0
Hispanic: white & other 0.3
Black (including Hispanic) 0.7
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 3.1
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.9
Other: non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
A or TF-3, Two-Family Residential 3.05
AA or SF-6, Single-Family Residential 67.95
B, Multi-Family Residential 2.48
BB or GO, General Office 3.03
Country Club 16.68
LC, Limited Commercial 6.74
MF-29, Multi-Family Residential 0.06
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
CITY: WClHrrA (EASTBOROUGH), KANSAS; CENSUS TRACT # 74
Percent persons below poverty 2.8
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 76,305
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 97.1
Hispanic, white & other 0.2
Black (including Hispanic) 2.1
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0.6
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other: non-Hispanic 0
Percent mae in tract by zoning designation
Single-Family Residential 100.00
CITY: WICHITA, KANSAS; CENSUS TRACT # 8
Percent persons below poverty 47.5
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 9,673
Parent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 3.0
Hispanic: white & other 0
Black (including Hispanic) 95.7
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 1.3
Other. non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
B, Multi-Family Residential 15.60
GC, General Commercial 0.88
GO, General Office 0.66
LC, Limited Commercial 4.11
TF-3, Two-Family Residential 78.76
CITY: WICHITA, KANSAS; CENSUS TRACT# 41
Percent persons below poverty 66.6
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 6,248
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispank 40.9
Hispanic: white & other 9.7
Black (including Hispanic) 45.9
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 3.5
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other. non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
B, Multi-Family Residential 6.77
CBD, Central Business District 48.93
GC, General Commercial 18.18
GO, General Office 1.05
LC. Limited Commercial 2.52
U, Limited Industrial 22.55
[Vol. 76:1
1998] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND LAND USE REGULATION 153
CITY: WICHITA, KANSAS; CENSUS TRACT# 78
Percent persons below poverty 41.4
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 15,065
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 14.1
Hispanic: white & other 3.2
Black (including Hispanic) 77.1
Asian & Pacific blander (including Hispanic) 4.8
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.7
Other:. non-Hispanic 0.1
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
B, Multi-Family Residential 2.52
GI. General Industrial 0.94
GO, General Office 0.78
C or GC, General Commercial 5.07
LI, Limited Industrial 5.58
MF-29, Multi-Family Residential 037
MH, Manufactured Housing 12.87
SF-6, Single-Family Residential 68.03
TF-3, Two-Family Residential 3.83

